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A B S T R A C T
This thesis examines and ultimately rejects the 
subjectivist critique of educational knowledge, according 
to which education is necessarily indoctrinatory because 
it cannot be based on objective knowledge.
In Part One discussion centres on the subjectivist 
claim that there can be no objective knowledge. It is 
argued in response to this claim that justified true belief 
constitutes objective knowledge. The notion of justification 
is then analysed as the survival of critical tests, a 
procedure which is made possible by criteria of rationality 
which are universally valid and can themselves be rationally 
justified.
Part Two investigates the methodological implications 
of the objectivist epistemology put forward in Part One.
The subjectivists claim that objectivism undermines the 
sociology of knowledge. In reply it is maintained that 
objectivism is compatible with the sociological investigation 
of knowledge and indeed widens its scope by permitting a 
critical approach.
Two intermediate conclusions have therefore been 
established: that there can be objective knowledge and that 
recognising that fact does not compromise the sociological 
investigation of institutions for transmitting it.
Accordingly, the way is open to examine in Part Three 
the specifically educational claim made by subjectivists, 
namely, that the methods and content of education are 
necessarily indoctrinatory and exploitative. This claim is 
rejected on the grounds that the curriculum, and the 
educational judgements based upon it, are potentially 
objective. The forms of knowledge provide an objective 
framework for the curriculum, because they can be transcend- 
entally deduced from the concept of rational action. The 
rational form of sensibility is the set of preconditions of 
acting for a reason; they give rise to the forms of knowledge, 
which constitute the preconditions of acting for a reason in 
the world as we know it.
It is concluded that only objectivism makes possible a 
critical attitude to knowledge and institutions and that 
subjectivism, if widely accepted, would lead to the 
subordination of reason to irrational forces.
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1.
INTRODUCTION
The central question of this thesis is whether 
knowledge and rationality carry within themselves the 
seeds of their own destruction. Some of those who set out 
in search of knowledge come to believe as a result of their 
inquiries that the object of their quest is not what they 
took it to be; seeking to discover the way the world 
actually is, they are led to conclude that all they can hope 
to find is a reflection of their own needs and interests; 
the grail is but a beaker. Similarly, some of those whose 
aim is to formulate the principles of rational thought and 
action are led by reason to deny that anything that is 
thought or done can be rationally justified; reasons are 
never reasons for belief or action but are mere epiphenomena, 
produced by but not producing events whose sole progenitor 
is the passions; the quest itself is just another power- 
struggle. The end of the endeavour to know and to be 
rational is that there can be no body of propositions which 
reveals the structure of reality and no laws of thought and 
conduct which are entitled to constrain the individual.
These sceptical arguments have a common and an ancient root 
in the subjectivism of Protagoras: 'man is the measure of all 
things - alike of the being of things that are and of the not- 
being of things that are not' and 'any given thing is to me
such as it appears to me and is to you such as it appears to
,1you
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A contemporary branch from this traditional root is 
the 'new sociology of education', or, in the terminology 
to be used throughout this thesis, 'the subjectivist 
critique of educational knowledge'. This title is 
preferred because not all sociologists share its 
characteristic views, some non-sociologists subscribe to 
them and its origins lie outside sociology. The 
subjectivist critique of education is based upon the alleged 
self-destructiveness of knowledge and rationality. It is 
claimed that sociology, as part of the quest for knowledge, 
as one mode of rational inquiry, shows the pretensions of 
knowledge and rationality to be false. Thus, it is 
maintained that the sociology of knowledge challenges
pobjectivism, which is defined as follows: 'The individual 
consciousness recognizes objects as being "out there", as 
coercive, external realities ..., Knowledge is thereby 
detached from the human subjectivity in which it is 
constituted, maintained and transformed.'^ And subjectivists 
take the view that 'the rules of logic .... are conventional, 
and will be shaped and selected in accordance with the purpose
/Lof the discourse.'
The main assumption on which subjectivism is based is, 
then, that scepticism about knowledge and rationality is 
implicit in the sociological investigation of their antecedents 
and effects. On this view, the sociology of knowledge is an 
essentially debunking inquiry: to show that knowledge and 
rationality are influenced by social conditions is to under­
mine the claims traditionally made on their behalf and with
3their authority. The reasons for this critical approach 
are not purely epistemological ones; political 
considerations are also important. The subjectivist claim 
is that those who defend knowledge and rationality 'treat 
Western academic standards as absolutes.'^ Accordingly, 
the sociology of knowledge is presented by subjectivists 
as 'subverting absolutism', which can be traced back to 
'the traditions of a centralized intellectual elite with
gclose links to those holding economic and political power.'
The political implications of subjectivism are made 
explicit in its critique of educational knowledge. By 
'educational knowledge' is meant (i) what teachers and 
examiners claim to know about pupils and candidates, and (ii) 
what is taught and learnt in schools. If there can be no 
knowledge, then a fortiori teachers and examiners cannot 
know what they claim to know and teaching can neither be nor 
in any way involve the transmission of knowledge. Instead, 
the judgments of teachers and examiners and even the school 
curriculum itself are, according to subjectivists, 
instruments of political control. Thus, it is argued that 
the 'imputation of normal attributes to pupils by teachers
does not tell us objectively about pupils ....  For the
teacher, social control may depend on his being able in the 
classroom to maintain publicly his definition of the 
situation. ' '  And the ways in which teachers classify pupils 
are claimed to have a wider social significance; according 
to Althusser, schools constitute an ideological state 
apparatus, whose function is 'the reproduction of the
4.
grelations of production, i.e. of capitalist exploitation.' 
Similarly, the curriculum, as traditionally conceived, forms 
part of what Friere calls the 'banking concept' of education, 
which, he contends, 'is well suited to the purposes of the 
oppressors, whose tranquility rests on how well men fit the 
world the oppressors have created, and how little they 
question it.'^
The main aim of this thesis is to rebut the subjectivist
critique of educational knowledge. Two preliminary comments
on the general standpoint from which this will be attempted
may be helpful. Firstly, the political outlook with which
subjectivism has recently been associated will receive no
direct attention. Moreover, it will not be contended that
the rejection of the subjectivist critique carries any very
specific political message. Of course it is true that
thinkers on the political right have been among its most
10notable critics. But Kolakowski, for instance, in the 
course of a reaffirmation of the social democratic idea, 
links the spiritual recession threatening affluent open 
societies to 'the world-wide degradation of educational 
systems', which he in turn traces to 'a lack of confidence 
among older generations in the intellectual and moral 
standards we inherited.' The philosophical questions 
about knowledge, sociology and education which are raised 
by the subjectivist critique will accordingly be considered 
on their own merits.
5Secondly, objectivism must be distinguished from 
absolutism: to defend the objectivity of knowledge is not 
to imply the absolute and unchangeable rectitude of all the 
criteria of knowledge and rationality currently in use, still 
less of all contemporary educational policies and practices.
Far from seeking to confer immutability upon the methods used 
to acquire and transmit knowledge, objectivism, as advocated 
in this thesis, aims at establishing conceptual connexions 
between knowledge and criticism. And to criticise a 
practice or an institution implies the possibility of changing 
it. Nevertheless, it will be argued that there are timelessly 
and universally applicable preconditions of rationality; 
certain things must be the case if rational intercourse with 
reality is to be possible. But to claim that there must be 
criteria of rationality is not to endorse the criteria in use. 
There are limits to what can count as rational inquiry, but 
these limits cannot be so tightly drawn that only one set of 
procedures can fall within them.
The argument of the thesis may now be foreshadowed.
The subjectivist critique of educational knowledge has a 
tripartite logical structure: there is the epistemological 
claim that there can be no objective knowledge; there is the 
methodological claim that objectivism is challenged by the 
sociology of knowledge; and there is the claim that the 
methods and content of education are instruments of domination. 
The thesis is accordingly divided into three parts.
6.
The subjectivists' epistemological claim will be 
examined, and ultimately rejected, in Part One. It will be 
interpreted as an attack upon the traditional analysis of 
knowledge as justified true belief and a defence of that 
analysis will be offered. The argument will be advanced 
that there can be objective knowledge in the sense of a body 
of propositions which have withstood critical tests and that 
survival of criticism amounts to justification. But the 
possibility of being justified in believing something is 
precisely what is challenged by the second of the subjectivists' 
epistemological arguments, that rationality, the process of 
giving reasons for doing and believing, 'self-destructs'.
Here subjectivism calls upon its allies, relativism and 
scepticism, to show that criteria of rationality (i) apply 
only to members of a particular social group and (ii) cannot 
themselves be rationally justified. In reply it will be 
maintained that there are some criteria of rationality, which, 
being indispensable to any rational intercourse with reality, 
are of universal applicability and can be rationally justified. 
This argument will occupy chapter three, the core of Part One; 
chapters four and five will offer accounts of ideas which will 
have been taken for granted in the development of an 
objectivist epistemology. The main conclusion of Part One 
will be that there can be objective knowledge.
The methodological implications of this conclusion will 
be examined in Part Two. The subjectivist claim is that 
objectivism is incompatible with the sociology of knowledge: 
knowledge is socially constructed rather than objective; all
7beliefs axe irrational or ideological; and objective 
knowledge about the social context of belief and action is 
impossible. In reply it will be contended that subjectivist 
fears that objectivism threatens the sociology of knowledge 
are groundless; objectivism neither undermines nor unduly 
restricts sociological inquiry; indeed, in one respect, it 
widens its scope.
The epistemological and methodological discussions of 
Parts One and Two are intended to lay the foundations for an 
examination of the subjectivists' educational claim, that 
criteria of pupil assessment and the curriculum are 
instruments of exploitation, in Part Three. Until it has 
been shown that there can be objective knowledge in general, 
the question whether there can be objective educational 
knowledge in particular cannot arise. And until it has been 
shown that sociological investigation is compatible with a 
recognition of the place of knowledge and rationality in 
human actions and institutions, it is impossible to evaluate 
the subjectivist claim that educational institutions cannot 
be saved by their concern with knowledge and reason from being 
modes of social domination.
Part Three will open with a consideration of the 
subjectivist argument that the categories and criteria used 
in assessing pupils are socially constructed. It will be 
agreed that there is a sense in which this is true: teachers' 
judgements about pupils' scholastic attainments and abilities 
express institutional, rather than brute, facts. Nevertheless,
8.
it will be maintained that such judgements can still 
express objective knowledge, as long as they are based 
upon an objective school curriculum. The forms of 
knowledge will be invoked as a curricular framework and 
a transcendental deduction of the forms will then be 
undertaken. The concept of acting for a reason will be 
shown to give rise to a set of preconditions of 
rationality, which constitute the rational form of 
sensibility. The forms of knowledge will then be 
derived from the rational form of sensibility; they state 
the indispensable preconditions of acting for a reason 
in the world as we know it.
In conclusion it will be held that the curriculum 
is potentially objective and so provides a foundation 
for objective educational judgements. Of course some 
actual educational judgements are false, ideological or 
irrational. But that does not entail that they must 
necessarily be so. For, it will be argued, a curriculum 
is possible which reflects, through the forms of 
knowledge, the preconditions of rational intercourse with 
reality. And such a curriculum permits the construction 
of an educational system based, not on the interests of a 
particular class, but on those of all rational beings.
9.
P A R T  O N E
THE SUBJECTIVIST CRITIQUE 01 OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE
INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE
The first part of the subjectivist attempt to unmask 
education can be construed as a critique of the 
objectivity of knowledge. The initial subjectivist claim 
is that knowledge is not objective but socially constructed, 
to which it will be replied that knowledge, as justified 
true belief, is objective precisely because it is socially 
constructed. Each component of the objectivist account of 
knowledge, according to which if someone believes that p, is 
justified in so believing and p is true then he knows that p, 
must be examined.
All beliefs, the subjectivist maintains, are ideological. 
In reply it will be contended that some beliefs belong to 
intellectual traditions, which embody criteria of rationality. 
Accordingly, a belief is ideological only if its putative 
justification departs from the appropriate criteria.
The fact that efforts to justify beliefs presuppose 
criteria of rationality provides a new target for subjectivist 
criticism: no one is ever justified in believing anything, 
because criteria of rationality are socially relative and 
impossible rationally to justify. Against this view it will 
be argued that some criteria of rationality are presupposed 
by any systematic intercourse with reality. Consequently, 
they can be justified and are not socially relative.
But the relation between belief and reality, posited by 
the previous reply, raises the question of truth. Denying
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that truth consists in the correspondence of thought to 
reality, the subjectivist asserts that it is no more than 
coherence with the beliefs of the dominant class or utility 
in serving their interests. In response it will be argued 
that truth must be defined as correspondence and that, while 
truth-criteria vary from one form of knowledge to another, 
those derived from the general idea of correspondence to 
reality are of crucial importance.
The correspondence theory of truth presupposes that 
thought and reality are distinct and mutually independent, 
an assumption challenged by the subjectivist, who claims 
that reality itself is mind-dependent. It will be replied 
that this contention is true, but only within the 
philosophical, not the empirical, form of knowledge, where 
it does not threaten the correspondence theory of truth.
The conclusion of Part One is, then, that the 
subjectivist critique of the objectivity of knowledge fails. 
Belief is not intrinsically ideological; the criteria of 
rationality used in justifying beliefs are indispensable; 
truth consists in the correspondence of thought to reality; 
and reality is mind-independent in the required sense. These 
statements support the conclusion that justified true belief 
is objective knowledge.
That conclusion will be used as the premise of further 
arguments concerning the methodological and educational 
implications of subjectivism.
12.
CHAPTER ONE : KNOWLEDGE
1.1 Introduction : Subjective and Objective Knowledge
The subjectivist claim that knowledge is not objective 
but socially constructed finds a notable proponent in 
Esland. The 1 objectivistic theory of knowledge' is 
presented by him in the following terms: 'The individual 
consciousness recognizes objects as being "out there", 
as coercive, external realities ....  Knowledge is there­
by detached from the human subjectivity in which it is 
constituted, maintained and transformed. Such a view 
implicitly presents man as a passive receiver, as the
1pliable, socialized embodiment of external facticities.' 
'Objectivism', he claims later, 'meant the transcending of 
socio-cultural influences and validation by universal
preason.' And he goes on to argue that 'the problems 
which are thought to reside in a "body" of knowledge and 
the rules for their effective solution or verification 
are themselves socially constructed.'^ The discussion 
in this chapter will focus on two important oppositions 
which underlie Esland's statements: (i) knowledge 
constituted in human subjectivity is contrasted with 
knowledge as a body of problems and solutions; (ii) the 
fact that the pursuit of knowledge is a social process 
is assumed to be at odds with its claim to be a rational 
one. These two dichotomies are aspects of a more 
general opposition between subjectivity and objectivity. 
Also apparent in Esland's claims is an association between
13
subjectivity and agency, on the one hand, and objectivity 
and passivity, on the other. In this section reasons will 
be given for accepting, and indeed insisting upon, the first 
distinction. In later sections it will be argued that the 
assumed conflict between the social nature of knowledge and 
its rationality, and the alleged affinities between 
subjectivity and agency and between objectivity and passivity, 
do not accurately reflect the procedures by which knowledge 
is attained.
The first distinction implicit in Esland's views, 
between knowledge constituted in human subjectivity and 
knowledge as a body of problems and solutions, is recognised 
by him only so that it can be denied. For it is clear that 
he regards the distinction between, let us say, subjective and 
objective knowledge as itself part of the objectivism he seeks 
to undermine. Objectivism is 'a reified philosophy in which 
objectivity is autonomized and which does not regard as 
problematical for the constituency of the object its 
constitution in the subjective experience of individuals.'^
It is therefore 'fundamentally dehumanizing'. But there is 
in fact a distinction between subjective and objective 
knowledge which arises naturally out of common observations 
concerning human actions and experiences. The antonyms on 
which the distinction depends are of course ambiguous. They 
may designate any of the following dichotomies: what belongs 
to consciousness and what belongs to the external world; the 
imaginary and the real; matters of personal preference and 
matters of fact; opinion or prejudice and conclusions based
14.
on an impartial survey of the evidence. But, properly 
defined, they mark a distinction which is essential to the 
understanding, not ¿just of knowledge, but of language and 
thought in general.
The distinction between subjective and objective 
knowledge is one aspect of a more general distinction 
between speech acts and mental states, on the one hand, and 
propositions, on the other. Searle^ introduces the concept 
of a speech act by drawing attention to sentences, such as 
'The President is sober today', which it is appropriate to 
utter only under certain aberrant conditions. It could 
appropriately be uttered if, for example, the President is, 
or is believed to be, an habitual drunkard. There would be 
no point in uttering it if he were always sober and it had 
never occurred to anyone to believe otherwise. In general 
it is pointless to assert of a standard situation just that 
it is standard, unless one has reason to believe that one's 
audience thinks it is aberrant. It follows that the truth 
of what is said is not always a sufficient reason for saying 
it. A more technical way of making exactly the same point 
is to say that the truth of a proposition is not always a 
sufficient reason for asserting it. And this insight 
presupposes a distinction between propositions and speech 
acts, or, in other words, between what is said and the saying 
of it. This distinction is the source of a series of 
ambiguities afflicting terms of cardinal importance in the 
theory of knowledge. 'Assertion', 'belief', 'knowledge', 
'statement' and 'thought' are all ambiguous between (i) what
15
is asserted, believed, known, stated or thought, that is, a 
proposition, and ^ii) the act or state of asserting, 
believing, knowing, stating or thinking. The significance 
of this distinction is twofold. First, it has important 
implications for the sociology of knowledge, which will be 
explored in chapter six. Second, and of more immediate 
interest, it is of considerable epistemological importance, 
for it shows that a major defence of the objectivity of 
knowledge is grounded in a generally recognised feature of 
language as a whole. The distinction between speech acts 
and propositions, that is to say, between the saying of 
something and what is said, underlies Popper's distinction 
between subjective or second-world knowledge, defined as a 
'state of being aware or informed', and objective or third- 
world knowledge, in the sense of a 'branch of learning; a 
science; an art.'^
It is clear that Esland's distinction between knowledge 
constituted in human subjectivity and knowledge as a body of 
problems and solutions is essentially the same as that drawn 
by Popper between subjective and objective knowledge. And it 
is equally plain that Esland wishes entirely to discard the 
notion of objective knowledge: an adequate epistemology could 
consist only of ascriptions of subjective knowledge, such as 
'S knows that p'. But, if the argument above is cogent, a full 
account of such ascriptions must include an explanation of what 
p, as distinct from what S's knowing that p, is; it must 
postulate propositions as well as speech acts. It is not 
suggested that this consideration is alone sufficient to
16.
refute the subjectivist account of knowledge, but only that it
indicates the form such a refutation may take. In the middle
sections of this chapter it will be argued that ascriptions
of subjective knowledge in formal, and specifically
educational, contexts, presuppose, not just the distinction
between what is said and the saying of it, but the existence
of objective knowledge, that is, of a body of propositions
with two essential characteristics. This idea of objective
knowledge departs from the classical Popperian concept, for
7reasons to be explained below/ by incorporating two 
conditions:
There is objective knowledge if there is a body of 
propositions
(i) which are true
and (ii) which it is rational to believe.
Before proceeding with the argument to show that subjective 
ascriptions of knowledge in formal situations presuppose 
objective knowledge in this sense, it is necessary to examine 
the second dimension of the subjectivity/objectivity dichotomy, 
which contrasts social influences and universal reason.
1.2 The Social Nature of Knowledge
According to subjectivism, as exemplified by Esland's remarks,
the pursuit of knowledge is beset by a conflict between social
influences and universal reason. There is a sense in which
8this claim is true. But it can be misleading, especially 
if taken together with the subjectivist association of
17
subjectivity with agency and objectivity with passivity.
It is perhaps the principal innovation of twentieth century 
epistemology that knowledge is social in nature and that its 
objectivity arises out of what people do in the public world 
rather than out of what happens to them in the privacy of 
the mental world. Thus, when Esland says that 'objectivity 
was thought to reside in the cognitive act of the individual 
who was endowed with an absolute capacity for rationality' 
he is in agreement with most contemporary philosophers. But, 
whereas he rejects the old definition of objectivity as part 
of a repudiation of objectivity as such, there are many 
philosophers who reject the traditional account in order to 
provide a new one. And indeed the main argument of this 
chapter is another statement of the modern interpretation of 
objectivity.
In traditional epistemology it was assumed that the 
question 'What is knowledge?' is synonymous with the question 
'What conditions must be satisfied before we are entitled to 
say that someone knows something ?'. The orthodox reply was 
a statement of the triune thesis that someone knows that p if 
and only if p is true, he believes that p and is Justified in 
so believing. This answer led to a search for criteria of 
Justification, such as sense-experience or self-evidence, 
which were held to be applicable to the individual knower.
It is this traditional approach which has been criticised by 
modern philosophers, notably Popper and Wittgenstein.
18.
Popper dismisses attempts to analyse the meaning 
of statements of the form 'S knows that p', on the grounds 
that such ascriptions of knowledge are irrelevant to the 
understanding of scientific knowledge, with which 
epistemology ought mainly to concern itself. The 
traditional interpretation of the question 'What is knowledge ?' 
is subjectivist in that it focuses attention on the mental 
state of the knowing subject. It thereby invites an 
authoritarian answer, that is, an answer that grounds 
knowledge in an ultimate criterion, such as sense-experience 
or self-evidence. S knows that p if and only if p can be 
derived by S from the approved authoritative source.
Popper's main criticism of this answer is that no such source, 
no such ultimate criterion, is defensible. But it is not 
just that he rejects the answer; the question itself is 
misguided in its concentration on the individual. A 
replacement for putative criteria of justification which 
apply directly to the individual is to be found by 
recognising the social nature of scientific inquiry, turning 
away from the lonely scholar subject to no constraint other 
than his own sense-experience or intellect, and looking 
instead at the procedures of the scientific community. If 
we then ask 'What is knowledge ?' we will be led to think 
of propositions rather than mental states. They can be 
criticised, tested and accepted or rejected by anyone who 
understands them. Propositions and the social activity of 
testing and criticism take the place of mental states and 
private reasoning.
10
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Wittgenstein's attack on traditional epistemology 
shares with Popper's the idea that knowing is a social 
activity. A private language was, he argued, an 
impossibility, for using words presupposes the existence 
of public rules. The epistemological corollary of this 
view is that knowing presupposes the possibility of error; 
unless it is possible for someone claiming to know something 
to be wrong, and for someone else to correct him, he cannot 
properly be said to know. And someone else can correct him 
only if there are publicly accepted rules or criteria for 
assessing claims to know. Thus, before we can ¿judge a 
claim to know, we must be conversant with the appropriate 
criteria of adjudication.
And so, according to both Popper and Wittgenstein, 
claiming to know is a social, rule-governed activity. The 
justification of a claim to know is never the tracing of an 
epistemological family tree, the discovery of a source, but 
rather the critical appraisal of the claim in terms of 
public, or objective, criteria. There is the prospect that 
social influences, albeit of a special sort, may support 
rather than undermine objectivity. And the association of 
objectivity with passivity is broken, for objective knowledge 
is not data descending on 'passive receivers' but the product 
of hard critical labour.
1.3 Knowledge and Justified True Belief
The characteristic tenets of traditional epistemology 
are not entirely to be discarded. One such belief is the
11
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triune thesis, alluded to in the previous section, that 
someone knows that p if and only if p is true, he believes 
that p and is justified in so believing. It will be 
maintained that, although it is not acceptable in that 
familiar form, which may also be expressed as the claim 
that knowledge is justified true belief, an alternative 
formulation is true. The version to be defended here is 
that justified true belief is knowledge.
It is natural to assume that 'Justified true belief 
is knowledge' is simply another way of saying 'Knowledge is 
justified true belief' ana that both of these statements 
are logically equivalent to the claim that someone knows 
that p if and only if p is true, he believes that p and is 
justified in so believing. But analysis reveals differences 
not just of style but of philosophical substance. As a 
statement of the conditions for subjective knowledge, 
'Justified true belief is knowledge' is not a mere re­
arrangement of 'Knowledge is justified true belief'. For 
if we have justified true belief then we necessarily have 
knowledge, while if we have knowledge then we do not 
necessarily have justified true belief, because we may have 
reliable true belief instead. A weak version of the 
familiar thesis is therefore acceptable: someone knows that 
p if p is true, he believes that p and is justified in so 
believing. The deletion of the customary 'and only if' is 
designed to recognise the fact that someone may know that p 
even though he cannot justify his nevertheless reliable 
belief that p.
2 1.
Some formal notation used by Griffin and Harton may
12help to clarify the matter. The epistemic terms 'knows' 
and 'believes' are symbolized by the two-place predicates 
'K' and 'B'; 'a' is an individual variable representing a 
knower or believer; 'p' is a propositional variable. Thus, 
'Bap' means 'a believes that p'. 'JaBap' is to be read as 
'a is justified in believing that p' and 'RaBap' as 'a 
reliably believes that p'. The strongest version of the 
traditional thesis, that someone knows that p if and only 
if p is true, he believes that p and is justified in so 
believing, can now be expressed as
(1) Kap ^  (p & Bap & JaBap) 
which is false, because
(2) Kap — > (p & Bap & JaBap) 
is also false. But
(3) (p & Bap & RaBap) Kap
is true. The version of the traditional thesis to be 
defended here is
(4-) (p & Bap & JaBap) — > Kap.
This is the thesis that justified true belief is knowledge.
The argument depends upon the assumption that, while 
justified true belief and reliable true belief are sub-species 
of knowledge, in that both (3) and (4-) are true, they are not 
merely different but mutually exclusive. What distinguishes
(4) from (3) is its reliance on the notion of objective 
knowledge. For we cannot make sense of the idea of 
justifying a belief except in terms of the admissibility of
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the proposition believed to the body of objective knowledge. 
What we say about an individual knower when we ascribe 
justified true belief to him cannot be understood without 
reference to what we say about a body of propositions when 
we confer upon it the status of objective knowledge. And 
so ascriptions of subjective knowledge as justified true 
belief differ from ascriptions of subjective knowledge as 
reliable true belief in incorporating objective knowledge.
For the same reason, justified true belief is epistemically 
preferable to reliable true belief.
The strongest statement of the relation between 
knowledge and justified true belief, namely, (1), will now 
be examined, with the intention of showing that it is false 
and that ($) and (4) are true. The distinct elements of (1) 
are not equally controversial. Indeed, in discussions of 
the claim that someone knows that p if and only if p is 
true, he believes that p and is justified in so believing, 
the first condition is seldom disputed. Perhaps this 
neglect is merely a symptom of the insularity of that debate, 
for it has been argued, in connexion with objective knowledge, 
that truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge.
Popper1^ breaks the link, contending that false, no less than 
true, propositions can be constituents of the body of 
knowledge. But this abrogation ought to be resisted, 
because we need to distinguish knowledge from justified 
belief. It has often been remarked that truth and
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rationality do not coincide, in the sense that it may he 
rational to believe what is in fact false. It is surely 
worth preserving this distinction, for an essential part of 
the meaning of 'true' is the idea that the mere fact that a 
proposition is believed, however Justifiably, does not 
guarantee its truth. So the truth condition stands.
The second component of the tripartite thesis, the
claim that someone's believing that p is a necessary
condition of his knowing that p, is more widely disputed.
Against the traditional view that knowledge is belief plus
something else, some philosophers maintain that knowledge
-15excludes rather than incorporates mere belief. ^ It is 
true that if someone (merely) believes that p then he does 
not know that p, but this entails only that knowing and 
believing are not identical, and is therefore consistent with 
the claim that believing that p is a necessary condition of 
knowing that p. But to dispose of a reason for denying a 
proposition is not to furnish a reason for asserting it.
In the present case such a reason is to be found in the fact 
that knowledge is sometimes attained through the Justification 
in public testing and debate of a hypothesis that was 
previously only believed by its begetter. Someone 
initially believes that p, submits p to criticism and 
testing and, if p withstands efforts to refute it, he is then 
Judged to know that p. To see knowledge, in the 
circumstances described, as belief plus something else is to 
do Justice to the way in which it is on those occasions 
achieved.
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It might be objected that this view of knowledge 
concentrates excessively on scientific inquiry, a formalised 
pursuit of knowledge which has little relevance to everyday 
uses of 'know'. Williams, for example, dismisses as mere 
prejudice the assumption that knowledge is belief plus quite 
a lot more, which he sees as the outcome of undue attention
to 'the examiner situation', characterised thus : ' ......
I know that p is true, this other man asserts that p is true, 
and I ask the question whether this other man really knows 
it or merely believes it.' In other words, the examiner 
checks the candidate's credentials for claiming to know what 
he, the examiner, already knows. The examiner situation 
shares with scientific inquiry a concern with objective 
knowledge, the difference being that scientific inquiry 
involves new contributions to the body of propositions, 
whereas the examiner situation has to do with its transmission. 
Both are formal situations and Williams may well be correct 
in thinking that there is a common, informal use of 'know' 
which has weaker conditions of application than 'believe'.
But this usage is of only peripheral interest in the analysis 
of knowledge in educational contexts: in the context of 
research, the use of 'knowledge' in scientific inquiry will 
be relevant, while in the context of teaching, the use of 
'know' in the examiner situation will be appropriate. So it 
seems reasonable to accept the belief condition as part of an 
account of knowledge in educational contexts.
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It might be thought that another reason for rejecting 
the belief condition arises out of the fact that a 
proposition p* could belong to the body of knowledge even 
though no one believed it. If p* were entailed by other 
propositions which were true and justifiably believed, it 
would be difficult to deny that p* constitutes objective 
knowledge. But perhaps no one notices the entailment and 
so no one believes that p*. In that case, it might be 
concluded that belief is not a necessary condition of 
knowledge. But this argument fails to take account of the 
distinction between subjective and objective knowledge.
The belief condition applies only to ascriptions of 
subjective knowledge; the argument under discussion does not 
undermine the claim that if S does not believe that p* then 
he does not know that p*. The oddity to which it draws 
attention is the fact that p* could constitute (objective) 
knowledge even though no one (subjectively) knew it. But 
the paradox is only apparent. It is simply that objective 
knowledge may contain a latent or potential element, 
arising from the fact that propositions can entail others 
but the entailments go unperceived. The belief condition 
can therefore be accepted.
The question now arises whether the two necessary 
conditions can be converted into a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions by the addition of a third. Should 
the believer be justified in believing what is true, does 
he thereby become a knower ? Discussion of this issue has
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concentrated on some alleged counter-examples, which are 
claimed to show that someone could he ¿justified in 
believing what is true in circumstances which would inhibit 
the verdict that he knows. Gettier^ has argued that the 
¿justification for S's belief that p may have nothing to do 
with the truth of p. This argument has been dismissed as 
redundant by Armstrong. If S knows that p on the basis 
of evidence, that evidence must be a proposition, q, which 
is also known to S. In Gettier's counter-examples, the 
justifiably believed grounds are false and so cannot be 
known; that they are also irrelevant to the truth of p is 
therefore beside the point. It is clear however that 
Armstrong has saved the idea of knowledge as ¿justified true 
belief only at the cost of importing a regress into the 
definition, for he accepts that if S knows that p on the 
basis of q, then S must also know that q and so on.
Having re;jected several reactions to the regress, 
Armstrong responds to it by propounding a reliability view, 
which he initially expounds in terms of non-inferential 
knowledge :
'A's non-inferential belief that p is non-inferential 
knowledge if, and only if :
(i) p is the case
(ii) There is some specification of A such 
that, if any person is so specified, 
then, if they further believe that p, 
then p is the case.' ^
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Armstrong later extends this analysis to inferential
knowledge, insisting that there is no difference between
20the two accounts. It is instructive to recast
Armstrong's conditions in the tripartite form characteristic 
of accounts of subjective knowledge :
A knows that p if, and only if:
(i) p is true
(ii) A believes that p
(iii) There is some specification of A such 
that, if any person is so specified, 
then, if he further believes that p, 
then p is true.
This new set of conditions derived from Armstrong's can be 
seen to differ from statements of the view that knowledge 
is justified true belief in substituting reliability for 
justification. But reliability is not a satisfactory 
surrogate for justification, although it does give rise to 
a sub-species of subjective knowledge. That is to say,
(5) Kap^> (p & Bap 8s RaBap) 
is no substitute for (1), but (3) is true. (5) is of 
course false, because (4) is true. Reliable true belief 
and justified true belief are two kinds of subjective 
knowledge.
The argument to establish this conclusion is based on
a counter-example, developed from one discussed by 
21Armstrong. Suppose that A has a brain defect such that
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whenever he experiences a visual stimulus of a certain sort 
he forms the belief that there is a sound in his environment. 
It so happens, quite accidentally, that visual stimuli of the 
appropriate sort coincide with the occurrence of sounds in 
A's environment. But the nature of the visual stimuli 
which cause A to believe that there is a sound in his 
environment varies unpredictably, so that it is impossible 
for A to establish a law-like connexion between visual stimuli 
of a particular kind and his believing that there is a sound 
in his environment. Indeed, it does not occur to A that 
anything is amiss; as far as he is concerned, there is a sound 
in his environment and that is all there is to it.
Before commenting on A's situation, it may be advisable 
to clear up a possible misunderstanding concerning the 
description of a belief as reliable, or, in Armstrong's 
phrase, 'empirically reliable'. It seems that empirical 
reliability is, for Armstrong, a descriptive rather than a 
normative notion, being the property of being true on repeated 
occasions, not just once by a fluke. In normal usage, to say 
that something is reliable is to commend it, and so a reliable 
belief is necessarily one that one would be justified in 
holding. In this sense, the reliability of a belief is not 
a natural relation between a belief-state and the situation 
which makes it true. Since Armstrong's account of knowledge 
is 'Externalist', in that 'what makes a true non-inferential 
belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which
holds between the belief-state, Bap, and the situation which
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makes it true', it is plain that he is not using 
'reliable' in its ordinary normative sense. The 
qualification 'empirically' may be intended to signify a 
purely descriptive use, though it could also be read as 'a 
reliable belief about an empirical matter'. In discussing 
the set of knowledge-conditions derived from Armstrong's, 
the purely descriptive usage, which means 'true on repeated 
occasions', will be adopted, though the ambiguous qualifier 
'empirically' will be dropped.
It is clear that A's belief that there is a sound in 
his environment is reliable in the sense specified for it is 
repeatedly true. But A cannot know that there is a sound 
in his environment, because his belief is reliable only by 
accident; it is true on repeated occasions, but only by 
virtue of a whole series of flukes. For the same reason 
the conditions derived from Armstrong's are not satisfied. 
The occurrence of a sound in his environment is not a 
necessary condition of A's believing that there is, and so 
we do not yet have a counter-example to the reliability 
view.
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But it is possible to construct one from the case 
discussed by Armstrong. Suppose there is a mad scientist 
who can predict when a sound is about to occur in A's 
environment and who contrives to bring it about that, on 
every such occasion, A experiences a visual stimulus which 
causes him to believe that there is a sound in his 
environment. A's brain defect is temporarily repaired by
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the scientist whenever a visual stimulus which would 
otherwise cause him to believe that there is a sound in 
his environment occurs at a time when there is in fact none. 
There being a sound in his environment is in these 
circumstances a necessary condition of A's believing that 
there is. His belief is therefore reliable by virtue of 
a law-like connexion between the visual stimuli which induce 
the belief and the sounds whose occurrence make it true.
It follows that, on the conditions derived from Armstrong's,
A knows that there is a sound in his environment. But does 
he really know this ?
Yes and no. A reason for saying yes is that he 
believes that there is a sound, his belief is true and it 
is not true merely by a fluke. To put it more generally, 
someone knows if he believes what is true and if what makes 
his belief true is connected in a law-like manner with what 
leads him to believe it. On the other hand, a reason for 
concluding that A does not know is that he is ignorant of 
this connexion and so cannot justify his belief. So A knows 
if 'know' means 'hold a reliable true belief' but not if 
'know' means 'hold a justified true belief'. How might 
these opposing views be defended ?
The adherent of the reliability view will take the 
anecdote as showing that knowledge is not justified true 
belief, since it is unreasonable to demand more of A than 
that his belief should be true and reliable: whenever there
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is a sound, in his environment he believes that there is 
and he does not hold this belief on any other occasion.
Of course A knows; it is just that he does not know how he 
knows. The case is no different in principle from that of 
Ayer's consistently successful forecaster of lottery results: 
'If his run of successes were sufficiently impressive, we 
might very well come to say that he knew which number would 
win, even though he did not reach this conclusion by any 
rational method, or indeed, by any method at all.'^
Similarly, the upholder of the reliability view might contend, 
the regularity of A's success in holding true beliefs about 
his auditory environment precludes accident or coincidence.
And so, when A says that there is a sound in his environment, 
we have to admit that he knows that there is.
This will not however convince the defender ox the
justifiability view, who will continue to maintain that A's
success is, as far as A himself is concerned, an accident.
As for the lottery man, Ayer's own verdict will be cited :
'Not everyone would regard a successful run of predictions,
however long sustained, as being by itself a sufficient backing
for a claim to knowledge. And here there can be no question
24of proving that this attitude is mistaken.' On the 
justifiability view, A, far from being in possession of 
knowledge, is the victim of deception, the butt of an 
elaborate practical joke played upon him by a mad scientist, 
who has manipulated him rather than informed him of something.
A has been duped; he has not discovered a fact about his 
environment.
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Rather than try to make a straight choice between these 
conflicting views, it seems more helpful to build upon a 
conclusion shared by both disputants. The common 
conclusion is that A cannot justify his belief that there 
is a sound in his environment. One side takes this as a 
reason for denying that he knows, the other as a reason for 
rejecting the definition of knowledge as justified true 
belief as being too stringent. A sequel to the counter­
example endorses this shared view, by showing what would 
have to happen before A can justify his belief. During a 
medical examination for severe headaches, A's brain defect 
is discovered and he is told about it. A uncovers the 
activities of the scientist, by observing his work and 
collecting evidence that whenever there is a sound in his 
environment - this being corroborated by B, whose brain is 
free from defect - the evil genius causes him, A, to believe 
that there is. A can now justify his belief by putting 
forward the hypothesis that a mad scientist is interfering 
with his brain. Should this hypothesis be tested and 
remain unfalsified, it would be reasonable to conclude that 
A knows that there is a sound in his environment, in that
histhere is a sound in^environment, he believes that there is 
and he is justified in so believing.
It is clear then that reliable true belief is not the 
same as justified true belief. Nothing is gained by 
responding to this difference by restricting the term
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'knowledge' to just one of these sorts of belief. This 
would be a quite arbitrary stipulation. In more formal 
terms, both
(1) Kap (p & Bap & JaBap)
and
(5) Kap > (p & Bap & RaBap)
are false. We should instead recognise that there are two
sub-species of subjective knowledge, or, more formally, that
both (p & Bap & RaBap) Kap
and (p & Bap & JaBap) - * Kap
are true. The next stage of the argument is to try to
show that justified true belief is not merely different 
from reliable true belief but epistemically preferable to 
it.
1.4 The Epistemic Preferability of Justified True Belief.
It might be objected that, even if successful, the 
argument presented above as a defence of a version of the 
thesis that knowledge is justified true belief cannot be 
more than a pyrrhic victory, for it has been admitted that 
reliable true belief is also subjective knowledge, which 
it has been a main purpose of most defenders of the 
traditional thesis to deny. Is the verification of (4), 
balanced against that of (3) and the consequent 
falsification of (1), to count as success or failure 7 
Perhaps we can no more answer that question than we can say 
whether a glass of water is half-empty or half-full. But
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it seems possible to tip the scales towards the 
traditional thesis by showing that justified true belief 
is epistemically preferable to reliable true belief.
To say that justified true belief is epistemically 
preferable to reliable true belief means that only the 
former can be the subject of rational argument. A useful 
distinction here is that drawn by Reichenbach^ between 
the context of discovery, in which occurs the process of 
thought by which a new hypothesis is actually arrived at, 
and the context of justification, in which the hypothesis 
is presented to public scrutiny. The actual process of 
discovery may contain invalid steps and unwarranted 
assumptions, but in the context of justification we are
26given 'a logical substitute rather than real processes1, 
something which purports to be a valid argument for the 
hypothesis rather than an historical account of how it was 
in fact discovered. It is clear that reliable true belief, 
as exemplified by the lottery forecaster and A before his 
detective work, cannot be rationally reconstructed to take 
its place in the context of justification. It is not that 
their processes of discovery resist translation into that 
context; there are no processes to be translated. A simply 
finds himself believing that there is a sound in his 
environment, while it just occurs to the lottery forecaster 
that 12 will win. They issue pronouncements which cannot 
be submitted to public criticism, because they are isolated 
statements without a supporting theory. In Popperian terms,
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they resemble the practitioners of 'revealed science', 
who produce 'a result, which, though in agreement with some
scientific results, is not the product of scientific method.'
But why, it might be asked, can A and the lottery man 
not cite their past records in justification of their 
present claims ? Why should we not reinstate the 
commendatory implications of 'reliable' in its normal 
usage, closing the gap between the reliability and the
justification of beliefs ? It is helpful to consider the
28rocking-horse winner, whose case is similar to those of A 
and the lottery man, for he is a boy who, after riding his 
rocking-horse, is able to say which horse will win the next 
race. His predictions are consistently accurate but 
inexplicable. Why not say that his regular success in the 
past justifies his belief - which turns out to be true - 
that Gringolet will win the 3.30 ? It will not do to reply 
that, apart from the usual difficulties over justifying 
induction, some betting men would act on counter-inductive 
principles. But at least this answer shows that the rocking- 
horse winner's appeal to his record is unlike that of a 
forecaster who studies form. Although, unlike the lottery 
man, who has no method at all, he does follow a procedure, 
it is not a rational one. If asked how he arrives at his 
predictions, he can only reply that he rides his rocking- 
horse, whereas the rational punter can explain that 
Gringolet has stamina, prefers soft going and is to be
27
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ridden by the champion jockey. The point is that some­
body else could check the rational punter's calculations; 
he could go through the same sort of procedure and 
compare results; in the event of disagreement, it would 
in principle be possible to settle the matter by rational 
argument. Nothing like this can be done in the case of 
the rocking-horse winner; it is most unlikely that anyone 
else who rode the rocking-horse would find himself with a 
prediction to make; even if he did and his forecast 
differed from the boy's, there could be no question of 
settling the dispute by rational argument. For there is 
no right or wrong way of predicting racing results by 
riding a rocking-horse, whereas there are right and wrong 
ways of doing so by inductive reasoning. A putative 
justification based on past success, where that success is 
the outcome either of no method at all or of an 
inexplicable one, is no substitute for the appraisal of 
arguments. Lacking an argument for appraisal, lacking a 
procedure which others can replicate, the rocking-horse 
winner would be unable to get his claims to know accepted 
as a contribution to objective knowledge. While we must 
admit that he subjectively knows, in the sense that he 
holds a reliable true belief, it must be insisted that what 
he knows does not constitute objective knowledge. For 
objective knowledge presupposes the presentation of an 
argument for public criticism in the context of justification.
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1.5 Knowledge in Formal Situations
The main aim of this section is to show that 
justified true belief is the correct analysis of 
knowledge in formal situations, including educational 
ones. In order to do this it is necessary to clarify 
the nature of justification. This issue raises a major 
philosophical problem, the criterion problem, which 
requires a chapter to itself (chapter three). All that 
is needed at this stage is an elucidation of the idea of 
public testing and criticism in the context of 
justification.
Justification should be understood as a procedure 
for choosing rationally amongst the many beliefs which 
compete for our allegiance. This has traditionally been 
taken to imply that justifying a belief consists in 
deriving it from the fundamental criterion of rationality. 
While this is in principle possible, it is not in practice 
what people, in trying to justify beliefs, do. For the 
fundamental criteria are so general that two incompatible 
beliefs may both be in accordance with them. Thus, a 
fundamental criterion of rationality in the historical and 
social scientific (or 'other minds') form of knowledge is 
that there are conscious beings other than oneself. But 
it is impossible to settle disputes about the causes of the 
Industrial Revolution, the changes in living standards it 
brought about or the effects of affluence on class
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consciousness by showing that only one of the set of 
conflicting beliefs on each of these questions can be 
derived from the other minds assumption. And so 
justification is better understood as failed criticism.
We criticise a belief because it is one of several 
competing for our allegiance. And if we try to criticise 
a belief and fail, then we have justified our acceptance of 
it, if only until a more stringent critical test has been 
devised. To justify a belief is unsuccessfully to criticise 
it. The definition of objective knowledge offered above^ 
can now be amended thus :
There is objective knowledge if there is a body of 
propositions
which are true
and which have survived the best 
available critical tests.
The claim that justified true belief is subjective knowledge, 
symbolized as (4-), can accordingly be stated as follows :
If p is true
A believes that p
and p has survived submission by A to the best
available critical tests
then A knows that p.
This definition recognises the fact that ascriptions 
of subjective knowledge as justified true belief presuppose 
objective knowledge and hence the existence of public criteria 
to be used in the process of justification by failed criticism.
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It thereby acknowledges the social nature of knowledge, for
a procedure can count as criticism only if it can be
replicated by someone other than the original knowledge-
claimant. The social nature of knowledge has also been
3 0  .pointed out by W a l s h , m  connexion with Ayer's account of 
knowing as having the right to be sure. His suggestion is 
that the notion of a right is a social one, implying the 
existence of an authority qualified to confer the right in 
accordance with the rules for adjudicating such cases. The 
concept of a claim is similarly social: one cannot be said to 
have a claim unless there is an institution, comprising an 
authority to dispense decisions about the granting or refusal 
of claims and rules for the authority's guidance. In the 
case of scientific knowledge, the institution is an open one, 
with the claimant's peers constituting the authority. What 
has to be decided is whether the proposition which A claims 
to know should be accepted as a member of the body of 
knowledge. Attention is focused on the proposition rather 
than on A, and it is just this aspect of objective knowledge 
that is captured by the idea of justification as the survival 
of criticism.
It might be objected that knowledge has in effect been 
admitted to be socially relative rather than objective, in 
that what is known is merely what the appropriate authority 
says is known. But this is to misunderstand the social 
nature of knowledge. What is being asserted is that the 
authority's verdict is a necessary but not a sufficient
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condition of knowledge. Unless a proposition has been
submitted to critical tests and has been admitted by the
authority to have survived them, it cannot be said to
constitute objective knowledge. But the authority itself
may err (and, when it is an informal group of practitioners
of a discipline, may of course be divided against itself), ana
so its decision is not a sufficient condition of knowledge.
Indeed, this is just the point of preserving the truth condition
-51in the definition of objective knowledge•. distinguishing 
knowledge from justified belief by means of truth entails that 
the authority's approval is not a sufficient condition of 
knowledge. Recognising the social nature of justification while 
retaining the truth condition shows that knowledge is socially 
constructed without being socially relative.
The rest of this section will be devoted to an attempt to 
show that justified true belief is the correct analysis of 
subjective knowledge in formal situations, to which educational 
contexts belong. It is helpful to begin by considering informal 
circumstances, in which the plausibility of analysing knowledge 
as justified true belief is much reduced. Saying 'I know....' 
does not always count as claiming to know, for one may 
instead be admitting knowledge or pointing out the super­
fluity of one's would-be informant's statement. Suppose 
R says 'It's raining' and S replies 'I know'. It is 
conceivable that S might be challenged and, if so, he must 
be able to offer some sort of justification. But it need
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not be anything very sophisticated: 'I've just seen T 
come in soaking wet' would do. S need not have considered 
other possible explanations of T's wetness and found that 
only 'It's raining' survives the critical tests. But even 
here such alternatives are available and there is a 
theoretical background to S's unconsidered utterance. It 
is simply that the theory is so uncontroversial that it can 
be assumed to be common ground. Of course R might say 
'But T and I have played a practical joke on you; the sun is 
shining and I turned the hose on him'. So there is an 
exception to the rule that when someone comes in soaking wet 
it means it is raining. But the need for justification will 
normally stop there; S would not usually be called upon to 
justify his assumption that if someone goes out unprotected 
in the rain he will get wet. And so it seems pretentious 
to analyse this case as one of justified true belief.
In contrast, the paradigm case of a claim to know occurs 
in a formal or structured situation, in which knowledge is 
most perspicuously analysed as justified true belief. The 
main distinguishing feature of such cases, in which someone 
is putting forward a proposition as a candidate for admission 
to the body of knowledge, is theoretical explicitness. What 
is to be judged is not a single proposition in isolation from 
all others but a proposition complete with its supporting 
theory. The would-be knower is called upon to justify his 
claim that p be admitted to the body of knowledge by showing
4-2 .
that it has survived the best available critical tests in 
better shape than its rivals. And this cannot be done 
unless there is a general theory in the background. This 
approach is typical of claims to knowledge made during 
academic disputes, legal proceedings, various sorts of 
official and semi-official inquiries and political and 
religious controversies. In these formal circumstances, 
the theoretical background is open to question just as much 
as the individual proposition.
Another feature of these formal situations is the fact 
that, if p is to be known, there must be at least one other 
proposition which answers the question answered by p. Other­
wise, it would be an empty procedure to choose the 
proposition which best withstands criticism. There is a 
Popperian and a Wittgensteinian way of taking this requirement. 
In Popperian terms, it demonstrates the necessity for public 
debate, as shown by the case of the rocking-horse winner. 
Although, after the race, we can discuss whether his 
prediction was falsified, we cannot discuss how he got it 
right or where he went wrong, for there are no procedures which 
can be replicated and there is no supporting theory. In 
Wittgensteinian terms, the requirement shows that knowing 
presupposes the possibility of error. Or, more precisely, 
it shows that claiming to know presupposes the possibility of 
error. And perhaps this is the view which ought to be 
attributed to Wittgenstein. When someone says 'Of course I
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know how I feel', the proper philosophical comment is that 
his utterance is not a claim to know. If it is impossible 
for anyone else to show that he was mistaken, then it is 
impossible to withhold agreement. And if it is impossible 
to withhold something, then it is inappropriate to claim it. 
And so a claim to know that p presupposes that p could be 
falsified by someone other than the claimant. Thus, 
Wittgenstein's point is true, not of knowing as such, but of 
claiming to know. And it seems reasonable to read the 
relevant part of Philosophical Investigations^  as implying 
precisely that uses of 'know' which do not admit of public 
checking are not to be understood as claims to know.
People make claims to knowledge outside the formal 
situations which have been discussed. And it might be 
objected that the account of justification as failed 
criticism is excessively elaborate for such cases and is 
therefore of limited application. Moreover, it might be 
said, the analysis of claims to know should reflect the fact 
that they are made in a range of situations of different 
degrees of formality. But, while it is true that it would 
be asking too much of the ordinary knowledge-claimant that 
he should have subjected p to a battery of critical tests, 
it remains essential that he should be able to perform such 
tests if called upon to do so. Suppose A says that he saw 
a great spotted woodpecker in the copse this morning and B 
asks him if he is sure that it was not the lesser spotted 
woodpecker that he, B, saw there yesterday. A replies that
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he knows that it was the great spotted variety and explains 
that it was the size of a thrush and had the diagnostic red 
abdomen. So even in this informal context A acts on the 
assumption that to know is ¿justifiably to believe what is 
true and that to justify a belief is to consider alternatives 
and accept the unfalsified one. For he has already, even if 
only subliminally, ruled out possible identifications of the 
bird he saw as a blackbird or a starling. Perhaps at first 
he thought it was a starling, when he glimpsed it contre ¿jour 
through branches. But, when seen clearly, its plumage was 
mainly black and white with two bits of red, and so a critical 
test rules out one alternative. A did not consider eagles 
and seagulls, nor did wrens and chiffchaffs cross his mind, 
but he must be able to eliminate these species if asked to do 
so. People are not computers; we do not sort serially 
through all the species of British birds, comparing the bird 
we saw with each picture in Birds of Britain and Europe; but 
we must be able to go through this data-processing procedure 
if we have to. Justification, therefore, is failed criticism 
even in these relatively informal circumstances. It is 
probable that all claims to knowledge involve ¿justification in 
this sense, along a continuum of increasing formality.
i.6 Summary
In reply to the subjectivist claim that knowledge is not 
objective but socially constructed, it has been argued that it 
is both. Ascriptions of subjective knowledge have been found
to fall into two categories: those ascribing ¿justified, 
true belief and those ascribing reliable true belief. 
Ascriptions of subjective knowledge as justified true belief 
can only be understood in terms of the admission of a 
proposition to the body of objective knowledge. And for 
that reason justified true belief is epistemically 
preferable to reliable true belief, for only the former 
admits of rational discussion. This is a social activity, 
in which propositions are submitted to critical tests, and 
so the result is both objective, as a body of propositions, 
and socially constructed. This analysis applies to all 
claims to knowledge and is particularly appropriate to the 
theoretically explicit justification characteristic of formal 
contexts.
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CHAPTER TWO. BELIEF
5.1 Introduction : Belief and Ideology
In replying to the subjectivist claim that knowledge is 
not objective but socially constructed, it was argued, in 
chapter one, that some ascriptions of subjective knowledge are 
ascriptions of justified true belief. This means that if 
someone believes that p, is justified in so believing and p 
is true then he knows that p. Thus, knowledge is in some 
circumstances to be analysed as the satisfaction of three 
conditions. It is therefore natural that arguments to under­
mine the objectivity of knowledge are sometimes addressed 
immediately to belief and only indirectly to knowledge. The 
account of knowledge defended in chapter one is an amended 
version of the traditional thesis that knowledge is justified 
true belief. And that thesis is at the very least a 
recognition of a series of undeniable conceptual relations 
between knowledge, belief, justification or rationality, and 
truth. Accordingly, there exist subjectivist arguments 
intended to show that belief, justification and truth are not 
objective but socially constructed. It is helpful to see 
these arguments as stages in a continuing debate, in which 
the objectivist replies to one subjectivist claim only to find 
that he has presupposed or relied upon another component of 
justified true belief and has thereby invited a new subjectivist 
challenge. This procedure is in a sense artificial, though 
not misleadingly so. It is not suggested that any one thinker 
has put forward all of the subjectivist arguments to be 
considered, though there is every reason to believe that some 
writers would be prepared to do so. It is simply that most
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writers who deny the objectivity of knowledge do so, quite 
naturally, by concentrating on one particular issue, such 
as truth or criteria of rationality. So, while the 
subjectivist critique of justified true belief is a 
construction, its constituent parts are real enough. All 
that has been done is to integrate the various subjectivist 
claims, and the corresponding objectivist replies, into a 
single, developing argument.
The subject of this chapter is, then, the nature of 
belief; in subsequent chapters the issues to be discussed 
are what it is for a belief to be justified (or, more 
perspicuously, what it is for someone to be justified in 
holding a belief) and what it is for a belief to be true.
The subjectivist claim is that all belief is ideological.
Helm, for example, maintains that 'human thought is ......
constrained by the conceptual limitations of the prevailing 
ideology.' The assumption that lies behind such a claim 
is that rational belief requires that we can have grounds 
for accepting or rejecting a belief which are independent of 
any theory. For a theory incorporates assumptions about 
what questions are worth asking, definitions of crucial 
terms, methodological principles and so on, of some of which 
we may be unaware. Blackburn explains that some of his
contributors believe that 'ideology is ......  defined by ....
those assumptions of which the theorist is least aware and
pabout which he is least explicit.' Consequently, such
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assumptions are likely to be the irrational responses of 
people, as members of a pa rticular social group, to 
features of the social structure. So social pressures 
engender ideological prejudices, which condition theories, 
which influence in turn the acceptance or rejection of 
beliefs. As an example of the intellectual deadlock to 
which ideological beliefs can lead, Montefiore refers to 
the problem of how to describe a strike in a capitalist 
economy: 'If a Marxist formulates his description in terms 
of class struggle and so on, the "liberal" will protest at 
the intrusion of unnecessary and tendentious theorizing; 
for the Marxist, the liberal's own more "straightforwardly 
factual" account could be equally tendentious in what it 
left out.'^ Montefiore's diagnosis of the trouble is 
similar to Helm's: descriptions presupposes a theoretical 
framework, which incorporates a response to social 
conditions: 'in this instance, where one description assumes 
the absence and the other the existence of some fundamental 
conflict of interests, the choice of terms may willy-nilly 
commit one to an at least indirect support of or opposition
tLto one side or the other.' Moreover, according to some 
thinkers, to deny that choice between beliefs presupposes a 
theoretical background is itself ideological: 'the very 
notion that social research can be conducted other than on 
the basis of the prior development of concepts and theories 
is held to be ideological.'^
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But why should it be thought that the fact, if it is a 
fact, that beliefs presuppose theories entails that beliefs 
are ineluctably ideological ? What is it about theories 
that makes their implicit presence incompatible with rational 
choice between beliefs ? The answer lies in the notion of a
gparadigm, which was introduced by Kuhn. Its influence is
apparent in Helm's claim that 'the paradigms within which
scientific problem-solving techniques are utilized are them-
7selves conditioned by conceptual limitations of societies.'
The significance of paradigms is that they preclude the 
construction of a theory-neutral language, that is, a language 
'consisting entirely of words which are attached to nature in 
ways that are unproblematic, and, to the extent necessary,
Qindependent of theory.' Without such a language, the 
subjectivist contends, it is impossible to make a rational 
choice between competing theories. Given that beliefs 
presuppose theories, it follows that it is impossible to make 
rational choices between beliefs. It is clear that a critical 
examination of the concept of a paradign is essential if the 
claim that belief is necessarily ideological is fruitfully to 
be discussed.
$.2 Paradigms and Ostensive Definition
Two arguments will be put forward against the claim that 
paradigms render theories incommensurable and hence beliefs 
ideological. The first concerns ostensive definition and the 
second forms of knowledge.
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The term 'paradigm' is ambiguous. One commentator 
distinguishes three senses: (i) 'exemplary instances of 
past scientific achievement that continue to serve as 
models for current practitioners'; (ii) 'the choice of 
problems and the set of techniques for analyzing them';
(iii) 'a general metaphysical world outlook'.^ But Kuhn's 
use of the word 'paradigm' is not as capricious as its 
ambiguity may suggest, for there is a common characteristic 
underlying the different senses. This is the idea that 
paradigms can only be learnt ostensively. The connexion 
between paradigms and ostensive learning emerges in Kuhn's 
critique of Popper's advocacy of Tarski's semantic 
conception of truth.
Kuhn's argument is that theories cannot be compared 
to discover which most closely approximates to the truth, 
because that procedure presupposes the existence of a theory- 
neutral language and the fact that some of each theory's 
terms can only be ostensively learnt precludes the 
possibility of constructing such a language. According to 
Kuhn, Popper 'takes it for granted that proponents of 
competing theories do share a neutral language adequate to
the comparison of .....  observation reports. I am about to
argue that they do not. If I am right, then "truth” may,
iOlike "proof", be a term with only intratheoretic applications.'
In support of his claim about the intra-theoretic nature of 
truth, Kuhn cites Quine's contention that translation is 
always problematic and on occasions impossible because the
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definition of words in terms of other words presupposes
that 'we already possess some vocabulary acquired by a
■1 inon-verbal or incompletely verbal process.' Just as
ostensivo learning is an impediment in the translation of
languages, so, Kuhn claims, it is an obstacle to the
comparison of theories. And the significance of paradigms
is precisely that they register the role of ostensivo
learning in rendering theories incommensurable. 'When I
speak of knowledge embedded in terms and phrases learned
by some non-linguistic process like ostensión, I am making
the same point that my book aimed to make by repeated
reference to the role of paradigms as concrete problem
12solutions, the exemplary objects of an ostensión.' Thus, 
Kuhn regards ostensive learning as the source of the 
paradigms which prevent the construction of a theory-neutral 
language. The premise on which his argument is based 
appears to be that, if understanding a theory were entirely 
a matter of understanding words defined in terms of other 
words, a neutral language could be formulated and theories 
compared. In such a language all the words of theory A 
could be translated by words from theory B and vice versa.
But, the argument continues, the fact that some words are 
learnt ostensively entails that understanding a theory is 
not entirely a matter of understanding words defined in 
terms of other words. For words which are learnt ostensively 
cannot be defined solely in terms of other words. And so
those words of theory A which are learnt ostensively cannot
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be translated into words from theory B, and vice versa.
The conclusion is drawn that theories A and B are not inter- 
translatable and do not therefore refer to a common reality 
against which they could be compared to discover which more 
closely approximates to the truth.
The main weakness in Kuhn's argument is the assumption 
that all words are either definable in terms of other words 
or can only be learnt ostensively. On the contrary, it is 
common for a word to be both definable in terms of other 
words and susceptible of ostensive learning. Moreover, 
those words which can only be learnt ostensively, such as 
colour words, can nevertheless be translated into other 
languages, although not without difficulty. Some American 
Indians, for example, had only two colours where we have 
three; instead of distinguishing yellow, green and blue, 
they talked of 'spring leaf colour' and 'deep water colour'. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the truth is rather the reverse 
of what Kuhn claims: the fact that some words are learnt 
ostensively is the basis, rather than the ruin, of 
translation. For, if the words of theory A could only be 
defined in terms of other words of theory A, and if the same 
were true of the words of theory B, then it is indeed 
difficult to see how a theory-neutral language could be 
constructed. The prospect of devising such a language 
exists only if it assumed that some words of both theories 
can be learnt ostensively.
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This line of thought suggests an alternative argument 
for Kuhn's conclusion. For it has been argued, notably by 
Wittgenstein, that ostensive learning is rather more 
problematic than traditionally supposed.^ The essential
point is that if someone is to learn what 'blue' means by 
his teacher's pointing to a blue object and uttering the 
word, he must have the theoretical background to enable him 
to realise that it is the colour of the object which is being 
defined for him, and not its shape, size, number, texture or 
spatial location. So it is not, as Kuhn thought, that 
ostensive learning undermines the possibility of a theory- 
neutral language. It is rather that ostensive learning could 
provide the foundation for such a language, if only it was as 
self-explanatory as philosophers had been accustomed to 
believe. But it is not. And so we need to know the theory 
before we can grasp the meaning of those of its words which 
can only be learnt ostensively. And if we cannot understand 
the ostensively learnt words of theory A until we have under­
stood the rest of the theory, then, if the same is true of 
theory B, then there cannot be any words with which to 
construct a theory-neutral language.
It is important to distinguish the general argument that 
ostensive learning presupposes a grasp of underlying 
linguistic principles from its particular application in 
support of the alleged incommensurability of theories. For 
it will be contended that, while the general argument may well 
be valid, the incommensurability argument is incoherent. An
understanding of why this is so leads to the conclusion 
that an adequate theory of knowledge must accommodate, 
not only beliefs and theories, but also disciplines, or 
forms, of knowledge.
2.3 Paradigms and Forms of Knowledge
The source of the general argument for the theory-
dependence of ostensive learning is Wittgenstein's The Blue
and Brown Books, where he invites us to consider an attempt
to 'explain the word "tove" by pointing to a pencil and
14-saying "this is tove".' The definition could be taken
to mean any one of several things: that this is a pencil, 
that it is round, wood, one, hard and so on. The learner 
can identify the intended meaning only if he already has 
the necessary background knowledge of how language is used: 
'understanding a sentence means understanding a language.'  ^
This may well be true; certainly, we do not acquire concepts 
separately, as is shown by the fact that we cannot know what 
yellow is without knowing what colour is and we cannot know 
what colour is in general without knowing what at least one 
particular colour is. But, if this is so, all that has been 
established is that we cannot ostensively learn a word in 
language L unless we already apprehend some general 
principles of L. And that is far from showing that we 
cannot ostensively learn a word in theory A unless we already 
apprehend the general principles of A.
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The transformation of the general argument into an
incommensurability argument can be effected by another
Wittgensteinian idea, that of a form of life. The claim
is that language games, including theories, are embedded in
forms of life, so that the ostensive learning of a word in
the language game presupposes an understanding of its
characteristic principles, which can be secured only through
participating in the appropriate form of life. This
application of the general argument assumes that forms of
life are socially variable, an assumption which is commonly
*16made but highly controversial. It receives support from
some of Wittgenstein's remarks: for example, having 
envisaged a 'language consisting only of orders and reports 
in battle', he comments that 'to imagine a language means to 
imagine a form of life.'^ But on other occasions he seems 
to have in mind a universally and distinctively human form of 
life: thus, arguing that it is human agreement that underlies 
the concepts of truth and falsity, he adds that this 'is not 
agreement in opinions but in form of life.' The textual
evidence for the authenticity of the interpretation of forms 
of life is therefore incomplete. But, even if it is based on 
a misinterpretation of forms of life, the 'new' 
incommensurability argument may still be valid.
The argument is that beliefs are ideological because 
theories are incommensurable. Theories are incommensurable 
because a theory-neutral language in which they could be 
compared as approximations to the truth cannot b;e constructed. 
No such language can be constructed because there are no
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words which can be learnt independently of understanding a 
theory. And there are no such ostensively learnable words 
because learning- presupposes an understanding of Lhe 
characteristic principles of the theory to which they belong 
and the form of life in which the theory is embedded. It 
will now be contended that this argument is incoherent.
The claim that theories are incommensurable is 
intelligible only if it is false. Upholders of the 
incommensurability argument take it for granted that we know 
when it is a problem that theories are (they allege) 
incommensurable. So we do, but only because the theories 
are commensurable. There are many incommensurable theories: 
the theory of phlogiston is incommensurable with Keynesianism, 
Darwin's theory of evolution with Suclidean geometry, the 
ontological argument with Romanticism, and so on. But none 
of these incommensurable pairs presents a rational inquirer 
with a dilemma. There is no reason to try to compare any of 
these pairs of theories, so the fact that they are 
incommensurable does not matter. That the alleged 
incommensurability of two theories is perceived as problematic 
presupposes that they have something in common. But what ?
Perhaps it is enough that the two theories belong to 
the same academic subject. If the suggestion is simply that 
a sufficient condition of the commensurability of theories is 
that they concern the same subject-matter, it must be 
rejected. For we do not differentiate subjects solely on
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the basis of their subject-matter. Physical geography 
differs from geology, or physics from chemistry, mainly 
on the basis of their different objects of inquiry; it is 
customary to see each of these subjects as the scientific 
study of a different aspect of the world. But if this 
were the only criterion of demarcation, it would be 
impossible to differentiate subjects as we do. Nobody 
takes Kant's famous remark about the starry heavens as a 
contribution to astronomy arrived at in accordance with an 
idiosyncratic paradigm. 7 And many poems have been 
written about meteorological, geographical and astronomical 
subjects without being mistaken for scientific treatises.
Yet we would be liable to commit that confusion if we relied 
exclusively on subject-matter in organising knowledge into 
academic subjects. So there must be some other means of 
distinguishing one subject from another.
A set of criteria which is adequate to this task is to
be found by recalling that academic subjects belong to
disciplines or forms of knowledge. It is not just that
objects of inquiry differentiate knowledge into subjects;
it is also that 'the major forms, or disciplines, can each
be distinguished by their dependence on some particular test
20against experience for their distinctive expressions.'
Four related distinguishing features of the forms of 
knowledge are set out by Hirst: each form has its own 
characteristic central concepts, a distinctive logical 
structure, a set of criteria for testing its expressions
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against experience and particular methods of exploring 
21experience. These features differentiate knowledge
into forms, or disciplines, which are in turn divided 
into subjects according to areas or objects of inquiry.
Thus, what accounts for the fact that poems about heavenly 
bodies are not mistaken for astronomical theories is that 
poetry and astronomy belong to different forms, or 
disciplines, of knowledge.
It is now possible to understand why the putative 
incommensurability of some contributions to knowledge is 
thought to pose a problem for rational inquiry, while the 
real incommensurability of others is not. If two theories 
belong to the same subject or discipline, and hence the same 
form of knowledge, then it would be an embarrassment to the 
rational inquirer to be bereft of criteria for choosing 
between them. But their belonging to the same form shows 
that they have enough in common to be commensurable. The 
concepts, logical structure, truth-criteria and techniques 
of testing provide shared standards for their comparative 
evaluation as approximations to the truth. It is only when 
we look at theories from different forms that we cannot 
compare them; but then there is no reason to do so. For 
unless we can see theories A and B as rivals competing for 
our allegiance, the fact that we cannot rationally choose 
between them does not matter. The necessity to choose 
brings with it the criteria for doing so rationally. The
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incommensurability of theories could be a problem only if 
they belonged to the same form of knowledge, but, if they 
do, they have enough in common to be commensurable. And 
so the incommensurability argument is incoherent.
The claim that all beliefs are ideological because
they are theory-laden does not therefore receive support
from the incommensurability argument. But the general
argument for the theory-dependence of ostensive learning,
and so of belief, may well be valid. If so, the conclusion
it establishes is consistent with the view that some
beliefs are not ideological. For the assumption that
rational belief is possible only if there are theory-
independent grounds for choosing between beliefs is unsound.
It overlooks the fact that the intrusions of theory may be
of two kinds: (i) there are the explanatory theories which
belong to particular academic disciplines, such as monetarist
and Keynesian explanations of inflation; (ii) and there are
the assumptions, principles, concepts and criteria which may
be common to all the theories within a discipline, such as
the definition of price or demand and the measurement of
inflation by the retail price index, or even to all the
disciplines within a form of knowledge, such as the concepts
22of action and rational choice. The point of this 
distinction is that the general aspects of thought afford 
grounds for Judging explanatory theories which are 
independent of the theories under consideration but not of 
theory as such.
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It may be objected that the forms of knowledge, or 
intellectual traditions, in question may well have 
originated as responses to social pressures. But even if 
they did, the history of their development necessarily shows 
a gradual emancipation from their social origins, as the 
concepts and criteria which characterise them are elaborated.^ 
And so the beliefs to which they give rise are not 
intrinsically ideological. Within a fully autonomous form 
of knowledge, ideological belief occurs only to the extent 
that its putative justification departs from the appropriate 
criteria or uses concepts from an alien form, and does so 
because adherence to the acknowledged standards would diminish 
the belief's utility in serving social interests. An analysis 
of the concept of an ideological belief will now be undertaken.
2.4 Ideological Utterances and Beliefs
Belief is a psychological state, but the criteria for its
identification are based on its expression in public behaviour.
As Williams has suggested, the most straightforward public
expression of belief is assertion, though asserting that £ is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of believing 
24that £.
There are many interpretations of the concept of 
ideology. An ideology may simply be the set of beliefs 
prevailing in a certain society at a certain time: a literary 
critic might trace the influence of the prevailing ideology on
a poet's work. Or it may be the beliefs which are 
characteristically held by members of a relatively well 
defined social group: a feminist writer might promote her 
book as a contribution to feminist ideology. In these 
cases it is clear that the term is being used descriptively; 
it is not implied that the beliefs are false or unfounded.
But there is an important strand running through the 
complicated pattern of the concept of ideology according to 
which to say that a belief is ideological is to imply it 
cannot be rationally justified and presents a false or 
distorted picture of reality. A closely related aspect of 
the concept is its action-guiding character: an ideological 
belief is one that is held, not because there are grounds for 
thinking it to be true, but because it prescribes actions 
which are perceived as serving the ideologist's interests.
These dyslogistic and prescriptive features of the 
concept of ideology are recognised in an attempt to
25distinguish ideological from non-ideological documents.
N o n -ideological documents present a rational case for these
theoretical and practical judgements, But, while
ideological documents appear to do the same, they are in fact
•epistemologically unsound in that much of what they assert
26is inadequately grounded.' On this view it follows that
'ideological documents are likely to contain empirical and
other statements which are made, not because there are
appropriate or relevant grounds for them, but rather because
they are believed to support an independently adopted
27normative position.'
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Ideological documents, then, are epistemologically 
unsound and believed to be socially useful in guiding 
action which promotes the interests of a social group. 
Moreover, they are epistemologically unsound because they 
are intended to initiate such action. That they are 
epistemologically unsound is a necessary condition of their 
success in promoting interests. For their readers would be 
unlikely to accept the practical judgements which they 
contain as reasons for action were not those judgements 
supported by apparently valid arguments from seemingly true 
premises. But there are no valid arguments from true 
premises which support the practical judgements in question.
So invalid arguments intrude to produce the semblance of a 
rational justification for the practical judgements which 
the ideologist intends his readers to accept. The occurrence 
of unsound reasoning is not on its own a sufficient condition 
of a document’s being ideological: incompetence or 
negligence could explain it. It must be the case that the 
effect of publishing the document could not come about 
without the acceptance by readers of practical judgements 
because they are supported by a putative justification in 
which ratiocinative weaknesses occur.
In analysing the concept of an ideological utterance, 
it is clear, then, that it is not enough to consider the 
logical relations between the proposition asserted and other 
propositions believed by the assertor and his hearer. The 
instrumental relations between the asserting of the
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proposition and the intended perlocutionary effect of that 
speech act must also be explained. In fact, a speech act 
cannot be said to be ideological if it is exhaustively 
described as the bare asserting that £• For it is 
necessary that the assertor be trying to convince his 
hearer(s) of the truth of 2 and of the desirability of some 
course of action for which 2 is part of the reason. It is 
possible to assert something in a 'take it or leave it' 
manner, so there is no necessary connexion between A's 
asserting that 2 hi*3 trying to convince H of its truth.
As Searle has it, '"I am simply stating that 2 a*1*3- not 
attempting to convince you” is acceptable, but "I am arguing
that 2 arxi not attempting to convince you" sounds
28inconsistent.' Arguing, urging, justifying and so on
constitute a sub-division of the general class of assertorial 
speech acts, and it is in respect of that sub-division rather 
than of the class itself that the question whether an 
utterance is ideological arises.
An utterance is ideological if it involves a divergence 
between what it would be appropriate to say if the speech act 
were one of assertion simpliciter and what is actually said 
because the speech act belongs to the subdivision of 
assertorial acts which are attempts to convince. According 
to Searle, the performance of an assertorial speech act implies 
that four conditions have been met: (i) a condition relating 
to propositional content; (ii) a sincerity condition, 
according to which A's asserting that 2 counts as the
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expression of his belief that 2; (iii) a preparatory-
condition, to the effect that A, in asserting that 2, implies
that he has evidence for its truth, and that it is not
obvious to both A and H that H already knows that 2? (iv) the
essential condition, that A's asserting that 2 'counts as an
undertaking to the effect that 2 represents an actual state 
?Qof affairs.' Thus, m  attempting to convince H that 2» A
asserts that 2 anc*- thereby implies, via the preparatory 
condition, that he has evidence for its truth. But, if his 
utterance is ideological, he will not have any such evidence. 
What appears to be evidence for the truth of 2 only seems so 
because A has perpetrated one or more of the ratiocinative 
deceits which have been seen to be a necessary condition of 
an utterance's being ideological.
In distinguishing ideological from non-ideological 
utterances, it is therefore the first part of the preparatory 
condition that matters. The first condition has to be met 
if a meaningful utterance is to occur at all, while the 
essential condition also has to be met if 2 is to be asserted, 
whether ideologically or not. The second part of the 
preparatory condition need not be satisfied, because A may 
intend to remind H of what he already knows rather than 
apprise him of new information. (This may seem at odds with 
the account of knowledge as justified true belief defended in 
the previous chapter. But it is quite possible for H to be 
justified in believing what is true and for A to use an invalid 
argument in support of the same proposition.) The sincerity
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condition may or may not be met: if it is, A is deceiving 
himself as well as H; if it is not, A is knowingly 
deceiving H, and, if £ is false, is telling an ideological 
lie.
It has been objected that lies create a difficulty for 
this analysis of ideological utterances.^0 The claim is 
that the suggested conditions do not discriminate between 
ideological utterances and straightforward lies or deceptions 
in contexts which it is counter-intuitive to describe as 
ideological. For example, the conditions could be satisfied 
where A is a father, H is his small son and £ is 'Father 
Christmas will not come until you go to bed'. In reply it 
might be argued that a further condition is needed to limit 
the content of £ to political matters. But this seems 
unwise, because many apparently innocent remarks can have 
political implications. It is preferable to admit that the 
father's asserting that Father Christmas will not come until 
his son goes to bed ¿s ideological, if the formal conditions 
are met. The incongruity of describing the father's 
assertion as ideological arises from the fact that such 
assertions are not usually presented as the conclusion of a 
rational argument, whereas ideological utterances must be part 
of an attempt to convince by ostensibly rational argument.
If the father tells his son a story about Father Christmas 
designed to support his original claim, few would deny that he 
is trying to manipulate his son's behaviour by imposing upon 
him a rudimentary ideology.
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It may therefore be concluded that the suggested 
conditions for an utterance's being ideological are adequate. 
They may be summed up as follows :
A's assertion that £ is ideological iff
(1) A is attempting to convince H that £
or, that £ and therefore r
or, that £ and therefore H ought to do x
(2) A asserts that £, thereby implying that he has evidence 
for the truth of £
(3) A does not have evidence for the truth of £.
It is important to notice that this account of 
ideological utterances presupposes that criteria exist, for 
deciding what is, and what is not, evidence for the truth of
£•
It remains to comment briefly on ideological beliefs.
The above analysis of ideological utterances suggests that a 
belief could be ideological in one of two ways. First, A 
might believe that £ in circumstances such that, if he were 
to try to convince someone else that £, his utterance would 
satisfy the conditions set out above. Second, if A succeeds 
in attempting to convince H that £ and the conditions for an 
ideological utterance are met, H's belief that £ will clearly 
be ideological. Thus, ideological beliefs have their 
proponents and their victims.
It can be seen that ideological belief is a sub-species 
of unjustified belief. It was argued in the previous
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chapter-' that to justify a belief is to try to criticise 
it and fail. An unjustified belief is therefore one which 
is held despite (a) its having failed the critical tests or
(b) its not having been submitted to them. In both cases 
the believer may be merely incompetent, not realising that 
2 has failed the tests or that others are available. But, 
if these errors of reasoning are a necessary condition of 
success in attempting to convince someone else of the truth 
of 2, or have been committed by someone who succeeded in 
convincing someone else of the truth of 2» then the belief 
that 2 is ideological.
2.5 Summary
The subjectivist claim is that all beliefs are 
ideological. The argument for this claim is that rational 
choice between beliefs presupposes theory-independent criteria. 
But, it is maintained, beliefs presuppose theories and 
theories involve paradigms, which prevent the construction of 
a theory-neutral language for the comparison and rational 
selection of beliefs and theories. In reply it has been 
argued that the claim that theories are incommensurable is 
incoherent, on the grounds that incommensurability could be a 
problem only if the theories belong to the same form of 
knowledge and that the fact they do so ensures that they share 
criteria and other features which enable a rational choice to 
be made between them. Given the existence of forms of 
knowledge and the criteria associated with them, it is possible
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to distinguish rational from ideological beliefs. 
Ideological beliefs are a sub-class of unjustified 
beliefs. Their identification, and the distinction 
between rational or justified and irrational or unjustified 
beliefs, presuppose the existence of criteria of 
justification.
The question now arises whether these criteria can 
themselves be rationally justified or whether they are 
socially relative. This will be the subject of the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE. JUSTIFICATION.
3.1 Introduction : Conceptual Relativism and the Criterion 
Problem.
It was argued in the previous chapter that a 
distinction can be drawn between rational or justified 
and ideological or unjustified beliefs. That distinction 
is part of the central argument of this section, that there 
is such a thing as objective knowledge and that it is to be 
analysed as justified true belief. Clearly, rational and 
ideological beliefs can be distinguished only if there are 
criteria for doing so. And the previous chapter ended by 
foreshadowing the expected subjectivist response to this 
presupposition of criteria of rationality, which is that 
such criteria are socially relative and cannot themselves 
be rationally justified. It is this subjectivist claim 
which is to be discussed in the present chapter.
The claim is twofold, comprising relativist and 
sceptical elements. So the first task is to explain how 
these components of the subjectivist claim are related.
In a sense the relativist contention prepares the ground 
for the sceptical one, for the fact, if it is a fact, 
that some societies use different criteria of rationality 
from those employed by others is no reason to conclude 
that all such sets of criteria are equally valid, which 
is the point of the claim that they are socially relative. 
For it may be that there is one uniquely valid set of
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criteria and that some, most or even all societies are 
using flawed approximations to it. But this 
possibility is ruled out by the sceptical argument. So 
the claim that criteria of rationality are socially 
relative, as distinct from the assertion that the 
criteria actually in use vary from one society to another, 
depends upon the sceptical conclusion that the criterion 
problem is insuperable.
The relativist claim is most controversial when made 
in connection with the rules of logic, on the basis of 
which we distinguish valid from invalid inferences. Thus, 
Bloor maintains that 'to appraise an argument for validity 
is to apply the standards of a social group. It cannot 
be other, or more, than this because we have no access to 
other standards.' Another writer, Young, expresses 
his approval of the suggestion that 'the rules of logic, 
whether practical or academic, are conventional, and will 
be shaped and selected in accordance with the purposes of
pthe discourse.' This suggestion is owed to Mills, who
is also cited by Esland as holding that 'criteria of
validity and truth .....  are themselves, in their
persistence and change, open to socio-historical 
relativization.'^  A philosopher to whom, rightly or 
wrongly, a similar view is sometimes attributed is Winch:
'criteria of logic ....  are only intelligible in the
h.context of ways of living or modes of social life.'
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In reply to the objection that these points establish 
only that members of some societies reason incompetently, 
not because they contravene rules their neighbours follow, 
but because the rules are themselves imperfect, the 
relativist can appeal to philosophical scepticism. For the 
objection presupposes that there are rules by comparison 
with which the unsatisfactory rules can be seen to be so.
And these presupposed rules must be universally applicable 
and, even more important, capable of being rationally 
justified themselves. For nothing would be gained if some 
societies' rules were rejected on the basis of rules, 
adherence to which cannot be defended but must be admitted 
to be a matter of dogmatic commitment. That all criteria 
ultimately depend upon such commitment is, however, just 
the conclusion the sceptic seeks to prove. Sextus 
Empiricus' statement of it is quoted by Popkin as follows:
'......  in order to decide the dispute which has arisen
about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion
by which .....  to judge the dispute; and in order to
possess an accepted criterion, the dispute must first be 
decided.'^ Either we decide upon a criterion arbitrarily 
and hold to it dogmatically or the search for a criterion 
continues ad infinitum.
In the remaining sections of this chapter several 
arguments against the social relativity of criteria of 
rationality and several attempts to solve the criterion 
problem will be examined and rejected as a prelude to the
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exposition of an acceptable defence of the objectivity of 
certain criteria of rationality. The self-refutation and 
internal disagreement ai'guments against relativism are 
found to be inconclusive. A more promising line of thought 
is taken up by the communication breakdown argument, a 
transcendental argument according to which there must be 
universally valid criteria of rationality if communication 
between members of different societies is to take place. 
Granted that such communication does occur, it follows that 
there are universally valid criteria of rationality. But 
it is clear that relativists would be reluctant to concede 
as much; communication of the sort required is at best 
imperfect and incomplete. So once again the outcome is 
inconclusive. The quest for a definite answer to the 
question whether it is possible for someone to be justified 
in believing something must therefore turn to philosophical 
efforts to solve the criterion problem. Bor if that can be 
done a criterion, or a set of criteria, might be found to 
exist, which it would be in the real interests of all 
people, regardless of the social group to which they belong, 
to adopt. And that is indeed the answer to be given in 
this chapter. Several traditional and more recent
propOSed solutions to the criterion problem are considered, 
only to be found wanting. A transcendental argument, 
derived from the communication breakdown argument, is then 
constructed, according to which much more than communication 
between members of different societies depends on the 
existence of universally valid criteria of rationality.
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Without such criteria, no systematic intercourse with 
reality would be possible at all. It would be difficult 
for the relativist or the sceptic to counter this argument 
by maintaining that all our transactions with reality are 
somehow delusory or disordered or that we never have any 
contact with reality at all. So the criterion problem is 
not so much solved as shown to be spurious: there are 
criteria for which a justification is available, because they 
are presupposed by our ordinary and indispensable dealings 
with the world. Accordingly, they are not even socially 
variable, let alone socially relative. Rather are they 
part of the distinctively human form of sensibility.
3.2 Conceptual Relativism
3.2.1 The Self-Refutation Argument. It is commonly argued 
that relativism is self-refuting, in that it cannot be 
stated without presupposing what it purports to deny.
While this claim is true of some naive versions of relativism, 
a coherent form of relativism can be propounded. It will 
however be encumbered with the notion of a form of life, 
which raised further problems.
The self-refutation argument is put forward by Trigg 
and Passmore. According to the former writer, the claims 
that 'there is no such thing as "objective truth"' and that 
'truth is relative to societies' both 'clearly purport to 
be objectively true, and are intended as truths about all
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societies.1 Similarly, Passmore contends that it is a
presupposition of all discourse that some propositions are
true. 'We cannot,' he maintains, 'simultaneously put
forward propositions for discussion and assert that no
nproposition is true.'r It is impossible to disagree with 
Passmore that it is self-refuting to assert, or imply, that 
no propositions are true, because, if it is true that no 
propositions are true, then at least one proposition is 
true. But it is less obvious that the idea of truth contains 
as an essential element the implication that if a 
proposition is true then it has a claim upon anyone who 
understands it. Admittedly, the view that a proposition 
is true only for its assertor is incompatible with rational 
discussion, from which it follows that someone who puts 
forward that view as a contribution to rational discussion 
is guilty of self-refutation. But perhaps the relativist 
wishes to follow a middle course between the incoherent 
doctrine that a proposition is true only for its assertor 
and the only alternative so far entertained, that a 
proposition is true for anyone who understands it, or, 
more straightforwardly, true simpliciter.
The middle way is the view denounced by Trigg, that 
propositions are true for their assertors and other members 
of the same society. This concedes that a proposition is, 
so to speak, entitled to be recognised as true by others 
than its assertor, who is therefore immune to the charge 
of self-refutation if he engages in rational discussion with
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his neighbours. But it does not go so far as to admit 
that putting forward a proposition is putting it forward, 
not as true for members of a certain social group, but 
simply as true. Is this a reason for thinking that it 
does not go far enough ? What exactly is the difference 
between a proposition's being true for members of the same 
social group as its assertor and its being, simply true ?
It may be helpful to distinguish between the state of 
affairs that makes a proposition true and that proposition's
Qbeing known by someone to be true. What makes a 
proposition true does not depend upon who asserts it and by 
whom it is understood. For instance, what makes it true 
that the Earth revolves around the Sun is simply the Earth's 
revolving around the Sun. And that is a state of affairs 
that is as it is regardless of whether or not anyone knows 
that it is. If the relativist, using the locution 'true 
for....', wishes to deny this, then he is committed to 
metaphysical idealism, a doctrine which will be examined at 
length in chapter five. If, on the other hand, he wishes 
merely to draw attention to the fact that a proposition can 
be known to be true only by someone who understands it, then 
an unorthodox theory becomes a trite observation.
Or so, at first sight, it may seem. For further 
reflection reveals a more interesting claim implicit in this 
relativist middle way. In asserting a proposition, a 
speaker uses concepts and criteria drawn from his own form of
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life. Consequently, the relativist maintains, his 
proposition will be intelligible only to those who share 
the speaker's form of life. If forms of life are socially 
variable, then propositions can be understood and known to 
be true only by members of a social group defined by 
participation in the form of life from which the concepts 
and criteria used in asserting those propositions were drawn. 
The conclusion at which the relativist arrives is that, even 
if what makes a proposition true is not relative to a social 
group, what makes someone justified in believing it is. An 
evaluation of this claim entails an analysis of the notion 
of a form of life. And that is best begun by considering 
another argument against relativism, namely, the internal 
disagreement argument.
3.2.2 The Internal Disagreement Argument. A form of life is
best understood as a congeries of concepts and criteria,
attitudes and assumptions, shared by members of an
identifiable social group, which at once underlies their
transactions with each other and limits their communication
qwith members of other social groups.' Thus, there are two 
quarters from which it may expect attack: the internal 
disagreement argument concerns relations within the social 
group, while the communication breakdown argument refers to 
relations between members of different social groups.
The internal disagreement argument is an attempt to 
prove that relativism collapses in trying to explain the
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existence of discord within a form of life. The relativist,
unlike the proponent of the view that a proposition is true
for its assertor alone, can, it appears, accommodate
disagreement about the truth or falsity of propositions.
For the individual assertor can be judged against the
standards current in his society. But this apparent
advantage turns out to be the cause of the relativist's
downfall. Or so it has been claimed. Trigg, for example,
poses the problem as follows: 'there is a disagreement in
the society, which must be resolved by deciding what the
10majority thinks.' The trouble with such a procedure is,
in his view, that it would be circular to use the result of
the ballot as a criterion of truth to settle the dispute,
because the organisers would have to ask each respondent
what he believed to be true. This circularity can be
avoided by asking each respondent to predict the result of
the ballot rather than say what his own opinion is. But,
according to Trigg, this amendment only displays the ultimate
incoherence of relativism. For the new procedure entails
that people predict their own and other people's
predictions and therefore their own and other people's
predictions about their predictions,and so on. Since the
respondents 'cannot all look at each other simultaneously to
see what the majority thinks,' Trigg concludes that
'individual judgements about what is true precede questions
11about what most people think.' One final difficulty
faces the the relativist: since he accepts the standards of 
a society, he cannot also question them. Consequently, he
is obliged, in Trigg's opinion, to adopt the implausible 
position that the lone rebel, the reformer or the prophet 
are simply mistaken about what the standards of their 
society actually are, 'for they cannot recognise the 
standards and still reject them.' Do these difficulties 
amount to a refutation of relativism ?
There are two reasons for returning a negative answer 
to this question: a workable ballot procedure is after all 
available to the relativist and, in any case, the whole idea 
of his having to resort to a ballot is misguided. A valid 
ballot procedure can be worked out by ignoring Trigg's 
amendment and clarifying the original method. The organisers 
ask people what they believe to be true; they employ the 
commonsense notion of truth as correspondence to the facts.
The results of the ballot are taken as evidence, not of what 
is true, but of what is true*, where a proposition is true* 
if and only if it is assented to by the majority. Clearly, 
there is no circularity in trying to find out what is true* 
in society S by asking members of S what they believe to be 
true. But, it will be objected, this procedure presupposes 
the ordinary notion of truth with which the relativist wishes 
to dispense. This is not so. The organisers of the ballot 
are not committed to endorsing the beliefs of members of S.
It is certainly not necessary for the relativist to deny that 
many people believe that some propositions are true; after 
all, it is only because some people are not relativists that 
those who are have to defend their views. For the fact that
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members of S believe that there are objective truths does
not entail that there actually are any. Perhaps the
members of S are simply mistaken. A relativist response
of this sort is akin to the error theory of ethics: 'The
claim to objectivity, however ingrained in our language and
thought, is not self-validating ....  Although most people
in making moral Judgements implicitly claim, among other
things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive,
these claims are all f a l s e . B u t  the relativist
generalises this claim to cover factual propositions as well
as moral Judgements. And so it is appropriate to resurrect
the self-refutation argument, on the grounds that relativism
now presupposes objective falsity, and so, by implication,
objective truth. The relativist can, however, evade this
charge by adopting a Pyrrhonian strategy: the organisers of
the ballot must claim no more than that the proposition
that the beliefs held by members of S are all false is true
. 14for those who share the organisers' form of life.
The second reason for rejecting the internal 
disagreement argument is that the relativist can properly 
object to having the ballot procedure foisted upon him. The 
assumption was that a ballot is the only means of deciding 
who is right when unanimity collapses, because the relativist 
is confined to the standards which are operative in S. So 
he is. But this does not entail that all he can do is 
attempt to discover which standards are most widely used.
80
For standards, in common with rules, criteria, principles 
and laws, exhibit a most important characteristic, namely, 
universalizability. Both descriptive and prescriptive 
laws go beyond experience. 'All swans are white' entails 
'If anything is a swan, then it is white' and thereby 
attempts, so to speak, to legislate for future experience 
in a way that is foreign to 'All swans so far observed are 
white'. Similarly, if I say that Simon is a fox terrier 
by virtue of having characteristics c ... c*, then I am 
committed to saying that anything else, as yet unexperienced, 
which has c ... c* is a fox terrier. What I say about 
Simon commits me to saying certain things about objects of 
future experience, on pain of inconsistency. All saying is 
doing, performing speech acts, and so what a speaker does on 
a certain occasion commits him to acting in a certain way on 
other occasions, as long as he is trying to be rational. A 
standard or criterion applies beyond the particular occasion 
of action when its presence was first detected. Suppose 
that all the members M ... Mn of S* are perfectly rational 
agents. Then, if M does x in circumstances C he will do 
x in circumstances C* as long as C and C* are alike in all 
relevant respects. It may be assumed that agents in real 
societies are only imperfectly rational. Discrepancies 
therefore arise between what an agent actually does in C* 
and what he should have done in line with the principle 
manifest in his action in C. If one and the same agent 
can in this sense disagree with himself there is no mystery 
about disagreement between different agents within the
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same form of life. Some are simply more rational than 
others. And this is sufficient to explain the existence 
of rebels, reformers and prophets: they are typically more 
rational than their neighbours in S. They see that a 
principle has implications for action in areas other than 
those in which it has so far been applied, while other 
members of S either fail to perceive the connexion or, 
through moral weakness, fail to act in accordance with their 
professed principles. Those who sought the emancipation of 
slaves or the enfranchisement of women exemplified this 
description particularly clearly. And so, in a sense, Trigg 
was right in thinking that the relativist can explain 
internal disagreement only as the outcome of a mistake. But 
not in the sense intended. For, in the first place, it need 
not be the minority view that is erroneous, as the reformer 
examples illustrate. And, secondly, the error is not a 
factual one about what the standards actually are, but a 
ratiocinative one about their applicability. Thus, internal 
disagreement is rooted in the universalizability of criteria 
of rationality.
3 .2 .3 . The Communication Breakdown Argument. This argument 
may be stated as follows : if relativism were true, people 
from different forms of life would be unable to communicate 
with one another; but people from different forms of life do 
communicate with one another; so relativism cannot be true.
An argument of this form is advanced by Lukes: '.......  the
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existence of a common reality is a necessary precondition 
of our landerstanding G's language', where G is a social
group other than our own, for otherwise '.... we and they
would be unable to agree about the successful identification 
of public, spatio-temporally located o b j e c t s . A n  
interesting feature of the communication breakdown argument 
is that it seeks to establish a conclusion which the 
relativist also wishes to insist upon. Par from being 
embarrassed at the revelation of a hitherto unsuspected 
implication of his doctrine, he will readily agree that, in 
the absence of a common reality, communication breaks down. 
But, whereas his critics assume that the breakdown of 
communication rarely, if ever, occurs, the relativist 
maintains that it is a common phenomenon. Thus, Kuhn, 
whose early views are generally agreed to be relativist 
despite his later disclaimers, writes of scientists working 
within different paradigms in the following terms: 'Since the 
vocabularies in which they discuss such situations consist, 
however, predominantly of the same terms, they must be 
attaching some of those terms to nature differently, and 
their communication is inevitably only partial.' Another
writer often perceived as a relativist, Winch, emphasises 
the limits of communication in the following passage : 
'Something can appear rational to someone only in terms of 
his understanding of what is and is not rational. If our 
concept of rationality is a different one from his, then it 
makes no sense to say anything either does or does not
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appear rational to him m  our sense.’ ' The assumption 
here is that there are no universally valid criteria of 
rationality; criteria of rationality are either theirs or 
ours. It is difficult to evaluate the communication break­
down argument and the reply to it, because the extent and 
frequency of communication breakdown required by either side 
before it can claim victory is not clear.
The deadlock might be broken by questioning an 
assumption shared by both parties to the controversy, namely, 
that there must be either a common reality or a myriad 
realities having nothing whatsoever in common. Suppose it 
is agreed that communication between members of social groups 
having different forms of life does take place but is limited 
to the identification and description of material objects.
The simplest explanation of such a state of affairs is that 
there is a fundamental reality which is common to everyone 
and a superstructure of localized realities tied to different 
forms of life. Perhaps the common reality is itself tied to 
a distinctively human form of life. In the present context
the idea of a common reality with localized realities 
superimposed upon it is interesting because it suggests a 
compromise solution to the problem of communication breakdown. 
This can be seen by considering how Winch could reply to a 
version of the communication breakdown argument directed 
specifically against his views.
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The argument starts from the familiar assumption
that 'the possibility of communication .....  requires
that there be a shared ground between the languages of
*18the various forms of life.' Its proponent, Kekes,
suggests that this common ground is provided by the fact
that people 'perceive the world in terms of five sense 
19modalities.' The resultant commonsense presents Winch
with the following dilemma: 'if commonsense and ordinary
language do form a substratum of forms of life, then there
is a ready-made, context-independent standard with
reference to which claims made within different forms of
life can be appraised; if, on the other hand, commonsense
and ordinary language are regarded as one form of life
among many, then it becomes impossible to explain how
communication is possible in the absence of a shared
20conception of reality.' But the dilemma is false.
For there is no reason why Winch should not agree that 
there is a substratum of forms of life which make it 
possible for people from different forms of life to 
communicate about a limited range of subjects, say, material 
objects. This would be consistent with relativism 
concerning other things, whose identification and 
description presuppose the existence of human institutions 
and associated forms of life. Indeed, a limited 
relativism of this sort seems to be just what Winch 
propounds: 'Two things may be called "the same" or 
"different" only with reference to a set of criteria which 
lay down what is to be regarded as a relevant difference.
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When the "things" in question are purely physical the
criteria appealed to will of course be those of the 
21observer.' It is implied here that it does not matter
what form of life the observer belongs to. For if this did
make a difference, then two observers from different forms
of life would employ different criteria and it would not be
possible to speak of the criteria of the observer.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that Winchean
relativism applies only to a finite range of things, namely,
intellectual or social things. This does seem the best way
to read page 106 of The Idea of a Social Science. A limited
relativism along these lines can be made more worthy of
credence by drawing attention to its affinity with a valuable
distinction, pointed out, for instance, by Searle, between 
. 22brute and institutional facts. Brute facts concern 
material objects and knowledge of them does not presuppose 
criteria drawn from socially variable forms of life; 
institutional facts have to do with what Winch calls 
■intellectual and social things and knowledge of them does 
presuppose criteria embodied, in social institutions and their 
associated forms of life. Thus, the most plausible response 
to the communication breakdown argument is a combination of 
objectivism with regard to the material world and relativism 
concerning the world of human institutions.
It may be helpful at this point to examine the 
implications of this tentative conclusion for the question 
whether beliefs can ever be justified. The premise on which
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this chapter is based is that justification presupposes 
criteria of rationality, which are generally assumed to 
be universally valid. The provisional conclusion is that, 
while there are criteria of rationality of universal 
validity, they apply only to beliefs about the natural or 
physical world. So it seems that beliefs about intellectual 
and social things cannot be justified on the basis of 
universally valid criteria of rationality. Does this mean 
that beliefs about social institutions, including those for 
the acquisition and transmission of knowledge, can never be 
fully justified ? Does there inevitably come a point at 
which justification has to stop: 'this game is played' or 
'this institution exists' ? If so, the justification of a 
practice would be relative to the institution of which it is 
a part, and, on the assumption that institutions cannot 
themselves be rationally justified, therefore incomplete.
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to an attempt to 
show that this view, that justification of beliefs about 
social and intellectual things is necessarily incomplete, 
is not implied by the tentative conclusion and is in any case 
unsound. In the next section it will be argued that
concepts and practices are embedded in institutions or forms 
of life, so that even the notion of what is real reflects 
human purposes and interests. This indeed is the truth in 
relativism. But in the remaining sections of the chapter 
it will be contended that there is a certain continuity 
between such institutions or forms of life and commonsense 
or the human form of sensibility. Philosophical discussion
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can sometimes be advanced by exchanging the horns of a 
dilemma for the shades of a spectrum. And it seems unlikely 
that human affairs can be adequately described in terms of 
simple dichotomies, such as that between forms of life and 
commonsense or that between brute and institutional facts.
Human activities cannot, except at the cost of over­
simplification, be divided into those that engage wholly with 
the physical world and those that are entirely confined to 
the social sphere. And so, if we can find some universally 
valid criteria of rationality, we may reasonably expect them 
to underlie, or in some way inform, the localised criteria 
peculiar to the more differentiated forms of life. It will 
be argued in the concluding sections of this chapter that such 
criteria exist and are indispensable to activities which are 
presupposed by the most socially variable forms of life.
3.2.4 Forms of life. The discussion of the communication 
breakdown argument produced the suggestion that, while common- 
sense or the human form of sensibility explains communication 
success, the existence of socially variable forms of life is 
necessary to understand communication breakdown. People from 
radically different cultures successfully communicate with each 
other up to a certain point by virtue of their common human 
form of sensibility. That their success is limited, that 
there comes a point at which communication breaks down, is to 
be accounted for by reference to forms of life. What this 
means in practice can be understood by considering an imaginary
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example of communication between people from different forms 
of life. Suppose that the people involved are a monk and a 
soldier and that the subject of discourse between them is 
something that can at least be described as a stone wall. ^
The criteria by which it is identified as a material object 
of that particular sort are the same irrespective of whether 
it is the soldier or the monk who is looking at, or talking 
about, it. For these criteria are part of the human form of 
sensibility. So the monk and the soldier agree that the 
object in front of them is a stone wall. But for both of 
them it is much more than that, and it is over its further 
description that disagreement arises. The monk regards the 
wall as a holy shrine, the site of an ancient miracle; it is, 
as Weber would say, charismatic, aussertaglich, outside the 
everyday. It is natural to say that the wall is a shrine 
for the monk. But not for the soldier; for him, what Weber 
called Entzauberung der Welt has long ago taken place. Never­
theless, he sees the wall as more than just a wall; his enemy 
is sheltering behind it and so he regards it as a legitimate 
target for his artillery. And so the object that is a wall 
for both soldier and monk is a target for one and a shrine for 
the other. What is it really ? Is it really a shrine or a 
target ? Or is it really just a wall ?
The value of conceptual relativism lies in revealing the 
futility of these questions. To endorse either of the further 
descriptions and dismiss the other would be arbitrary. To 
insist that both further descriptions are invalid and that the
wall is really nothing but a wall would entail a drastic
diminution of reality. A world that contains stone walls
but neither targets nor shrines is not a world in which a
fully human life could be led. Reality as we engage with
it is more than merely material. And it is precisely this
insight which is implicit in/idea of forms of life. For an
important aspect of the meaning of 'real', and one which
objectivists are liable to overlook, is that what is real is
partly a matter of what is taken seriously by people in
24-thinking and acting. Suppose, for example, that the monk
visits the soldier with the intention of urging him to
respect the holiness of the wall. It is unlikely that the
soldier would contradict the monk’s claim that it is a shrine.
The conflict between them is not accurately described by
saying that one denies what the other asserts, that the wall
is a shrine. Certainly, the soldier does not believe that
the monk is simply mistaken, that, say, the authenticated
site of the miracle is actually a mile or two down the road.
It is just that he does not take the description *x is a
shrine’ seriously. The monk and the soldier do not
contradict each other, because they do not speak from within
the same form of life. And what shows that they do not speak
from within the same form of life is that they do not take the
25same descriptions seriously. ' But what exactly is involved 
in taking a description seriously ?
A person takes a description seriously if it guides his 
actions, if it is before his mind when he makes decisions.
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And since the idea of taking a description seriously was 
introduced in order to explain how the reality of something 
can be relative to a form of life, it is clear that part at 
least of what makes something real is how people behave 
towards it. Thus, although the soldier might understand 
the place which the shrine has in the lives of religious 
believers, it is not a shrine for him because he does not 
take that description seriously. But, whereas the 
description of the wall as a shrine carries no weight with 
the soldier, it does influence the actions of the monk. For 
him the following practical syllogism is valid :
(i) Shrines are to be treated with respect.
(ii) This wall is a shrine.
(iii) Therefore, this wall ought to be 
treated with respect.
In other words, if the wall is a shrine for the monk, then we 
can derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. Some descriptions, such 
as 'x is a shrine', comprehend, rather than simply entail, 
evaluations, which shows that what is real has something to 
do with human action and is not purely a matter of what things 
are like. And so the description of the wall as simply a 
wall is not a privileged description which takes precedence 
over, or is somehow more real than, than the description of it 
as a shrine. Far from it. The neutral description of the 
wall as a wall has fewer implications for action than evaluative 
ones, and so it applies to something that is less real, not 
more so. The wall is a shrine, and a real shrine, because
of the way in which people behave towards it. And so 
there is a sense in which man is indeed a world-producer, 
for an adequate description of the world must certainly 
include shrines (and barricades) as well as walls.
This, then, is the truth in conceptual relativism: 
what is real is in part determined by what we do. And this 
has important implications for education. For what is real 
in education is in part a matter of what teachers do. The 
standards in terms of which they classify pupils are the 
outcome of decisions rather than part of the unalterable 
fabric of the universe, but they are no less real for that. 
This point will be discussed in detail in chapter nine.
The next step in the argument of the present chapter is to 
show that, while relativism contains a kernel of truth, it 
does not constitute the whole truth. Although what is real 
depends in part upon what is taken seriously in a form of 
life, it is also conditioned by commonsense or the human 
form of sensibility. If this claim is to be made good, 
the criterion problem must be confronted and solved.
The Criterion Problem
Before a solution to the criterion problem can be 
offered, it is necessary to survey the philosophical controversy 
surrounding it. Only in that way can its significance be 
fully appreciated. Several putative solutions will be 
considered and rejected, but only as a preliminary to the 
eventual objectivist argument that the criterion problem can 
indeed be solved.
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3.3.1 Methodism and particularism. Two traditional 
responses to the sceptical challenge are methodism, the 
view that we do have a general criterion or method for 
deciding what we know, and particularism, according to which 
there are occasions when we do not need a criterion to know 
that we know.
It is particularism which Chisholm finds the more
attractive counter-sceptical strategy. The main premise of
his argument for this doctrine is the claim that 'in order to
find out whether you know such a thing as that this is a hand,
27you don't have to apply any test or criterion.' There are
therefore paradigm cases of knowledge, 'many things which,
28quite obviously, we do know to be true', and these enable 
us to formulate a general criterion to apply in less straight­
forward cases.
But particularism, however initially attractive it may 
be, is ultimately incoherent. The fact that the paradigm 
cases have to be selected makes it clear that it is .just not 
true that we can sometimes know that we know without applying 
a criterion. The cases which Chisholm picks as paradigms 
are not chosen in an aleatory manner but have to pass a test, 
namely, that what is known must be obvious or self-evident to 
the knower. Knowledge of propositions such as 'This is my 
hand' or 'I am now typing' expressed in the appropriate 
circumstances meets this criterion and so is taken as
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paradigmatic, whereas knowledge of propositions such as 'There 
is intelligent life on Mars' or 'It is now snowing in Florida' 
fails the test. So particularism is really a disguised form 
of methodism, for the particularist does have to apply a 
criterion, that of self-evidence or obviousness.
It might be objected that this is not a criterion, that 
the whole point of particularism is that giving reasons must 
come to an end somewhere and that in the paradigm cases we know 
without being able to justify our knowledge and so without 
appealing to a criterion. Particularism, the objector might 
suggest, is really another name for intuitionism. But this 
objection misses the point. If the paradigm cases are known 
by intuition in the way that empiricists hold that basic 
propositions are known by sense—experience, then intuition is 
overtly another general criterion or method. If, on the other 
hand, it is argued that the paradigm cases are simply known 
without the possibility of justification, so that any appeal 
to intuition is not to a faculty but merely to the lack of 
justifiability, then it remains true that the cases have been 
selected in a non-arbitrary manner and that non-justifiability 
is now the covert criterion.29 Either way, particularism 
collapses into methodism, open or concealed.
This outcome naturally arouses interest in methodism.
But the standard objection to that doctrine, that the chosen 
criterion is at once of very general application and completely 
arbitrary, is a powerful one. As Chisholm puts it, the
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methodist 'leaves us completely in the dark so far as 
concerns what reasons he may have for adopting this particular 
criterion rather than some o t h e r . C l e a r l y ,  the methodist 
faces a dilemma: if he gives us a reason for adopting the 
criterion which is independent of the criterion, then he has 
shifted his ground and the problem arises all over again in 
respect of the new criterion; if his reason depends on the 
criterion, then it is evidently circular. But, it may be 
asked, is this true of all possible reasons that might be given 
for adopting a particular criterion ? Is a different kind of 
justification possible ?
3 .3 . 2  Pragmatic .justification. The claim that traditional 
answers to the criterion problem have failed because they have 
relied upon cognitive justification, and that the problem is to 
be solved only by pragmatic justification, has been put forward 
by Feigl.^ An adequate theory of knowledge, he maintains, 
must distinguish the fact that a rule is followed from the fact 
that it is valid. Thus, the sociology of knowledge, which 
seeks to explain why certain claims to know are made in preference 
to others, must not be confused with, or thought to have 
superseded, epistemology, which is concerned with questions 
about the validity of knowledge-claims. It follows that a 
theory of knowledge which treats logical rules and methodological 
principles as no more than empirical phenomena is inadequate.
The difficulty is that the criterion problem seems to imply 
that, since we cannot without circularity justify our most basic 
principles of rationality, then we have no choice but to regard
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them as purely empirical phenomena. We could give a causal 
explanation of their popularity or success but we could not 
justify them.
In an effort to solve the criterion problem, Feigl 
postulates a new kind of justification. What he is looking 
for is a justification of the most basic and general 
methodological principles to which contemporary scientific 
practice conforms. Take, for example, the principle of 
induction: we observe repeated instances of X's being followed 
by Y and frame the inductive generalisation 'X causes Y.'
Since this statement goes further than the more cautious 
assertion 'X has so far always caused Y' and the even less 
adventurous 'X has so far always been followed by Y', it 
assumes that the future will resemble the past in all relevant 
respects. It would clearly be circular bo try to justify 
this principle on the grounds that induction has so far 
enabled accurate predictions to be made and that action based 
upon such forecasts have produced desirable consequences. It 
is for this reason that Feigl disclaims any attempt to 
establish empirical conclusions about the practical discomforts 
likely to accompany the implementation of unsound principles, 
even though that is the form which a pragmatic justification 
might reasonably be expected to take.
A pragmatic justification of basic methodological 
principles is, Peigl suggests, one which relates them 
conceptually to the realisation of certain ends. These ends 
are the ideals of clarity, definiteness, consistency and
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conclusiveness, warranted assertibility and maximum scope.
The methodological principles are pragmatically justified
if 'it can ....  be shown deductively (and asserted in an
analytic statement) that conformity with the principles is a 
necessary condition for the attainment of these ideals.'^2 
Suppose that theory A is preferred to theory B because it 
explains phenomena for which B cannot account. We could 
justify our preference, according to Feigi, by showing that 
maximum scope is part of the meaning of 'theory', so that 
necessarily A is a better theory than B. The relation between 
the principle, that we should prefer the theory which explains 
the most phenomena, and the ideal, maximum scope, is a 
conceptual one. Feigi can therefore claim to have avoided 
the circularity which vitiates cognitive justifications.
However, it does not follow that pragmatic justification has 
solved the criterion problem. Even if methodological 
principles have been shown to be conceptually related to 
certain ideals, it seems reasonable to press the demand for 
justification a stage further and ask why it is rational to 
pursue these particular goals. All that Feigi has to say is 
that 'they are taken as the objects of certain interests* and 
that successes and failures 'in the enterprise of science have 
given rise to a strong interest in them.'^5 This simpiy 
to take for granted the validity of current scientific 
principles and practices. Any attempt to justify the ideals 
themselves, which inform those principles and practices, would 
evidently encounter the criterion problem all over again. So 
the notion of pragmatic justification does not solve the
problem, but merely pushes it back a stage further: the 
problem now is to justify, not our criteria of knowledge, 
but our ideal of knowledge, or the cluster of ideals which 
constitute the goal of systematic scientific knowledge.
Cognitive and pragmatic justification have both failed 
to solve the criterion problem. A possible response to 
this outcome is to question the propriety of the demand for 
justification.
5.3.3 Comprehensively critical rationalism. If, then, we 
are led to conjecture that there may be something wrong with 
the demand for justification, Bartley's doctrine of 
comprehensively critical rationalism (CCR) will seem to us 
to be a promising alternative. For the assumption on which
that theory is based is that previous accounts of rationality
• 54-have erred in identifying it with justification. Since
justification is taken to be the deriving of a belief from
the ultimate criterion of knowledge, or rationality,
rationalists are at once faced with the criterion problem.
Admitting the impossibility of justifying rationality,
Bartley argues that rationality consists in criticising,
rather than trying to justify, beliefs. All beliefs and
standards, including CCR itself, are to be held only
provisionally, so that they are always open to critical
scrutiny and the possibility of revision or rejection. In
this way, according to Bartley, the need for an irrational
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initial commitment as the foundation of rationality is 
obviated.
Discussions of OCR have tended to concentrate on some 
of its curious consequences. Bartley insists that an 
adherent of his doctrine could be persuaded to renounce his 
rationalism, so proving that he had not been dogmatically 
committed to it but had been holding it only provisionally 
until something better came along. But, if he was led to 
abandon his rationalism by adverse criticism of it, OCR has 
been vindicated: rationalism has been renounced in response 
to criticism. It seems that nothing could count as a 
refutation of OCR, in which case the distinction between 
holding it provisionally and adhering to it dogmatically is 
difficult to discern. Even if it can be extricated from 
this embarrassing predicament, OCR is open to criticism on 
other grounds.
Bartley's initial premise concerning the nature of 
rationality is unsound. The assumption is that rationality 
consists in trying to criticise rather than justify beliefs, 
which presupposegthat criticism and justification are distinct. 
But in practice to try to criticise a belief and fail is to 
justify it, if only provisionally and until more exacting 
critical tests have been devised. Indeed, it has already been 
argued that a belief is criticised because it is one of several 
competing for our allegiance and that it is the belief which 
best withstands the critical tests that has to that extent been
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¿justified.^ But why, it may be asked, does this matter 
for CCR ? Does it not merely indicate the advisability of 
revising our notion of ¿justification ? Is not CCR left 
intact, simply being reinterpreted as a revision rather than 
a re;jection of the demand for a ¿justification of criteria of 
rationality ?
The answer to the last two questions is no. A criticism 
of a theory, or of a belief, is not an isolated atom of thought, 
owing nothing to other products of the mind; a criticism pre­
supposes a theory and a reply to a criticism will often take 
the form of sub;jecting the theory on which it relies to 
criticism in its turn. And so criticising a theory presupposes 
criteria of knowledge ¿just as much as ¿justifying a theory does. 
What made it look as though there was a radical difference 
between criticism and ¿justification, so that reliance on the 
former would escape commitment to an ultimate criterion, is an 
ambivalence in GCR between attitude and policy. To hold one's 
beliefs open to criticism is to hold them in a certain way, to 
adopt a certain attitude toward them, more specifically, to 
refrain from placing one's absolute trust in them. And it is 
clear that to adopt such an attitude does not involve 
committing oneself to a criterion of knowledge. So, if Bartley 
is understood as analysing a certain sort of cognitive attitude, 
bis doctrine may be accepted and the attitude adopted. But it 
is plain that he is trying to do more than this: he is seeking 
to recommend a policy; otherwise, the dispute over the curious 
consequences of putting his theory into practice would be beside
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the point. Actually criticising one's beliefs, as distinct 
from having a certain attitude towards them, does presuppose 
a theoretical background, which will include a criterion, or 
set of criteria, of knowledge. The conclusion must be that 
OCR is no solution to the criterion problem.
3.3.4 Inconsequentialism. One possible response to the
failure of these attempts to solve the criterion problem is to 
question the assumption that a solution needs to be found.
The inconsequentialist admits that the criterion problem cannot 
be solved at the theoretical level but insists that this 
failure does not matter because it has no practical 
consequences. The sceptic presents us, not with a real problem 
requiring a solution, but with a bogus problem which 
recognition will dissolve. This argument will be expounded at 
greater length; it will then be rejected on the grounds that 
scepticism about criteria of knowledge does have practical 
consequences and is therefore a genuine problem which must be 
solved if objectivism is to be established.
The argument to be considered is that scepticism about 
criteria of knowledge resembles philosophical scepticism in 
general, in entailing no practical consequences. Thus, 
scepticism about material objects is too general to make any 
difference to what we do; its proponents continue to make the 
same discriminations within the class of material objects as 
everyone else does; they can tell a hawk from a hernshaw, an 
elephant from a postage stamp, a mountain from a molehill.
Where the sceptic differs from the rest of us is in 
holding that we cannot Justify our belief in the existence 
of material objects as such. Although he makes the same 
discriminations as everyone else does, he gives a 
different account of the objects of those discriminations.
If his scepticism were more selective, it could well 
have untoward practical consequences. A man who believed 
in the existence of some material objects but not in that 
of others would act in ways that might put his life in 
danger and his sanity in doubt. But Just because the 
sceptic's doubts are so comprehensive they will not disturb 
the customary pattern of his behaviour.
Similarly, the argument continues, all the putative 
criteria of knowledge have been found to depend upon an 
ultimate criterion which cannot itself be Justified. But 
this need not prevent us from using context-dependent or 
discipline-specific criteria of knowledge. And so 
scepticism about the basic criterion of knowledge does not 
entail that we can never have grounds for preferring one 
claim to know to another. Even if we cannot Justify the 
principle of induction, for example, it is still rational 
to test theories by controlled experiments rather than 
haruspication. Perhaps the former is not simply beyond 
Justification but outside the need for it. After all, 
sceptics and other irrationalists, such as fideists, continue 
to engage in rational argument. Just as the sceptic about 
material objects can discriminate between real and
hallucinatory daggers, so the sceptic about the ultimate 
criterion of knowledge can differentiate between sound and 
unsound arguments or propositions which it is reasonable to 
believe and those which it is not reasonable to believe.
And again, dust as the sceptic about material objects differs 
from the non-sceptic in the way in which he describes his 
experience and not in what he experiences, so does the 
sceptic about the ultimate criterion of knowledge differ from 
the non-sceptic only in the status which he ascribes to the 
criteria they both use.
There is some truth in inconsequentialism: it is indeed 
odd to ask for a justification 0f principles as basic as that 
of induction, as though dispensing with such principles were 
a serious possibility. Nevertheless, the demand for 
justification is intelligible and must therefore be met.
While inconsequentialism points towards the right answer to 
the criterion problem, it does not itself provide that answer 
For the sceptic believes that the use of criteria of 
knowledge is limited in a way which the objectivist cannot 
accept. Rational argument is limited, in the sceptic's view 
in that it cannot settle disputes between those whose 
fundamental commitments are to different criteria. As long 
as the disputants remain within the limits of rationality, 
by appealing only to shared criteria, their dispute can in 
principle be resolved. But if either side should invoke a 
criterion not accepted by the other it becomes impossible to 
settle the dispute by rational means. And so
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inconsequentialism cannot be accepted, because scepticism 
about the ultimate criterion of knowledge does have 
practical consequences, in that it limits rational argument.
It should not however be assumed that the objectivist 
has to deny that there are any limitations on rationality 
at all. True, this assumption is apparently made by
Bartley, who believes that to concede that rationality is
• 557limited in any way is to succumb to irrationalism.
Similarly, Popper denounces as 'a pernicious philosophy' the
view that 'rational discussion is possible only between
people who agree on fundamentals.'^8 But the conclusion
of the previous section was precisely that rationality is
limited in that there are some disputes that cannot be
settled. In the example concerning the monk and the soldier,
there is simply no answer to the question whether the wall is
really a shrine or a barricade. And this surely amounts to
saying that here is a dispute which reason is powerless to
resolve. So the objectivist must agree that there is a
sense in which rationality is limited.
But he must also insist that there is a sense in which 
rationality is not limited. What this sense is can be under­
stood by noticing an ambiguity in the sceptic's claim that 
reason cannot settle disputes between those whose fundamental 
commitments are to different criteria of knowledge. This 
can mean, for instance, that someone as a monk has a 
fundamental commitment to religious criteria according to
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which a wall near his monastery is a shrine, while someone 
else has a fundamental commitment as a soldier to military 
criteria in terms of which the wall is a barricade. In this 
sense the sceptic's claim is true. But it can also mean 
that the monk and the soldier do not have any criteria of 
knowledge in common at all, because each uses criteria which 
depend upon a different fundamental criterion. In this sense 
the sceptic's claim is false. For the monk and the soldier 
as human beings share some criteria of knowledge. Indeed, if 
this were not so, it would be impossible to speak of there 
being a dispute between them.
Bambrough makes the same point. Referring to the 
alleged fact that proof requires a premise and that the premise 
itself is always questionable, he suggests that the sceptic is
'right in saying that these requirements cannot be met .....
but wrong in supposing that they have to be met.'^ We should, 
he continues, look at the cases cited by the sceptic in a new 
perspective, seeing them as revealing, not the limits, but the 
scope of reason. That there cannot be a dispute between 
people unless they share some common ground entails, not that 
rational discussion is limited to people who agree on 
fundamentals, but that even people who are in dispute have 
something in common, for otherwise they would be at cross- 
purposes and not in dispute at all. For instance, the 
disagreement between members of the Inquisition and their 
liberal critics is intelligible only on the assumption that they 
agree on certain points. Both sides want to save the heretic
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from avoidable pain and differ only in that the Inquisitors 
do, whereas their critics do not, believe that 'a temporary
40and temporal torment would save a man from eternal hellfire.' 
Bambrough's conclusion is 'not that we never fail to resolve 
our conflicts but that our failures to resolve them are 
failures in our powers or failures in our efforts; that we 
cannot escape responsibility for the failures by attributing
41them to the character of the questions instead of to our own.
But this distinction between our powers and efforts and 
the questions with which we are faced is less significant than 
Bambrough believes. For a question is only a question if 
somebody asks it. We can of course abstract a question from 
its context and imagine how disputants more rational than the 
original ones could use reason to resolve it. But in real 
life there are many cases like that of the monk and the 
soldier, a rational resolution of which would involve too 
great a sacrifice on the part of one of the disputants, 
requiring him to abandon a commitment that is fundamental to 
his role as a monk or a soldier. Even if the nature of the 
questions themselves imposesno limits on the scope of reason, 
in practice reason is curtailed by the fundamental commitments 
people have as incumbents of social roles. So, while 
Bambrough's point that a dispute implies common ground is 
true, it does not entail that all disputes are amenable to 
rational resolution.
It may be helpful at this point to compare the results 
of this discussion with those of the previous section on forms
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of life. The truth in conceptual relativism was found to 
lie in the assertion that some questions about what is real 
cannot be answered, for what is real depends in part upon 
what descriptions are taken seriously and that in turn 
depends upon the form of life to which a person belongs. 
Similarly, there is a sense in which what the sceptic says 
about criteria of knowledge is true: there are disputes 
which reason cannot resolve, because important criteria are 
not shared by the disputants. On the other hand, it was 
concluded in the previous section that the objectivist was 
right to insist that as well as socially variable forms of 
life there is a distinctively human form of sensibility. 
Again, this conclusion is echoed in the view that the truth 
in inconsequentalism is that there are some criteria of 
knowledge which we cannot seriously consider dispensing with, 
so that even those in dispute with one another still share 
some common ground. Both discussions suggest that, while 
there are socially variable forms of life which limit the 
scope of reason, there is also an underlying human form of 
sensibility without which reason could not operate at all.
In the next section it will be argued that this is enough to 
solve the criterion problem.
The Human Form of Sensibility.
'..... we are like a person in whose mind the
law of causality barely exists, a person who 
would be incapable therefore of establishing 
any connexion between one phenomenon and another, 
to whose eyes the spectacle of the world would appear unstable as a dream.' «.o
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The purpose of this section is twofold: (i) to propose a 
solution to the criterion problem; (ii) to introduce the 
notion of tne human form of sensibility. It will be argued 
that there are criteria of knowledge which are rationally 
justified in that their use is indispensable to any systematic 
intercourse with reality. These preconditions of systematic 
engagement with the world constitute the human form of 
sensibility.
A detailed analysis of the human form of sensibility 
is outside the scope of this thesis but an attempt will be 
made to describe those features of it which are particularly 
significant for the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. 
The most elaborate description of what has been referred to in 
this thesis as the human form of sensibility is that contained 
in two major works by Strawson.^ His aim is 'to lay bare
the most general features of our conceptual structure' 
which are indispensable to the more particular processes of 
thought with which we are commonly occupied. The conclusion 
of his investigations is that our conceptual framework must 
include the following features: the concepts of space and 
time; the notion of material bodies which exist independently 
of us; the concept of a person; the everyday concept of 
causality; the law of non-contradiction; and the concepts of 
truth and falsity.  ^ The principle of induction must also 
feature in any specification of the human form of sensibility.
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The existence of the human form of sensibility enables 
it to be seen that there is no need to pretend that the 
criterion problem is not a genuine problem or is one that 
can safely be left unsolved because it makes no difference 
to the conduct of practical affairs. On the contrary, 
were the criterion problem to be left unsolved, were it to be 
admitted that no criteria of knowledge can be ¿justified, the 
damage would be enormous. Not only rational inquiry and 
scientific knowledge, not only communication between members 
of different forms of life, would be in ¿jeopardy: no 
organised dealings with the world would be possible at all.
And there is the solution to the criterion problem. We do 
engage with the world in many rational and routine ways and 
that is sufficient justification for the criteria of knowledge 
on which we rely in doing so.
It is of course a ¿justification that will only rarely 
be demanded. For the most part the fundamental criteria of 
knowledge, which constitute the human form of sensibility, 
are taken for granted. And rightly so. Sub;jectivists too 
readily assume that to show that a principle or a belief is 
taken for granted is to destroy its claim to validity or 
truth.^ But to accept something without question may be
perfectly rational if it is an indispensable precondition of 
any rational thought and action at all. An example may help 
to substantiate this claim.
One such indispensable criterion is the principle of 
induction. It is important to be clear about ¿just what the
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principle of induction actually is. It cannot be the 
assumption that all past regularities will continue 
indefinitely, for the vagaries of futurologists' pronouncements 
demonstrate the folly of simply extrapolating every observed 
regularity into the future. So the principle of induction 
is the assumption that some regularities, which it is 
impossible to specify a priori, will continue, or, in other 
words, that the world will continue to exhibit a certain degree 
of pattern and uniformity. Strawson puts it thus : 'The
chaotic universe ....  is not one in which induction would
cease to be rational; it is simply one in which it would be 
impossible to form rational expectations to the effect that 
certain things would happen.' f It is worth trying to imagine 
what life would be like in the chaotic universe.
The consequences of placing the principle of induction in 
abeyance would be drastic. The world includes my body and in 
my dealings with the rest of the world I take for granted many 
things concerning my body. For instance, I unconsciously 
assume that my legs are not liable to sudden and unpredictable 
changes in length. But suppose that in the chaotic universe 
instantaneous changes in the length of my legs become common­
place. I might begin a stride on the assumption, carried 
over from the real world, that my inside leg measurement was 
its customary thirty-three inches, only to discover that it at 
once extended to twice that span, with the disconcerting 
consequence that my foot regains contact with the ground when, 
according to my usual sublimal calculations, it should still
have been in mid-air. No sooner would I seek to 
accommodate my actions to my new-found length of limb than 
my legs would diminish to half their normal length. And so 
in the chaotic universe, bereft of the principle of induction, 
not only rational discussion and scientific inquiry but even 
such everyday activities as walking would be rendered quite 
impossible. For the conjunction of many bodily and 
environmental changes, of the sort just described, would put 
an end to human life as we now live it. And that is of 
course the justification for the principle of induction: it 
is part of the human form of sensibility, in that human life 
would be impossible without it.
Another constituent of the human form of sensibility is 
what Wittgenstein calls 'agreement in judgements', which he 
regards as indispensable to communication: 'If language is to 
be a means of communication there must be agreement not only
in definitions but also ....  in judgements. This must
mean two things. Firstly, it implies that similar objects 
produce similar effects on the sense-organs of different 
people. It is a contingent fact, to be explained in terms of 
the similarity of human sense-organs and nervous systems, that 
a particular object, such as a rose, causes similar visual and 
olfactory sensations in different people. But it is a fact 
which can be inferred from the existence of language, for 
without such constancy linguistic communication would be 
impossible. Secondly, agreement in judgements is a pre­
supposition of language in the sense that each individual must 
be able to recognise the similarity of similar sensations
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without knowing what the common quality is. If he could 
not do this, if he could not perceive the similarity 
between a current sensation and one which he experienced 
yesterday or which is familiar even though no particular 
experience of it comes to mind, then he would be quite 
unable to learn how to apply a word to a range of 
particulars. And so, firstly, without agreement in 
judgements between different people language could not 
function as a means of communication and, secondly, without 
agreement in judgements by the same person at different 
times language could not be taught and learnt.
There are, then, two sorts of constituents of the human 
form of sensibility: criteria of knowledge and contingent 
features of human beings as biological organisms. Both are 
necessary if a rational engagement with the world and with 
other people are to be possible. But it is the criteria of 
knowledge which are of greater philosophical interest.
For we are, so to speak, ’stuck with’ the cognitive 
apparatus with which evolution has endowed members of the 
species homo sapiens. But the necessity for criteria of 
knowledge can be, and of course has been, questioned; it is 
intelligible to suggest that they are not indispensable to 
rational thought and action. And so an adequate account 
of the human form of sensibility must include a justification 
of the need for criteria of knowledge.
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This is a task that is usually undertaken as part of 
a theory of truth. For, if justified true belief is 
knowledge, distinguishing valid from invalid claims to 
knowledge may actually mean distinguishing propositions which 
one would be justified in believing from those which one would 
not; and believing a proposition is necessarily believing it 
to be true. So what have been called in this chapter 
criteria of rationality or knowledge are criteria of truth.
The next chapter will therefore offer an account of criteria 
of truth as part of the human form of sensibility. But it 
will also perform another task, since truth is the remaining 
constituent of knowledge as justified true belief, which it 
is the main purpose of this section to analyse.
3 .4 Summary
Two arguments for the subjectivist claim that no one is ever 
justified in believing anything have been considered. The 
first is the conceptual relativist thesis that the criteria 
we use in justifying beliefs are socially relative. Three 
arguments against this thesis were discussed. The self­
refutation argument was rejected because it overthrows only an 
extreme version of conceptual relativism. The moderate form 
which survives depends upon the idea of a form of life, which 
the internal disagreement argument seeks to undermine. But 
the universalizability of criteria of rationality enables the 
conceptual relativist to meet this objection by showing that 
forms of life can accommodate internal disagreement. The
communication breakdown argument is partially successful, 
in establishing that, as well as socially variable forms 
of life which explain communication breakdown, there must 
be an underlying human form of sensibility which makes 
possible communication success. Thus, the conceptual 
relativist is right in introducing the notion of forms of 
life but wrong to eschew the equally valuable idea of the 
human form of sensibility.
The second argument for the subjectivist conclusion 
is the sceptical thesis that criteria of rationality cannot 
themselves be rationally justified. Some unsuccessful 
attempts to solve the criterion problem were discussed. 
Particularism collapses into methodism; methodism is 
circular; pragmatic justification relies on ideals which it 
does not try to justify; comprehensively critical 
rationalism is vitiated by its assumption that criticising 
a belief can be distinguished from justifying it; and 
inconsequentialism is refuted by the fact that scepticism 
about criteria of rationality does have practical 
consequences. A solution to the criterion problem was then 
put forward: some criteria are indispensable to rational 
thought and action and as such are partly constitutive of 
the human form of sensibility.
The next chapter has a double aspect; it will contain 
an account of the criteria of truth and therefore of the 
human form of sensibility to which they belong; and it will 
at the same time complete the analysis of knowledge as 
justified true belief.
CHAPTER POUR. TRUTH.
4.1 Int roduct ion
There are two tasks to be undertaken in this chapter.
The main aim of Part One of the thesis is to clarify and 
defend an account of knowledge as ¿justified true belief. It 
has been argued that to ¿justify a belief is to try to 
criticise it and fail; and that rational belief is 
distinguishable from ideology. And it has been found that 
rationally ¿justifying beliefs presupposes criteria which are 
not socially relative and which can be rationally ¿justified 
themselves. As necessary conditions of rational thought 
and action, these criteria form part of the human form of 
sensibility. In order to amplify this account of knowledge 
as ¿justified true belief two questions must be answered: What 
is truth ?, and What precisely constitutes the human form of 
sensibility ? Por in the first place the sub;jectivist, even 
if he admits that there are ¿justified beliefs, will no doubt 
point out a new target for his attacks: the obijectivist claim 
that some ¿justified beliefs are also true. And he will try 
to show that truth itself is socially relative. A complete 
account of knowledge as ¿justified true belief therefore 
requires a theory of truth. As for the second question, 
while it has been argued that some criteria for ¿justifying 
beliefs are part of the human form of sensibility, only one 
example of such criteria, namely, the principle of induction, 
has so far been considered. It will be contended that there 
are other preconditions of rationality; that they serve as
criteria of truth.; and that the concept of truth itself 
is a central component of the human form of sensibility. 
Correspondence to reality and coherence with other beliefs 
will be proposed as further criteria of truth, which link 
the human form of sensibility with the forms of knowledge.
The first task is, then, to give an objectivist answer
to the question, What is truth ?. The subjectivist
seeks to prove the social relativity of truth by refuting
the correspondence theory and upholding the coherence and
pragmatist theories. A repudiation of the notion of truth
as correspondence to reality is implicit in Esland's outline
of the objectivism which he deplores: 'The individual
consciousness recognises objects as being "out there", as
coercive, external realities.' A reason for rejecting
this view emerges a little later on: 'Such a view implicitly
presents man as a passive receiver, as the pliable,
socialized embodiment of external facticities .... One finds
it difficult to disagree with the claim that this epistemology
ois fundamentally dehumanizing.' Esland's preference for 
pragmatism is expressed in his approval of Mills' contention 
that 'the rules of the game change with a shift in interest',^ 
for the rules of the game include 'norms of truth'. So it 
seems that, in Esland's opinion, for a statement to be true 
is for that statement to serve an interest, specifically, 
the interest of those who make the rules of the game. The 
idea of truth as coherence can be interpreted so as to yield 
a very similar position. Thus Bloor maintains that 'the
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objectivity of knowledge resides in its being the set of 
accepted beliefs of a social group. This is why and how 
it transcends the individual and constrains him ....  The
/Lauthority of truth is the authority of society.' It 
follows that 'new' beliefs will be accepted only if they 
are coherent with those already held by members of the 
dominant social group, or possibly, by the majority of people 
in the society in question.
In reply it will be argued that an adequate theory of 
truth must be syncretistic, drawing on two of the traditional 
accounts, the correspondence and coherence theories, though 
allotting the major role to the former. To understand why a 
composite theory is necessary and how it is possible to 
construct one, a preliminary distinction must be drawn between 
a definition and a criterion of truth. Truth can then be 
defined in terms of a very general notion of harmony or 
agreement, which encompasses both correspondence and coherence 
while excluding pragmatic utility. A similar eclecticism is 
appropriate when analysing criteria of truth, for there are 
forms of knowledge which are distinguished on the basis of 
their characteristic truth-criteria, so that no single 
criterion applies invariably across all the forms. Neverthe­
less, the dominant role must be assigned to the idea of 
correspondence between thought and reality, because it is a 
family resemblance concept whose members appear in almost all 
the forms of knowledge. Coherence, on the other hand, is the 
criterion of necessary truth and so is characteristic of the
mathematical form of knowledge. Pragmatic utility is not 
a criterion of truth in any form of knowledge, although it 
does provide evidence for the truth of statements in 
certain fields, as distinct from forms, of knowledge; it is 
best understood as being reducible to correspondence.
It was suggested in chapter three that the preconditions 
of systematic transactions with the world constitute the 
human form of sensibility. The suggestion that those 
features of the human form of sensibility are also criteria 
of truth is, however, less likely to command assent. Never­
theless, they provide a means of identifying some propositions 
as false and so they constitute the first stage of the 
filtering process by which we seek to select for the body of 
knowledge only those propositions which are true. The 
notion of causality may be taken as an example. Part of 
that concept is the assumption that every event has a cause, 
that things do not just happen for no reason at all. It is 
unlikely that anyone would actually deny this, but someone 
might put forward a theory which has that denial as an 
unrecognised entailment or might act on the tacit assumption 
that the denial is true. It would be enough to refute his 
theory or to impugn the rationality of his action if we were 
to point out the unacceptable assumption to which he is 
committed. Indeed, this form of argument has been deployed 
against Cartesian dualism, in an effort to show that it entails
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solipsism, and against the Causal or Representative Theory 
of Perception, with the intention of showing that it 
entails the denial of the existence of the external world.^
The essential feature of such arguments is the assumption 
that some propositions (that there are persons other than 
myself, that there is an external world) are so secure in 
their truth that they can be used as a standard for judging 
the truth or falsity of others.
It is however only rarely that a claim to knowledge made 
in the ordinary course of events, during, for instance, an 
examination, an academic dispute, a trial, a scientific 
■investigation or an official inquiry, can be rejected on such 
grounds. For the propositions advanced in such circumstances 
will have no difficulty in getting through the initial 
screening provided by the indispensable preconditions of 
rationality. A finer net is needed if we are to select, 
from among several rivals, the one proposition which offers 
the true description or explanation which we seek. And this 
is precisely the need which traditional theories of truth 
have tried to satisfy: correspondence, coherence and pragmatic 
utility have each been suggested as the one criterion necessary 
to distinguish truth from falsity.
It will be argued, however, that none of these criteria 
is adequate on its own; the syncretistic theory of truth to 
be put forward in this chapter incorporates both correspondence
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and coherence. The tests which are applied in the search 
for truth can all be subsumed under one or other of those 
two general ideas. And so a hierarchy of truth-criteria 
emerges: the tests which are actually used to distinguish 
true from false propositions; the two general types of such 
tests, namely, correspondence and coherence; and the 
involvement of those same two ideas in the definition of truth. 
That definition expresses a major constituent of the human 
form of sensibility, for rationality presupposes (i) a means 
of relating propositions to reality, that is, correspondence, 
and (ii) a means of relating one proposition to others, that 
is, coherence. In this way the concept of truth connects 
the human form of sensibility, universal and fundamental to all 
rational thought and action, to its particular manifestations 
in the forms of knowledge, which are local and underlie only 
one, albeit powerful, conception of reality.
4,2 The Definition of Truth.
It will be suggested that there is a minimal account of 
truth available, based on agreement or harmony. This idea is 
shared by the notions of correspondence and coherence, which 
are differentiated by the terms which they relate. It will 
later be argued that both correspondence and coherence are
indispensable to rationality.
Before truth can be defined, a distinction must be drawn 
between a definition and a criterion. In everyday usage this 
distinction is straightforward: the definition states the
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meaning of a word, while the criterion provides a test for 
detecting the presence of the object to which the word 
refers and so for applying the word. The chemical term 
'acid', for instance, means 'a substance which neutralizes 
»Ufi is neutralized by alkalis and is compounded of hydrogen 
and at least one other element'; the test for the presence 
of an. acid is that it turns litmus paper red. But even in 
ordinary usage the terms display a tendency to coalesce.
Thus, 'freezing point' is defined as the temperature at which 
liquids, in particular water, freeze, so there can be no more 
reliable criterion for the temperature's being at freezing 
point than that water freezes. Is 'true' like 'acid' or like 
'freezing point' ? Or is it unlike both of these easily and 
u n co n troversially defined terms ? A more formal statement 
of the difference between a definition and a criterion may 
help to answer those questions.
It has been suggested that a distinction can be drawn 
between guaranteeing criteria, which are infallible, and 
authorising criteria, which are fallible. C is a guaranteeing 
criterion of x if it is necessarily true that C occurs if and 
only if x obtains. Clearly, a definition of a word provides 
a guaranteeing criterion of the presence of what the word 
stands for. If, for example, a chemical substance neutralizes 
alkalis and is neutralized by them, then it is necessarily true 
that the substance is an acid, for those properties belong to 
the definition of 'acid' and provide infallible guaranteeing 
criteria of the presence of an acid. (Perhaps this would remain
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true even if the substance were found to contain no hydrogen,
for we might then abandon our present definition of 'acid').
It may however be impossible to apply the guaranteeing
criterion, in which case authorising criteria are worth
having. As Haack puts it, '..... an authorising criterion
gives an indicator which may be less than completely reliable,
but which, by way of compensation, is easier to discover to 
7obtain.'
Unfortunately, it is far from easy to apply the 
distinction between guaranteeing and authorising criteria to 
the concept of truth. If the distinction is to be used, then 
it must be true that (i) the definition in question is either 
a single property or a set of properties of finite and known 
number which always occur together and so could constitute 
guaranteeing criteria of the presence of the thing defined, 
and (ii) there are other properties which are easier to 
discover to obtain and which generally, but not constantly, 
indicate its presence. But truth is an essentially contested 
concept if ever there was one and so there is no general 
agreement about its guaranteeing criteria. Indeed, it seems 
at first sight that the only definition to which everyone 
could assent is so nebulous that the question of criteria of 
truth is left entirely open.
The three traditional answers to the question of what 
'true' means are that a proposition is true if and only if (i) 
it corresponds to reality, (ii) it is coherent with other
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propositions already known to be true and (iii) its 
acceptance brings about desirable consequences. The 
differences between these competing definitions have been 
widely discussed; that they exhibit a certain affinity has 
apparently been overlooked. All three definitions have a 
common root in the very general idea of agreement or 
harmony. Thus, the correspondence theory asserts that 
truth consists in a relation between thought and reality 
which may be designated as agreement or harmony ¿just as well 
as correspondence. It may be held that there is an isomorphism 
between an element of thought or language and an element of 
reality, both having the same number of constituents arranged 
in the same way. Or it may simply be pointed out that what 
one says is true if and only if things are as one says they 
are. In both cases correspondence is evidently synonymous 
with agreement or harmony. Coherence may be analysed in a 
similar manner. A body of propositions is coherent if and 
only if none of its members is inconsistent with any of the 
others. And that is simply to say that there is harmony 
among the propositions and to imply that anyone asserting 
one of them could agree with someone else who asserted another. 
Similarly, what little plausibility attaches to pragmatism is 
derived from the gesture that theory makes towards the idea of 
harmony. If acting upon a proposition leads to the 
satisfaction of a certain sort of desire, then we may surely 
speak of harmony among the agent's beliefs, actions and 
desires. Perhaps, then, the three traditional definitions
of truth have developed from a common core of harmony or 
agreement. If so, an acceptable definition must either 
refine that central notion or somehow incorporate all three 
traditional ideas.
The idea of refining the central notion of harmony
is made attractive by the existence of a definition of truth
which is claimed by its creator to be epistemologically
neutral: Tarski's semantic conception of truth. It has
q
been interpreted as a formal analysis of correspondence.7 
And it is indeed reasonable to see the schema
•Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
as a definition of truth as correspondence between language, 
on the left, and reality, represented on the right. But it 
could also be taken as an attempt to give systematic 
expression to the idea of coherence. In that case 'Snow is 
white' would stand for that sentence as uttered by a speaker 
on a particular occasion, while its repetition without 
quotation marks to the right of 'iff'would represent the 
sentence itself in its standard meaning within a given 
society. The truth of the sentence could then be analysed 
in terms of its consistency with others and the schema would 
state that someone speaks the truth if and only if what he 
says is consistent with whatever else is believed to be true 
in his society. It is not possible, however, to construct 
a plausible pragmatist interpretation of Tarski's scheme.
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For the harmony to which the pragmatist appeals involves 
desire as well as language and external reality and there is 
no place in the schema for that new element. Thus, the two 
sides of the Tarskian schema can be taken to represent 
language and the world or language on a particular occasion 
of use and language in general but not language, the world 
and the will. And so correspondence and coherence, but not 
pragmatic utility, can be used in interpreting the bare 
Tarskian schema.
This does not mean, however, that the two terms are but 
different names for the same idea. Nor does it entail that 
either notion is reducible to the other. The relation 
itself may be indifferently described as one of agreement, 
harmony, correspondence or coherence; but the terms of the 
relation distinguish correspondence from coherence theories 
of truth. Correspondence is used to designate the agreement 
between language or thought and reality or the world; 
coherence refers to the agreement between, or among, two, or 
more, elements of language. Despite their common origin in 
the general idea of agreement, correspondence and coherence 
definitions of truth are distinct.
Must we then choose one or other of these ideas as the 
sole definition ? Must we elect to interpret the Tarskian 
formula in one way rather than the other ? Surely not. 
Correspondence cannot be discarded, because language would be 
of little use if it did not refer to something outside itself; 
granted that there must be a nexus between language and the
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extralinguistic, truth can hardly be denied a major role in 
establishing the link. As for coherence, the propositions 
of logic and mathematics are generally said to be true or 
false, yet the idea of comparing them with reality outside 
the formal system of those disciplines seems altogether 
inappropriate. Empirical propositions are tested against 
the world outside language; analytic propositions are tested 
against the rest of the system. Since we use the word 'true' 
of both sorts of propositions, the definition must be 
sufficiently wide to cover correspondence and coherence alike. 
And so Tarski's schema provides an acceptable definition, not 
for the usual reason that it rehabilitates the correspondence 
theory, but precisely because it is impartial between 
correspondence and coherence.
Truth is, then, to be defined as follows: '£' is true if 
and only if £; where £ is an empirical proposition its truth 
consists in its corresponding to reality; where £ is an 
analytic proposition its truth consists in its cohering with 
other propositions. 'True' is not radically ambiguous, it 
is simply that correspondence and coherence are two sub­
species of truth, each with its own sphere of application; the 
single Tarskian stream is fed by two equally powerful 
tributaries. If the ability to distinguish truth (in this 
sense) from falsity is to be established as a part of the human 
form of sensibility, correspondence and coherence must both be 
shown to be indispensable to rational discourse.
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But this cannot be done until the question about 
criteria of truth has been answered. For it has been 
suggested that what brings out the difference between 
correspondence and coherence is the way in which we test a 
proposition for truth or falsity. So it is reasonable to 
expect that an account of the criteria we use in 
distinguishing true from false propositions will contribute 
to an understanding of why truth as correspondence and 
coherence is part of the human form of sensibility.
4.5. Criteria of Truth
In this section the three traditional theories will be 
examined to see if any of them can provide an adequate 
criterion of truth. It will be argued that the correspondence 
theory, taken literally, encounters insuperable difficulties 
but survives in the form of correspondence as a family 
resemblance concept, whose main area of application is the 
empirical and historico-sociological forms, or disciplines, 
of knowledge. Coherence is only a necessary, not a sufficient, 
condition of truth in those two forms of knowledge, but it is 
an adequate criterion of truth in the mathematical form and 
perhaps also in the aesthetic and ethical forms, where a 
certain indeterminacy of truth-judgements is found. Pragmatic 
utility will be seen to be unable to sustain its identity.
The way is therefore open for a weaving together of 
correspondence and coherence in the syncretistic theory of 
truth which will be expounded in the next section.
4.3.1 Correspondence. The epistemologically richest elaboration
of the idea of truth as correspondence to reality is
10probably that worked out by Russell. The causal nature 
of Russell's theory adds to its interest, because it 
explains why subjectivists are anxious to repudiate 
correspondence; if the external world causes a person's 
beliefs to correspond to it, then evidently social 
conditions are prevented from determining those beliefs.
The Russellian and the subjectivist theories are simply 
rival accounts of the causes of true belief. It will now 
be contended that any causal theory of truth must be 
unsound; rejection of Russell's theory does not therefore 
entail acceptance of subjectivism.
Truth, according to Russell, consists in the 
correspondence of a proposition to a fact; to each true 
proposition there is just one fact the occurrence of which 
makes the proposition true. But the propositions of 
ordinary discourse are ambiguous; for instance, the 
proposition that Socrates was mortal may mean to one person 
that the Greek who drank hemlock was mortal, while to another 
it means that the teacher of Plato was mortal. So molecular 
propositions of this sort must be analysed into their 
constituent parts, namely, atomic or basic propositions. The 
isomorphism between a basic proposition and a fact in which 
correspondence consists is the product of a causal relation 
between the external world and the believer or assertor of 
the proposition. For someone asserts a basic proposition when
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'the truth of what he says ... can ... be wholly dependent
11upon the character of one occurrence he is noticing.'
And so a basic proposition must 'arise on the occasion of' 
a sensible occurrence and be of such a logical form that it 
cannot be contradicted by another basic proposition; it 
cannot therefore refer to any previous or subsequent 
experience of the assertor, nor to the experience of others.
The postulation of basic propositions enabled Russell 
to present knowledge of the truth as the product of a 
process in which the knower is causally affected by his 
environment. Knowledge which is expressible in basic
propositions is no more than the effect of the environment 
on the knower, while the rest of the edifice of knowledge, 
theories and scientific hypotheses, 'are a precarious super­
structure built upon the foundation of simpler and less
12dubious beliefs.' Correspondence to fact is therefore the
ultimate criterion used in accumulating the body of knowledge, 
selecting from among candidates for inclusion those which can 
be shown to be derived from basic propositions. This 
invariant element being the imprint of reality, or the 
environment, upon the knower, the correspondence theory, as 
interpreted by Russell, is essentially a causal theory of 
truth; propositions are true if they can be derived by 
approved methods from basic propositions which are no more 
than environmental effects upon the knower. This makes the
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subjectivist's suspicion of correspondence entirely under­
standable, for if we explain truth as the outcome of the 
operations of external reality on the minds of knowers we 
are debarred from explaining it as the outcome of human 
interests, social and individual alike. To the extent that 
truth is determined by the non-human world, as Russell claims, 
it cannot be determined by the human or social world. So 
the subjectivist would maintain. But truth is not causally 
determined at all.
There are four objections to be made to Russell's 
version of the correspondence theory. The first applies to 
any causal theory of truth. In chapter one a distinction 
was drawn between subjective and objective knowledge. 
Subjective knowledge consists of belief states and speech 
acts; it is perfectly proper to ask whether we freely choose 
to say and to believe the things that we do or whether we are 
causally determined to do so. Objective knowledge is a body 
of propositions, considered in abstraction from any particular 
occurrence in a belief state or a speech act; it is a category 
mistake to think that they can be either freely chosen or 
causally determined. The question of free will or causal 
determinism arises in connexion with someone's believing or 
asserting that £ and not in connexion with £ simpliciter.
That someone believed or asserted a certain proposition, in 
one set of circumstances rather than another, might be 
explicable in causal terms, but the truth, or falsity, of that 
proposition cannot possibly be explained in such a way.^
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A causal interpretation of the correspondence theory must 
therefore be rejected.
The second objection is implicit in the dismissal of 
methodism as an answer to the criterion problem. Taken
literally, the idea of correspondence between thought and 
reality relies on sense experience as the fundamental criterion 
of knowledge. Any attempt to justify it would either depend 
upon sense experience itself and so be circular or would 
introduce a new fundamental criterion and so initiate an 
infinite regress. Russell’s postulation of basic propositions, 
which are by definition no more than the expression of sensible 
occurrences and which are used as the ultimate criterion of 
knowledge, is therefore vitiated by its failure to confront the 
criterion problem.
The third objection is the familiar one that there are no
basic propositions. Even an utterance as simple as 'red patch
here now', assuming that it means 'there is a red patch here
now*, is drawn into logical relations with other propositions
by the occurrence in it of the general term 'red'. For
instance, it contradicts 'there is a green patch here now' (on
the assumption that 'here' and 'now' have the same referents in
both propositions). One such proposition could be used to
correct another; so there are no propositions which, being
immune to correction, can constitute the unalterable foundation
15of knowledge which Russell sought. It has been suggested
that basic propositions, since they do not go beyond the 
immediate experiences which cause them, cannot contradict one
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one another. But in that case they cannot include general 
terms and so even 'red patch here now' is too complex to be 
a basic proposition. The conclusion must be that nothing can 
be both a proposition and the mere effect of a sensory cause.^
The fourth objection is that, even if there were basic 
propositions, the rudimentary awareness which they provide 
would not amount to a practicable criterion of truth. To 
postulate basic propositions as the foundation of knowledge 
is paradoxical, for to do so is to judge fully articulated 
claims to know, which people find it helpful to make and 
discuss, in terms of utterances which most closely resemble 
reflex responses to external stimuli and which no one would 
ever wish to use during the ordinary transactions of life.
For example, even if the proposition that the divorce rate is 
higher now than it was ten years ago could be analysed into its 
myriad supposed constituents, the results would be unlikely to 
justify the labour of their attainment, being individually 
useless and aggregatively too cumbersome to understand. If the 
point of a criterion is that it should be easier to discover 
to obtain than what it is a criterion of, then correspondence, 
in the Russellian sense, is as unsatisfactory a criterion of 
truth as it is possible to imagine.
There is, nevertheless, something of great value to be 
salvaged from the wreckage of the causal interpretation of the 
correspondence theory. The point of using the word 
'correspondence' is to draw attention to the terms of the 
relation it designates; more specifically, it is to emphasise
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the fact that they must include an extralinguistic item.
It follows that correspondence is the appropriate criterion 
when testing a proposition for truth or falsity involves 
some kind of contact with the world outside language, 
whether by means of experiment and observation or statistical 
techniques and surveys. In other words, when a proposition 
is empirical, attributions of truth must take into account 
the way things are in the world. What this means in detail 
is for the practitioners of the academic disciplines that 
study the empirical world to decide. In the case of every­
day knowledge, it means, for example, that what makes it true 
that I saw a nuthatch in the woods this morning is that I saw 
a nuthatch in the woods this morning. And so Russell's 
causal interpretation of the correspondence theory can be 
abandoned without having to relinquish the idea of corres­
pondence as such. Consequently, the repudiation of Russell's 
correspondence theory, far from offering support to the 
subjectivists' dismissal of truth as correspondence, entails 
the rejection of any causal theory of truth, including their 
own.
Coherence. The coherence theory of truth is associated with 
metaphysical idealism. It is therefore natural that it 
should be attractive to subjectivists, because their position
is akin to idealism, as will be seen in chapter five.
A characteristic of Hegelian (as distinct from Berkeleian) 
idealism is that it tends to explain something by relating it 
to other phenomena with which it constitutes a complex whole
133.
rather than by analysing it into its component parts.
Nothing is atomistically self-contained; everything is 
constituted as the thing it is by its relations to other 
things. And so truth is explained by relating propositions 
to one another instead of dividing them into simple elements 
having no logical relations. A single proposition is 
essentially a part of a body of propositions. The idealists'
A Qinclination to 'encourage everything to coagulate' leads to 
the belief that coherence is an obstacle to correspondence, 
understood as a one-to-one correlation between a proposition 
and a fact: 'The intellectual apparatus which we try to apply 
to things outside the mind preventsus from really making
A Qcontact with them'. 7 And so we can never hope to arrive at 
a theory which corresponds to reality. Since we have to give 
some meaning to the words 'true' and 'false', if we are to 
derive a criterion of truth, it is understandable that coherence 
comes to be favoured by subjectivist thinkers. For a body of 
propositions exists only as a consequence of collective human 
action. Truth as coherence is therefore a social artefact 
and the coherence theory a natural ally of an activist, 'non­
dehumanizing' epistemology.
Everyone will agree that coherence has a part to play in 
justifying attributions of truth. A body of propositions 
some of which contradicted each other could not possibly be 
accepted as an explanatory theory. So coherence is a necessary 
condition of the truth of a body of propositions. And a 
necessary condition of the truth of a newly discovered
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proposition is that it should be coherent with the existing 
members of the body of knowledge to which it seeks admission. 
But it is of course the standard criticism of coherence 
theories of truth that they provide only necessary, not 
sufficient, conditions of truth. This objection is 
evidently valid if coherence is identified with logical 
consistency. If _s is inconsistent with £ and £ is true then 
s cannot also be true; but if s is consistent with £ and £ is 
true then, while £ might be true, its consistency with £ is 
not in itself a reason for believing that it is. But there 
is more to coherence than consistency.
Coherence involves comprehensiveness as well as
consistency. There may be many sets of propositions all of
which are internally consistent but each of which is
inconsistent with at least one other set. If we are to
identify one set as being uniquely true, then comprehensiveness
is an attractive criterion to apply. Bradley, for example,
holding that correspondence is the definition of truth, argued
that, since reality is coherent, the body of propositions
which uniquely correspond to it must be consistent and
comprehensive, so that they correspond not merely to a part of
20reality but to the whole of it. A more formal statement of 
the view that coherence is consistency plus comprehensiveness 
is put forward by Rescher, who suggests a procedure for 
selecting from among the propositions with which one is 
acquainted those which one would be warranted in asserting.
The maximal consistent subset of the original data set is
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defined thus: ' S* is an M.C.S. of S if it is a non-empty 
subset of S which is consistent, and to which no member of 
S not already a member of S* can be added without generating 
an inconsistency.'2  ^ But there is no guarantee that this 
procedure will lead to the identification of a single set 
of propositions which one would be warranted in asserting. 
Indeed, Rescher believes that the end-product will be a 
disjunction of M.C.S.s. To reduce the number of possible 
M.G.S.s a plausibility index is proposed to filter out some 
members of the original data set on the grounds of their 
implausibility. But this device does not, Reascher maintains, 
ensure uniqueness and so he concludes by recommending 
acceptance of the disjunction of permitted M.G.S.s.
It is therefore clear that coherence cannot be accepted 
as the criterion of truth. For the need to introduce the 
plausibility index shows that choosing propositions on the 
basis of their coherence with others presupposes the 
selection of some propositions on other grounds. Otherwise, 
there would be nothing for new propositions to be coherent 
with. An infinite regress would be initiated were coherence 
accepted as the sole criterion of truth. But forestalling 
it by means of the plausibility index is a desperate measure, 
relying on an ad hoc and makeshift procedure. Moreover, it 
fails, in the opinion of its author, to eliminate the 
disjunction of permitted M.G.S.s. It will be argued in the 
next section, 'A Syncretistic Theory of Truth', that, while 
this precludes coherence as the criterion of truth in empirical
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propositions, it does not entirely destroy its usefulness, 
partly because there is a form of knowledge in which 
coherence is capable of excluding all but one M.C.S., and 
partly because there is another form in which a disjunction 
of M.C.S.s is the best we can hope to achieve.
4.3.3 Pragmatism. Pragmatism is the view that assertions are to
be judged in terms of their utility, as warranted or
unwarranted, rather than as true or false, as those terms
are conventionally understood. So warranted assertibility
can be seen as a reinterpretation of the traditional idea of
truth as correspondence. The pragmatist seeks to offer a
new account of the terms of that relation: there being no
objective reality to which thought might correspond, the
relation holds between a plan and its own execution, between
a solution and the problem it solves: 'In the sense of
correspondence as operational and behavioural ....  I hold
that my type of theory is the only one entitled to be called
22a correspondence theory of truth.' For the pragmatist,
correspondence relates two stages of the same activity and 
truth is grounded in 'practical facts' which pose problems 
for agents rather than in the causal operation of the 
environment upon the knower. In view of the repudiation of 
causal theories of truth, this is a welcome approach. But 
reliance on pragmatic utility alone, it will now be contended, 
leads to incoherence.
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Incoherence is in fact the standard argument against 
pragmatism. But some critics of pragmatism have been too 
hasty to dismiss it, putting the standard objection in a 
somewhat naive form which admits of a plausible reply.
Russell, for instance, argued that warranted assertibility 
could not be used to redefine truth, because it lacked an 
essential feature of the orthodox interpretation of that idea, 
namely its capacity for performing a normative function. It 
lacked, that is to say, a means of imposing impartiality upon 
the individual scientist, or user of assertions generally.
In Russell's theory, basic propositions were intended to 
establish a fixed standard against which other propositions 
could be judged. And the connexion between a basic 
proposition and the experience which makes it true, if it is 
true, is a causal one. This seems to have led Russell to 
assume that the connexion between an assertion and those of 
its consequences which warrant making it is also causal. In 
his view, Dewey proposed that the division of assertions 'is to 
be defined by the effects of assertions, while I hold, at
least as regards empirical assertions, that it is to be
23effected by their causes. ' Consequently, pragmatism pre­
supposed the traditional idea of truth it was intended to 
supersede; Dewey, Russell maintained, could not help but 
implicitly rely upon 'causal laws of the old sort "C causes
E", except that C must be a situation plus an act, and E
24another situation.' How can the pragmatist reply to this 
criticism ?
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The most promising response is that the criticism is 
"based on a misinterpretation of pragmatism. And this is 
just what Dewey sought to establish, by arguing that 
pragmatism is the view that assertions are to be judged by 
their utility in inquiry. Making an assertion is an action 
performed according to conventions arising out of collective 
attempts to solve problems; it is the conventionalised, or, 
in Dewey's words, 'operationally instituted', consequences of 
such actions which determine whether or not the making of an 
assertion was warranted in a particular field of inquiry. An 
example may help to clarify this point. Suppose a pupil 
knows that Lanfranc was appointed to the Archbishopric of 
Canterbury by William the Conqueror and also knows that his 
teacher is convinced that Odo was appointed. He secures the 
prize being offered for the right answer by saying that 
William made Odo Archbishop of Canterbury. On Russell's 
interpretation of pragmatism, what he asserted was true because 
asserting it produced desirable consequences. But what he 
said was false and so pragmatic utility is a flawed criterion 
of truth. Dewey, however, would reply that the pupil got 
what he wanted only by breaking the conventions of inquiry; 
he satisfied a merely personal want at the expense of 
resolving the doubt in the impersonal problem situation. It 
is the inquiry as a whole that is justified to the extent that 
it is causally efficacious in satisfying human needs. Dewey 
was, so to speak, saying of truth or warranted assertibility 
what Hume said of justice, that it is an artificial virtue.
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This account of truth may be perfectly sound but 
only imperfectly pragmatist. The objectivist may 
readily agree that truth is an artificial virtue, as long 
as the meaning of that phrase is properly clarified. 
Suppose someone argued that pragmatism was still 
dependent upon 'causal laws of the old sort' to establish 
the connexion between human institutions, such as 
scientific inquiry, and the satisfaction of wants. The 
pragmatist might reply that when we evaluate one 
institution we do so, as it were, from within another, so 
that our contact with reality never fails to be mediated 
by our conventions and interests. The implication is 
that such mediation is necessarily distorting. But this 
implication is untenable, for it is in effect a repetition 
of the relativist critique of criteria of rationality which 
was rejected in chapter three.^ The pragmatist assumes
that the only source of criteria and interests is forms 
of life; for conventions of inquiry are a matter of choice, 
like driving on the left. But it has been argued that 
inquiry is also guided by principles which are not a matter 
of choice but indispensable preconditions of any rational 
intercourse with the world. If the claim that truth is an 
artificial virtue is taken to mean that causal laws are 
true because they further human interests, then it must be 
dismissed. But if it means that we try to establish which 
causal laws are true because it is in our interest to do so, 
then it is surely uncontroversial, for it is evidently 
true and compatible with the belief that which causal laws
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turn out to be true is unconnected with our interests.
And it is that belief which is central to the notion of 
truth as correspondence to reality and to objectivism in 
general. And so the claim that truth is an artificial 
virtue is either firmly pragmatist but unsound or sound 
but scarcely pragmatist.
It is now possible to advance a theory of truth which 
incorporates both correspondence and coherence as criteria, 
assigning each the major role in a different form of 
knowledge, but excludes pragmatic utility.
4.4. A Syncretistic Theory of Truth
26'The truth is rarely pure, and never simple.'
The theory of truth to be put forward in this section
is impure and compound in that (i) it postulates two
criteria of truth, correspondence and coherence, and (ii)
it includes an account of correspondence as a family
resemblance concept. An eclectic theory of this kind may
seem to be no more than an issue-fudging compromise. But
it is mere prejudice to assume that to every philosophical
27problem there is a pure and simple theory that fits it. ' 
Moreover, in allocating correspondence to empirical 
knowledge and coherence to mathematical knowledge, the 
syncretistic theory elaborates an insight owed to Hirst: 
'The truths of formal logic and mathematics involve 
concepts that pick out relations of a general, abstract
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kind, where deducibility within an axiom system is the 
particular test for truth. The physical sciences, on the 
other hand, are concerned with truths that, in the last 
analysis, stand or fall by tests of observation by the
posenses.' And so the argument of this section is also a
defence of the irreducibility of at least two of the forms 
29of knowledge.
The concept of correspondence is particularly 
appropriate in testing empirical propositions for truth. It 
originates in sense-perception: if I see something under 
standard conditions, precluding hallucinations, colour­
blindness and so on, then the contents of my visual field 
correspond to the objects in my surroundings. Seeing is 
distinguished from hallucinating precisely on the grounds that 
it can only be done if there is something outside myself for 
me to see.^ This is perhaps the root of the idea of 
correspondence which plays a distinctive part in the empirical 
sciences and in our everyday dealings with the physical world. 
But there is no general formula which can encompass the 
entire range of tests for agreement between thought and 
reality. A series of family resemblances between a variety 
of specific tests is all that can be found. It is possible 
to arrange truth-criteria in a spectrum, so that, while the 
first and the last members may have nothing in common, each 
member shares a characteristic with its immediate neighbours. 
Consider the following list of ways of testing propositions: 
observing the effects of a chemical substance on litmus paper;
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recording readings on a voltameter; observing the physical
reactions of sentient creatures to various sorts of physical
stimuli; eliciting the psychological responses of human
beings to contrived environments; carrying out a survey of
opinions among people in their accustomed surroundings;
reporting on the unintended consequences of the unco-ordinated
actions of many individuals; collecting and analysing samples
to discover if there is a correlation between the presence of
a virus in the water supply and the incidence of a certain
disease; and collecting and analysing statistics to find out
whether the rate of growth of £M3 is correlated with the rate 
7>p . .of inflation. Similarly, there is no single property
which is possessed by all and only the following activities: 
a physicist’s plotting a graph from movements of a needle 
across a dial; Sir Humphry Davy's administering of nitrous 
oxide to himself; the dissecting and experimenting of a 
vivisectionist; and an historian's efforts to establish the 
authenticity of a mediaeval document. Yet it is clear that 
they display the criss-crossing and overlapping network of 
similarities which Wittgenstein found to characterise the range 
of activities we call games. ^
There are three ways in which coherence can enter into 
the testing of propositions. It will be remembered that 
the indeterminacy problem facing the coherence theorist was 
left unresolved. The three ways of using coherence as a 
criterion of truth arise out of three different responses to
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this problem, each of which is appropriate in a distinctive 
form of knowledge. The first reply to the objection that 
coherence yields only a disjunction of permitted M.C.S.s is 
simply to deny that this is always true. The mathematical 
form of knowledge provides a counter-example to the claim 
that coherence is only a necessary, not a sufficient, 
condition of truth. Just as correspondence originates in 
the workings of the senses, coherence is rooted in the 
operations of the intellect. It would be misleading to try 
to explain the truth of Pythagoras' Theorem as a matter of 
correspondence to reality, as though it were an inductive 
generalisation based on observation of triangles. In a 
sense, it is reality that has to correspond to the 
proposition, for if it is not true of a certain figure then 
that figure cannot be a right-angled triangle. What makes 
it true that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled 
triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two 
sides is that certain terms, such as 'right-angled', 
'triangle', 'hypotenuse' and so on, have been defined in 
certain ways and that certain mathematical rules concerning 
sums and squares are acknowledged. The Theorem of 
Pythagoras cannot be denied as long as these definitions and 
rules are accepted. And so its truth is evidently a matter 
of coherence. It might be objected that all that has been 
established is that within a given formal system coherence 
yields a single true proposition rather than a disjunction 
of possibly true propositions. If so, the objector might 
continue, nothing has been done to remove the possibility
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of there being a disjunction of permitted, that is, 
internally consistent and comprehensive, formal systems.
This is true: there is non-Euclidean as well as Euclidean 
geometry and classical logic has been Joined by many-valued 
and non-truth-functional deviant logics. But these systems 
are not so numerous as to prevent the practical application 
of the theorems they contain. In principle it may be 
impossible to rule out a disjunction of permitted M.C.S.s.; 
in practice it is clear that one attains a dominant, indeed 
unassailable, position. And, within that system, coherence 
alone can eliminate all but the one proposition which is 
true.
The second response to the indeterminacy problem is to 
draw attention to forms of knowledge in which the conclusive 
resolution of disputes appears to be impossible. A 
criterion of truth which yields a disjunction of permitted 
M.C.S.s is to be welcomed as an explanation of the nature of 
these forms of knowledge. Perhaps the clearest example of 
such a form is philosophy itself. For there are few 
philosophical disputes which can confidently be said to have 
been settled. And the emphasis in Justifying philosophical 
theories is placed on consistency and comprehensiveness, as 
it is bound to be in a discipline which tends to define its 
questions by distinguishing them from empirical ones about 
the same subject. The present thesis provides a case in 
point: what is said about belief limits what can be said about 
Justification and what is said about Justification is
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compatible with only some of the many things that might be
said about truth. Truth in philosophy depends ultimately
upon logical relations between concepts. Literature and
the arts furnish another example of a form where
indeterminacy is a requirement in a criterion of truth and
not a weakness. Whether they constitute a form of knowledge
themselves is of course a controversial question.^ But it
is clear that aesthetic and literary criticism, being
apropositional, have a secure claim to constitute/form of 
knowledge. And it is equally clear that propositions such 
as that D.H.Lawrence was a better novelist than C.P.Snow or 
that Romanticism was a reaction to the Industrial Revolution 
are not empirical. Yet they cannot simply be asserted without 
constraint; and the constraint is what else we wish to say 
about novelists or poets. Again, it would be a cause for 
suspicion, not congratulation, if someone proposed a criterion 
of truth that would facilitate the conclusive resolution of 
such controversies. And so there exist forms of knowledge 
in which the best we can do is to arrive at a disjunction of 
permitted M.C.S.s.
The third response to the indeterminacy problem is to 
admit that there is a form of knowledge in which coherence is 
only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition of truth, 
because a disjunction of permitted M.C.S.s is not the best 
attainable outcome. A single M.C.S. can be established as 
uniquely true in empirical disciplines where correspondence is 
available as a criterion of truth. But even here the notion
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of coherence is important. For the more theory-saturated 
a proposition is, the more its logical relations with other 
propositions will enter into the making of ¿judgements 
concerning its truth-value. The greater the scope for 
rejecting it as false because it is inconsistent with other 
propositions already known to be true, by virtue of their 
correspondence to reality, the more important is coherence as 
a criterion of truth. And so there are many propositions 
which are judged to be true or false according to whether they 
both correspond to reality and cohere with other propositions. 
At one end of the scale, a deduction from a complex theory, 
such as Darwin's theory of evolution through natural 
selection, will be logically related to a great many other 
propositions. It will be inconsistent with many of them, 
such as those belonging to competing theories and rival world­
views, and so we may be able to decide on its truth-value even 
if direct observation or experiment are impossible and so 
correspondence inapplicable in this particular case. At the 
other end of the scale, a proposition of the simplest sort, 
such as that there is a red patch here now, will be 
consistent with so many propositions that coherence would be 
a useless test for truth. We would be unlikely to be able to 
decide upon its truth-value in the absence of a test for 
correspondence. Coherence, it can be concluded, has no more 
than an ancillary role, albeit an important one in some 
circumstances, in the empirical form of knowledge.
Correspondence between thought and reality and coherence 
among propositions may both, therefore, be criteria of truth, 
depending on the form of knowledge concerned.
W .
4.5 Truth and the Human Form of Sensibility.
How, if at all, are the forms of knowledge related to 
the human form of sensibility ? Can the testing of 
propositions for truth or falsity be justified by deriving 
the criteria employed in such testing from the human form of 
sensibility ? It was suggested above^ that the concept of 
truth is a principal constituent of the human form of 
sensibility and that the tests which we apply in the quest 
for truth can all be subsumed under one or other of the two 
general ideas of correspondence and coherence. The previous 
section has attempted to accomplish the second of these tasks, 
by showing how correspondence is a family of different but 
related tests and coherence a sufficient test of the truth of 
some propositions and an ancillary one for others. It must 
now be established that truth, defined so as to encompass 
both correspondence and coherence as criteria of application, 
is a component of the human form of sensibility.
Truth has been defined as follows : £ is true iff £.
It can be shown that this concept is indispensable to rational 
discourse, and therefore part of the human form of sensibility, 
by proving its denial to be self-refuting. Suppose someone 
argues that we can safely discard the idea of truth and the 
practice of distinguishing true from false propositions. The 
suggestion may have an initial plausibility; there are many 
propositions which were once widely believed to be true, and 
justifiably so, but are now known to be false; it is therefore
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likely that some of the propositions we are now justified in 
believing will turn out to he false. This is of course 
quite true but it is far from entailing the dispensability 
of the distinction between the true and the false. That 
some propositions now justifiably believed to be true will in 
the future be found to be false does not entail that all such 
propositions will, or even could, be found to be false. And 
even if it did it would not follow that rational discourse 
could survive such a catastrophe. For it is a precondition 
of rational discussion that some propositions are true and 
some false. There is at least one proposition that must be 
true if rational argument is to be possible and that is the 
proposition that there is a difference between a true 
proposition and a false one. To deny that proposition would 
make it impossible to continue to engage in rational discussion. 
For if there were no difference between true and false 
propositions no one could ever have a reason for asserting one 
proposition rather than another. And, since to believe a 
proposition is necessarily to believe it to be true, no one 
could ever have a reason for believing one proposition rather 
than another. Rational discourse would therefore be 
impossible.
The general argument that truth is a necessary condition 
of rational debate can be reformulated in terms of both 
correspondence and coherence. The indispensability of 
correspondence can be shown by considering the purpose of 
rational argument about empirical questions. The purpose of
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such discourse is to say how things are: 'The general form 
of proposition is: This is how things stand.' So the 
idea of correspondence to reality is implicit in the 
definition of rational discussion about empirical matters.
It follows from that definition that propositions that 
correspond to reality, that is to say, that succeed in saying 
how things are, are to be preferred to those that do not.
To repudiate the distinction between propositions that do, 
and those that do not, say how things are is to reject the 
entire enterprise of rational discourse about empirical 
questions.
Coherence is an essential precondition of rational 
discourse in any field. If someone, A, asserts £ and £ and 
£ and £ are inconsistent, then he has failed to give his 
hearer, H, a reason for believing either £ or £. It is as 
though he had asserted nothing at all.^® Under normal 
circumstances A's asserting that £ will be understood by H 
to imply that A believes £ and wants H's recognition of that 
belief to be instrumental in bringing it about that H 
believes that £. If H knows A to be a competent authority 
or a reliable witness, and an honest man, then A's asserting 
that £ gives him a reason for believing £ to be true. But 
once A asserts £ that reason is withdrawn. And so 
asserting inconsistent propositions is incompatible with 
giving someone a reason for believing something. It must 
in turn be concluded that coherence is a precondition of 
rational discourse.
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The human form of sensibility includes, then, the 
concept of truth as correspondence and coherence. This 
reflects the fact that if rational discourse is to be 
possible we must have a way of relating words to the world 
and a way of relating them to each other. It also shows 
that the doctrine of the forms of knowledge is in part based 
upon the human form of sensibility. For correspondence and 
coherence are criteria of truth which apply characteristically 
to the empirical and the mathematical forms of knowledge.
That knowledge can be divided in this way is therefore 
entailed by the fact that truth is an indispensable pre­
condition of rational discourse.^ This outcome raises 
some interesting questions about the forms and educational 
knowledge, as will be seen in chapters ten and eleven.
4.6 Summary
It has been argued that an adequate theory of truth 
must incorporate elements which are usually assumed to be 
disparate. Truth is to be defined in epistemologically 
neutral terms, but implicit in this definition are the two 
ideas of correspondence and coherence. These have been 
developed in two ways: as criteria of truth and as parts of 
the human form of sensibility. Correspondence, understood 
as a family resemblance concept, is characteristic of the 
empirical form of knowledge, while coherence, only a necessary 
condition of the truth of empirical propositions, is also a 
sufficient condition of truth in the mathematical, and
151.
philosophical, forms. Both ideas are indispensable to 
rational discourse and as such are partly constitutive of 
the human form of sensibility. It follows that the 
distinction between the empirical and the mathematical (and 
philosophical) forms of knowledge can be derived from a 
consideration of the human form of sensibility. The 
implications of this limited support for the doctrine of 
forms of knowledge will be examined in chapter ten.
Of more immediate interest is the place of the 
syncretistic theory of truth in the defence of the claim that 
justified true belief is knowledge. For the argument that 
truth as correspondence and coherence is part of the' human 
form of sensibility rebuts, if it is valid and based on true 
premisses, the subjectivist contention that the criteria which 
we use in distinguishing true from false propositions are not 
objective but merely socially useful. The pragmatist theory 
of truth on which this claim is based has been found to be 
unsound; pragmatic utility is neither the definition nor a 
criterion of truth. But it may seem that this reply to 
subjectivism has succeeded only in setting up another target 
for criticism, for to speak of correspondence between thought 
and reality is to presuppose the distinctness and mutual 
independence of the terms of that relation. And it is 
precisely that presupposition that the subjectivist will seek 
to undermine. The arguments with which he will try to 
establish the idealist view that thought and reality are too 
close ever to fail to correspond will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE. REALITY.
5.1 Introduction
The main subjectivist claim about reality is that it is 
mind-dependent, a thesis familiar to philosophers as meta­
physical idealism. If, as the metaphysical idealist is 
generally held to maintain, reality is the product of thought, 
the two can hardly fail to correspond. Since truth is often 
difficult and sometimes impossible to attain, it cannot 
consist in a correspondence which is unavoidable. In this 
way metaphysical idealism is thought to undermine the 
correspondence theory of truth. While that theory was 
argued in the previous chapter to be inadequate as an account 
of truth in general, correspondence was found to be an 
important criterion of truth in the empirical form of 
knowledge. And so it seems that metaphysical idealism 
threatens the objectivity of knowledge in the empirical domain, 
for objective knowledge is commonly interpreted to be 
knowledge of an objective, or mind-independent, world. If 
metaphysical idealism succeeds in showing that there is no 
such world, or reality, then there can be no objective 
knowledge. A possible objectivist response to this challenge 
is to accept the idealist contention that there is no 
objective world and to reinterpret the notion of objective 
knowledge, perhaps in terms of public criteria governing 
beliefs and claims to know. But it is just such an anthro­
pocentric approach which has been adopted in this thesis and 
which has led to reliance on the idea of truth as 
correspondence to reality and so to the need to postulate
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the existence of mind-independent reality. So the question 
of whether metaphysical idealism is true is the crux of the 
entire argument in support of an objectivist epistemology.
Before examining the subjectivist argument that meta­
physical idealism prevents correspondence from playing any 
role in the identification of true propositions, two other 
manifestations of idealist thinking in the sociology of 
educational knowledge must be discussed.
$.2 Idealism in the Sociology of Educational!- Knowledge
In addition to the claim that there is no mind-independent 
reality, there are two theses put forward by subjectivists in 
recent contributions to the sociology of educational knowledge 
which are idealist in inspiration. These will be discussed 
briefly before the main subject of this chapter, metaphysical 
idealism itself, is examined.
The first of these idealist contentions is that part of 
reality, namely the social world, is mind-dependent, in the 
sense that it is constructed by social actors. Berger and 
IiUckmann appear to subscribe to this view in saying that 
* sociology of knowledge understands human reality as socially
Aconstructed reality', but their tendency to refer to 'reality' 
rather than reality suggests a need for caution in bestowing 
the title 'idealist' upon them. For if their claim is that 
it is 'reality', that is, what is taken to be reality, which
is socially constructed, then it is consistent with the 
metaphysical realist assertion that reality itself is mind- 
independent. But it is likely that they would deny the 
distinction between reality and what is taken for or counts 
as reality in the sphere of war, marriage, suicide and so on. 
This is certainly how one commentator interprets what they 
say: 'What are important in any social world are the processes 
of Institutionalization, Legitimation and Internalization of 
intersubjectively constructed social reality. These are the 
chief components, then, of any society, above the purely
pbiological or physiological constitution of human reality.'
So this is a restricted version of idealism, according to 
which only a segment of reality, namely the social world, is 
socially constructed or mind-dependent. It is unnecessary to 
discuss it at any length, because it is no more than an 
alternative formulation of a position which has already been 
endorsed.^ But there is another subjectivist claim of 
idealist origin which cannot be accepted.
The second idealist claim is put forward by Blum: 'it is 
not an objectively discernible purely existing external world 
which accounts for sociology; it is the methods and procedures
tLof sociology which create and sustain that world.' Clearly, 
this is not a claim about reality in general; the idealist 
argument is applied to the specific case of that part of 
reality which is studied by sociologists. It has already been 
established that the social world is mind-dependent, in that 
facts about it are institutional rather than brute facts. If
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Blum, in the first part of the passage quoted, is claiming
no more than that social facts are not brute facts, then what
he says is true. But he goes on to claim that it is not
social actors but sociologists whose activities create the
institutions presupposed by expressions such as 'is married'
or 'declared war'. Since the first idealist claim is, it has
been argued, true, this one must be false. One could not get
married or declare war in the absence of the appropriate
institution; but one could do both of these things even if no
sociologists had ever existed.^ Indeed, since marriages and
wars antedate the emergence of sociology, it is unquestionably
false that 'the methodical character of marriage, war and
suicide is only to be seen, recognized and made possible
0through the organized practices of sociology.'
The third idealist thesis in the sociology of educational 
knowledge is a statement of metaphysical idealism itself, as 
interpreted by a subjectivist. In repudiating the idea of 
correspondence between thought and reality, Esland rejects the 
objectivist assumption that 'the individual consciousness 
recognizes objects as being "out there", as coercive, external 
realities' and goes on to attack objectivism for presenting man 
'not as world-producer, but as world-produced.'' It rather 
looks as though Esland is denying that human actions are in any 
way constrained by external objects. But people do have to 
take account of such things, even if they do not know what they 
as Helm has pointed out: 'It is because of the physicalare,
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properties of the world that human beings cannot walk through
brick walls, no matter what they believe about ....  them.
What is compulsory about the physical environment is the fact 
that if men are to survive in it, they must reckon with it in
Ocertain ways.' Having the concept 'brick wall' does not 
bring brick walls into existence and is not a necessary 
condition of having to reckon with them. Someone from a 
society lacking that concept is not thereby enabled to walk 
through them. What is real is in part a matter of what 
descriptions are taken seriously. But only in part, as 
argued in chapter three (see sections 3.2.4 and 3.3 .5 ). It 
seems that Esland is committed to denying that the physical 
environment is, as Helm puts it, compulsory; for to say that 
the physical environment is compulsory is surely to say that 
there are coercive, external realities. And this is ¿just how
Qmetaphysical idealism is widely understood.7
It appears that metaphysical idealism entails the denial 
of an incontrovertible truth, and must therefore be false, in 
which case the idea of truth as correspondence between thought 
and reality remains intact. But the issue is not in fact as 
simple as it appears. For metaphysical realists and 
sub ;jactivists misinterpret metaphysical idealism in precisely 
the same way, as an empirical rather than a metaphysical, or 
metalinguistic, theory. It will be argued in the rest of this 
chapter that there is a sense in which metaphysical idealism is 
both true and compatible with the notion of truth as 
correspondence between thought and reality. In the next 
section five arguments for metaphysical realism will be
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critically examined, with a view to showing that they are 
based on an unsound interpretation of metaphysical issues.
5.5 give Arguments for Metaphysical Realism
Metaphysical realism is assumed by its adherents to be the 
view that there is a world independent of human thought, which 
existed before the evolution of intelligent creatures and may 
be expected to survive their demise. There is a sense in which 
this realist claim is true, but it is not a sense in which the 
realism involved can properly be described as metaphysical.
Nor is it a sense in which the well-informed idealist would 
wish to deny it. For it is indeed ridiculous to assert that 
the natural world did not exist until the emergence of 
creatures with minds and that its continued existence is 
causally dependent on mental activity. Empirical realism is 
therefore true; at the empirical level reality is mind- 
independent. But attempts to present realism as a metaphysical 
doctrine are bound to fail, because at the metaphysical level 
reality is mind-dependent. The distinction between empirical 
and metaphysical theories, on which this argument depends, is 
a difficult one and will be explained in full in section 5»5« 
give arguments for metaphysical realism will now be considered.
.5^  r.nmTnonsense. The first argument is that metaphysical realism 
is part of commonsense. For reasons to be explained below 
(section 5.5)» it is most unlikely that commonsense includes 
a genuinely metaphysical version of realism. But, even if 
it did, that would not constitute a convincing argument for 
metaphysical realism. That our opinions are heterodox may
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be a reason to examine them more carefully, but conformity
with commonsense is no guarantee of intellectual rectitude.
What was at one time the most outrageous eccentricity may
later be subsumed under the reassuring heading of commonsense.
Not only is commonsense no basis for philosophical
conclusions, its support has not infrequently been enlisted
on both sides of a philosophical dispute. For instance,
after arguing that realism is part of commonsense, Popper
claims that idealist arguments are grounded in 'an
10uncritically accepted part of commonsense.' The first
argument must therefore be rejected.
Prediction without the senses. This argument is borrowed 
by Popper from Sir Winston Churchill, who claimed to have 
devised a 'method, apart altogether from our physical senses, 
for testing the reality of the sun.' Astronomers, working 
on data provided by automatic observatories activated by light 
falling on them, predict that a black spot will cross the sun 
at a certain time. This prediction, arrived at without the 
aid of the senses, can be verified by observation, thereby 
proving the reality of the sun. But this line of thought is 
not an argument against idealism in general; if valid and 
based on true premises, it would refute only Berkeleian 
idealism in particular, for the conclusion is simply that the 
sun can he causally efficacious even when there is nobody 
around to observe it. It is questionable whether the
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paraphernalia of automatic observatories are needed, to make 
what is essentially the standard objection to Berkeley's 
doctrine. In any case, this argument is not germane to a 
discussion of metaphysical idealism, understood as the thesis 
that the world as we know it is mind-dependent and that any 
other concept of the world is unintelligible.
Science and Language. The second and third arguments will be
discussed together, for they are similar in form: realism is
presupposed by science and by language, respectively. Popper,
for example, contends that 'what we attempt in science is to
describe and (so far as possible) to explain reality' and
goes on to say that 'an unambiguous description is always
realistic; it is of something - of some state of affairs
which may be real or imaginary ......  Rationality,
description, language, argument, are all about some reality,
and they address themselves to an audience. All this
'i?presupposes realism.' In saying that the object of a
description may be real or imaginary, Popper is not of course 
implying that realism would still be true even if the objects 
of all descriptions were imaginary. So he must mean that if 
the object of a description is imaginary the description must 
be false. Or so it might seem, for the view imputed to him 
is obviously false. It is possible, indeed commonplace, to 
assert truths of imaginary objects: 'King Arthur was the 
illegitimate son of Uther Pendragon' and even 'King Arthur is 
a legendary figure' are examples of such truths. Perhaps 
'imaginary' is to be understood not as 'fictitious' but as
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'mind-dependent'. But this does not help, for people 
frequently assert truths of mind-dependent things, such as 
hallucinations and toothaches. And so unless he is saying 
something that is evidently false, Popper must be saying no 
more than that some of the things we say about mind-independent 
things - physical, material or external objects - presuppose 
that those things exist. But this seems too obvious to be 
worth saying.
However, if an obvious truth is denied, its assertion is 
appropriate. And metaphysical realists do sometimes claim 
that their opponents' views are not merely erroneous but out­
rageously and absurdly so. Flew, for instance, takes a 
sociologist whom he describes as a metaphysical idealist to be 
denying what no reasonable person would dream of denying: 'It 
is ridiculous to maintain .... that the stars in their courses 
are in any way dependent on what we say or do not say; and it 
is not for any sociologist to deny the claims of the natural 
scientists to know that this earth existed long before it bore 
any language-using creatures.'^  It may readily be agreed 
that when someone says 'Silicon composes 26# of the earth's 
outer crust' he means that silicon composes 26# of the earth's 
outer crust, not that 'silicon' is part of 'the earth's outer 
crust'. In other words, he is using language in talk about 
extralinguistic reality rather than using language to talk 
about language itself. And it is certainly true that whether 
silicon composes 26# of the earth's outer crust does not depend
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on his saying so. The illocutionary act which the speaker 
performed was one of describing or reporting (that silicon 
composes 26% of the earth's outer crust), not one of 
conferring (the complex property of composing 26% of the 
earth's outer crust upon silicon). The speaker's saying 
what he says does not bring it about that silicon composes 
26% of the earth's outer crust. And so science and language 
do indeed presuppose realism, at this straightforwardly 
empirical level. The question is whether this is what the 
metaphysical idealist wishes to deny.
Metaphysical idealism cannot be understood until the 
nature of metaphysical questions has been clarified. For 
metaphysical theories are not simply highly generalised 
versions of empirical ones. A genuinely metaphysical realism 
must therefore set out to be a theory about the ontological 
status of reality as such rather than a straightforward list 
of the contents of reality as a whole. Yet it has been seen 
that some philosophers seem to assume that metaphysical 
realism is simply empirical or naive realism writ large. In 
conducting scientific inquiries and in using language we take 
it for granted that there are stars, the earth, water, paper, 
acids «nd so. All that needs to be said about reality is
that it comprises all these things. So the metaphysical 
realist appears to argue. But all that he has produced is a 
summary of the objects assumed by science and language to 
exist, an account which is of no particular philosophical 
interest. The metaphysical issue is whether, granted that we 
assume in empirical discourse that there is an objective world,
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we should regard that assumption as unique to such discourse 
or carry it over to the metaphysical, or metalinguistic, level. 
From a metaphysical perspective, a reiteration of the 
assumptions of empirical discourse is irrelevant. The meta­
physical question is : Is language related to reality as 
'Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system' is related 
to Jupiter's being the largest planet in the solar system ?
But the putatively metaphysical realists do not confront this 
question at all, tacitly accepting an affirmative answer. A 
properly metaphysical theory must, however, confront it; it 
will shortly be argued that only an idealist answer can be 
defended.
Creation by the mind. The argument is that metaphysical
realism must be true because its only rival, metaphysical
idealism, is false, for it entails that an individual mind can
bring the world into ecistence. Thus, Popper claims that
idealism implies 'something like this: that it is my mind
which creates this beautiful world. But I know that I am not 
1 4its Creator.' Metaphysical idealism, on this interpretation, 
also has the radically relativist consequence that there are 
as many realities as there are minds. No doubt there have 
been injudicious idealists who have espoused a theory 
according to which there is no reality except the many 
realities each of which is the creation of a mind. And it 
might be argued that it is best to call the mistaken theory 
metaphysical idealism and that where realists are wrong is in
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assuming it to be the only alternative to their own 
doctrine. But in fact the mistaken theory is a mis­
interpretation of metaphysical idealism, arising out of an 
inadequate understanding of metaphysics as a very general 
sort of empirical knowledge.
Once metaphysics is properly understood as metalinguistic 
analysis, it becomes clear that metaphysical idealism does 
not entail that the mind creates, or is causally responsible 
for the existence of, the world it thinks about. The 
sagacious idealist does not believe, what would be absurd, 
that someone's asserting or thinking that Jupiter is bigger 
than Mercury somehow brings it about that Jupiter- is bigger 
than Mercury. To believe that he does is to transfer a 
metaphysical thesis from the metalinguistic level, where it 
belongs, to the empirical realm, where it is out of place. 
Metaphysical idealism is not an empirical or a causal hypo­
thesis; rather aoes it assert a conceptual connexion between 
the mind and the world. It is not that the conceptual 
apparatus which we employ in thinking and speaking about the 
world creates it, but rather that the only world there can 
be is the world as it is known and understood through that 
conceptual apparatus. The-world-as-we-know-it is, so to 
say, mind-informed. No other world is intelligible, as 
is shown by the fact that the attempt to imagine one yields 
only an empty concept of 'the world as it is in itself'.
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It is important to clarify exactly what is, and what 
is not, being asserted. It is not being claimed that there 
are two worlds, or realities, the-world-as-we-know-it and 
the-world-as-it-is-in-itself, and that one of them is forever 
beyond the reach of our knowledge, so that we should, having 
acknowledged its existence, avert our minds from it and think 
only of what can be thought of. There is only one world and 
it is mind-informed, in that any attempt to describe it must 
draw on concepts and principles which cannot be understood 
without reference to minds. When metaphysical realists say 
that there is a world of things as they are in themselves, 
what they seem to have in mind is a world exactly like the 
one we seek to know and understand, except that there are no 
intelligent creatures about to seek to know and understand it. 
Although they claim to be describing a world altogether 
independent of minds, all that they succeed in imagining is a 
world causally unaffected by mind-possessing creatures. It 
is as if they begin with the world as it is known to human 
intelligence and then subtract the intelligence. A world in 
which there are 'rocks and stones and trees' but no 
intelligent creatures, no minds, is easily imagined; but it 
can hardly be said that such a world is uninformed by our 
conceptual apparatus. A world which is genuinely mind- 
independent is a world which cannot in principle be
identified. And so the concept of such a world is a concept
nofor which there are/criteria of application. If we remain 
true to the spirit of empirical realism, recalling that
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science and language presuppose a mind-independent world, 
we must insist that there can be no sense in the idea of a 
world necessarily beyond the reach of human knowledge, for 
such a world could not be presupposed by science and 
language. So empirical realism entails metaphysical 
idealism: the assertion of the mind-independence of the world 
at one level of discourse entails its denial at another.
It is worth persisting in this attempt to elucidate 
metaphysical idealism, because misleading statements tend to 
intrude themselves even into its most careful expositions. 
Rescher, for example, maintains that 'what is mind-dependent
....  is not reality itself (whatever that might be) but
reality-as-we-picture it: not reality an sich, but our 
reality.'^ This disclaimer appears to undermine his idealist
pretensions, for to admit that reality itself is not mind- 
dependent is surely to concede the central claim made by the 
realist. Rescher would probably reply that the notion of 
reality itself is so attenuated that it is, if not actually 
unintelligible, at least vacuous. For when all mind­
involving concepts are excluded from a specification of reality, 
all that is left is 'a world without particularity', 'a chaos 
because its various stuff-kind components would not be 
empirically discriminable', 'an amodal world - without any 
colouration of necessity and possibility', 'an anomic world - 
one without laws, and without causal interaction' and a world 
which lacks the 'entire potentialistic domain of powers, 
capacities, dispositions and the like.' It is natural to
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take this as a statement that is misleading in the way 
identified above: it is first asserted that there are two 
realities and then it is denied that one of them deserves the 
title. Flirthermore, the reason for this denial appears to 
be that we cannot know anything about this putative reality: 
yet a list of its features is then provided. And so, even 
though those features are negative ones, the impression 
remains that Rescher has failed to exorcise the ghost of 
reality-as-it-is-in-itself from his version of idealism.
What has to be made clear is that the negative features 
listed by Rescher are not features of a reality which exists 
but is beyond the reach of our understanding. They are 
instead features of the concept of reality an sich. The 
idealist is not of course committed to the absurd view that 
simply possessing or postulating a concept guarantees its 
instantiation. Whether a concept is instantiated is an 
empirical question, as long as its specification is not self- 
contradictory and it can be supplied with criteria of 
application. And surely it is that second condition to which 
Rescher is drawing attention. For the concept of reality 
itself is so devoid of content that no criteria of application 
can be specified for it and so the question whether it is 
instantiated does not arise.
The concept of a world, of reality, is a concept of some­
thing with discernible characteristics of some description.
For a world is necessarily a totality, something exhibiting
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structure, a complex whole whose constituents are related to
each other in certain ways. And these properties and
relations are nothing other than what a mind can identify
and discriminate. So the concept of a world is a concept
of something which cannot be specified without referring to
the mind. Admittedly, a thing can possess features even
though no minds exist to discern them. The idealist is not
saying that without the mind there would not be any features
and therefore there would not be a world, as though stars
could exist only when minds had evolved to identify them.
This is the position mistakenly ascribed to metaphysical
17idealists by realists such as Popper and Flew. r But it 
is not a position which the wise idealist will wish to adopt. 
The point he wants to make is rather that a thing could not 
be entirely bereft of features and still be a thing; a fort­
iori it could not be the world, that is, the totality of 
things and the relations holding between them. Metaphysical 
idealism is not the empirical claim that nothing can exist 
until there are minds to think of it, but the metalinguistic 
thesis that we cannot say what the world is like without 
referring to minds.
It can therefore be concluded that no case has been 
made for rejecting metaphysical idealism, for the realist 
critique is based upon a misinterpretation. In reply the 
realist might argue that metaphysical realism is an equally 
misguided interpretation of his doctrine. Another version 
of realism has in fact been propounded and it is clearly 
appropriate to examine it.
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5.4. Internal Realism.
Internal realism is interesting because it is put 
forward as an alternative to both metaphysical realism 
and metaphysical idealism. According to its 
progenitor, Putnam, this idea's task is to explain the 
fact that scientific theories tend to converge, 'in the 
sense that earlier theories are, very often, limiting 
cases of later theories (which is why it is possible to 
regard theoretical terms as preserving their reference
A  Qacross most changes of theory).' Metaphysical realism 
cannot explain convergence because it envisages 
correspondence between thought and reality an sich, which 
can easily be seen to be unintelligible. For, as 
Rescher has it, 'one cannot workably operate a
19correspondence theory with one inaccessible member.'
Putman would argue that this objection overturns meta­
physical realism but would go on to claim that internal 
realism evades it.
Internal realism is presented as an empirical 
thesis: 'an account of the relation of language-speakers
20to the world is part of a causal model of human behaviour.' 
But if internal realism is simply a contribution to an 
explanatory theory of human behaviour, it can be of no 
more than marginal philosophical interest. For if meta­
physical idealism does not entail that the world is 
causally dependent on the mind, it is consistent with the 
fact that, in speaking and acting, we need to take account
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of objects which do not owe their existence to us. And so 
it is consistent with an explanatory model of human behaviour 
which also takes account of that fact. But this does not 
make metaphysical idealism part of such a model, because, 
being a metaphysical theory, it is not an empirical one. 
Internal realism is therefore both unnecessary and irrelevant: 
unnecessary in that there already exists a theory, metaphysical 
idealism, which does not contradict the assumption that there 
are objects which are causally independent of our minds, and 
irrelevant in that it is put forward as an empirical, rather 
than a metaphysical (or metalinguistic), one.
As an empirical theory, internal realism cannot accomplish 
the task of explaining the tendency of scientific theories to 
converge. Unlike metaphysical realism, which concerns the 
relation of a theory to the world, internal realism postulates 
a relation between linguistic terms and the world within a 
theory. Putnam explains that, according to metaphysical 
realism, 'there has to be a determinate relation of reference 
between terms in L and pieces .... of THE WORLD.'21 This 
applies to all correct theories and the world is supposed to 
be independent of any theory about, or model of, it.
Internal realism, on the other hand, 'employs a similar 
picture within a theory.'** But in that case internal 
realism cannot explain convergence, because that phenomenon 
presupposes the existence of terms which preserve their 
reference across changes of theory. There must therefore be 
objects which are independent of any particular theory;
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otherwise, later theories could not be seen as more 
accurate accounts of the objects which figure in earlier 
theories. But internal realism cannot accommodate such 
objects, for the relation between language and the world 
obtains within a theory, from which it follows that no 
theory can attempt to explain the same phenomena as any 
other theory. So, far from helping us to understand how 
convergence comes about, internal realism, if true, would 
make it impossible for scientific theories ever to converge, 
for there would be as many realities as there were theories. 
At this point internal realism appears to collapse into 
conceptual relativism.
Realism, metaphysical and internal alike, is, it may 
now be concluded, unsatisfactory. An exposition of meta­
physical idealism is therefore appropriate.
5 .5 . Metaphysical Idealism.
In xinderstanding metaphysical idealism it is essential 
to be clear about the distinction between empirical and 
philosophical forms of knowledge. The former comprises 
propositions which are intended to say what the world is like, 
while the latter is made up of propositions which are not 
directly about the world but refer to what we say about it.
In empirical discourse we attempt to describe and explain the 
world; in metaphysical, or metalinguistic, discourse we 
comment on empirical propositions and the concepts occurring
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in them. And. so metaphysics is the clarification and 
criticism of che conceptual apparatus which informs our 
dealings with the world. The attempt to ostablis.i the truth 
of metaphysical realism as though it were a straightforwardly 
empirical thesis is therefore ill-advised, for it is only 
metaphysical realism if it is a metalinguistic thesis about the 
empirical realm of discourse. The task of the philosopher is 
not to augment the body of empirical knowledge but to 
describe and critically to examine the concepts and criteria, 
the principles and the procedures, of those who do. To 
allude to a familiar analogy, he seeks, not to make a move in 
accordance with the rules of the game, but to comment on the 
rules. In doing that, he will of course be making a move in 
accordance with the rules of another game, or meta-game. And 
he will be engaging in an activity which can claim descent 
from the metaphysical speculation of the past. For although 
philosophers make statements which are immediately concerned 
with our conceptual scheme, they are nevertheless about certain 
general features of the world as it is known and understood 
through those concepts. Since there is no other world, for 
the concept of a world beyond the reach of the human mind is, 
it has been argued, unintelligible, metalinguistic or 
conceptual analysis, or at least that part of it which concerns 
the most genei'al and enduring aspects of the human conceptual 
framework, is the legitimate heir to the metaphysical tradition.
This understanding of metaphysical issues depends 
upon the distinction between empirical and philosophical 
forms of knowledge. And it might be objected that that
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distinction is unclear or even invalid. An attempt will 
therefore be made to clarify and defend it.
That there are empirical and philosophical forms of 
knowledge reflects the fact that there are empirical and 
conceptual realms of discourse, the fact, in other words, 
that we want to say things about the world and we also want 
to say things about the things we say about the world. And 
it is possible to accept realism in one sphere and idealism 
in the other. Indeed, that is just what has been advocated 
in the preceding sections. As Kant had it, 'We assert, then,
the empirical reality of space .....  and yet at the same time
we assert its transcendental ideality.1 v But this 
combination of realism and idealism cannot be sustained unless 
there are two levels of discourse.
A helpful approach to the problem of clarifying the 
distinction between empirical and philosophical forms of 
knowledge is provided by Carnap's dichotomy between internal 
and external questions. Internal questions are those which 
are raised within a conceptual framework as part of its 
application to the task of understanding the world, while 
external questions are those which are asked about the frame­
work.^ The distinction is illustrated by Helm: '..... the
question "Do material objects exist ?", considered as an 
external question, is about whether there is to be a system 
of rules governing a concept "material object", whereas "Does 
this paper exist ?", considered as an internal question, is 
to be answered in terms of the rules governing the use of
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material-object concepts.' Internal questions form part
of the object-language; external questions, on the other 
hand, are partly constitutive of the meta-language. In 
using the object-language speakers are said to be employing 
the formal mode. The distinguishing mark of the material 
mode is the availability of empirical tests to confirm or 
disconfirm propositions expressed in this mode; propositions 
expressed in the formal mode do not admit of empirical 
testing.
Nevertheless, the suspicion may remain that these 
distinctions are all of them merely ad hoc devices to enable 
a philosopher to have it both ways, to espouse both 
(empirical) realism and (metaphysical) idealism. Perhaps 
the most convincing reply to this charge is to set out an 
example of a conversation in which a proposition, while 
resembling a straightforwardly empirical one, is in fact of a 
metalinguistic, that is, metaphysical, character. Suppose 
p, looking at a small statue, says 'It appears to be made 
of marble. Yes, I'm sure it's quite solid. Kick it, if you 
don't believe me.' But Q replies 'No, you're wrong. It 
isn't really solid.' He kicks the statue, which collapses: 
it was only jelly after all. A little later P meets R, who 
is doing an Open University science degree. Putting down 
his textbook, R points to the table at which they are 
sitting and says 'It isn't really solid.' In a sense what 
R says is true; the table consists of tiny particles 
constantly in motion and with space between them; it is
25
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perfectly reasonable to express one’s newly acquired 
knowledge of this fact by saying of the table that it is 
not really solid. But in another sense what R says is 
false; for tables are paradigm cases of solid objects; if 
a table is not solid then nothing is. The point is of 
course that R is not denying this; he does not believe that 
if he kicks the table it will wobble and collapse, as the 
statue did when Q kicked it. So R and (£ were not speaking 
at the same level. R was not suggesting that we should 
reallocate tables to the category of fluid things; his 
remark was intended to apply to all solid objects, to solid 
objects as such; it concerns the nature of solidity. P 
was not being invited to revise his application of the word 
'table', nor indeed to do anything at all. When someone 
says 'It isn't really solid' in ordinary circumstances, 
that is, in empirical discourse or the object-language, 
what he says carries implications for action. For instance, 
it could constitute a premise in an argument for the 
conclusion 'You can kick it without hurting your foot'.
But when R said 'It isn't really solid' it did not carry 
any practical implications at all. And so what he said 
belongs to the meta-language.
It might be objected that there is no real disagreement 
between realism of a Popperian sort and metaphysical 
idealism and that the dispute is purely terminological.
For the empirical reality of the world has been accepted: 
it is agreed that the world is not imaginary, not a mere 
creation of the mind in the way that an hallucination is,
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not, in Kant's phrase 'a mere phantasm of the brain.' And 
it is also agreed that science and language presuppose 
realism, in that asserting that S is £ does not bring it 
about that S is £: the way the world is is independent of 
what we say about it. So it might be thought that if the 
Popperian were to amend the title of his doctrine to 
'empirical realism' no dissensus whatever would remain.
But empirical realism is only half of the position defended 
in this chapter and it seems probable that the Popperian 
would find the other half, metaphysical idealism, 
unintelligible. Once we have established the empirical 
reality of the world, there is nothing more to be said 
about it: so would he be likely to argue. To claim that 
the world cannot be specified except in terms which pre­
suppose minds is, he would continue, obfuscatory.
That the world cannot be specified except in terms 
which presuppose minds is, however, a consequence of two 
of the metaphysical realist's own arguments. For the 
science and language arguments, which aim to establish 
that those institutions would be impossible if the world 
were not independent of minds, are transcendental. They 
are attempts to deduce what the world must be like if 
science and language are to be possible. And their 
shared conclusion is that the world must be causally 
independent of what we say and think about it, for 
science and language are more than possible; they are two 
of the most characteristic institutions of civilised
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humanity and of mankind in general, respectively. It is 
clear that what these arguments prove is that the world 
presupposed by science and by language must be mind- 
independent in the required sense. And there is no other 
world (of things as they are in themselves). What the 
metaphysical idealist believes is that the world is the 
world presupposed by science and by language and that it is 
therefore both mind-independent in one sense (that it is 
causally independent of what we say and think about it) and 
mind-dependent in another sense (that its description must 
refer to features which it has as a presupposition of the 
mind-manifesting activities of science and language).
5.6 Metaphysical Idealism and the Human Form of Sensibility.
Metaphysics is the analysis of the most general and 
enduring aspects of the conceptual apparatus which informs 
our transactions with reality. Thus, to say that the world 
is mind-dependent in the sense that its specification 
involves reference to the actions and capacities of minds, 
or in other words to advocate metaphysical idealism, is to 
assert that the concept of such a world is part of the human 
form of sensibility and to imply that no other concept, such 
as that of a world of things as they are in themselves, could 
occupy such a position. The significance of this outcome 
is that it enables metaphysical idealism to be defended 
against the familiar charge that it leads to relativism.
Hence its appeal to subjectivists: mistaking the mind-
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dependence of the world for an empirical thesis, they hold 
that it entails that there is not one world but as many 
worlds as there are forms of life. The argument of this 
chapter has been that both the accusation and the attraction 
rest on a fallacious interpretation of metaphysics. It will 
now be contended that even if the mind-dependence of the 
world were an empirical thesis, and even if it were true, 
its reliance on the human form of sensibility rather than on 
forms of life would still preclude support for relativism.
The argument will proceed by examining a defence of the 
objectivity of knowledge which (i) has much in common with 
metaphysical idealism, especially the notion of the human 
form of sensibility and (ii) shows some tendency to vacillate 
between the empirical and the metaphysical (meta-linguistic 
or conceptual) levels of discourse.
Hamlyn's account of the objectivity of knowledge 
represents an attempt to divorce the anti-relativistic merits 
of realism from its world-as-it-is-in-itself-postulating 
demerits. Initially he appears to adopt a straightforwardly 
realist position, in claiming that 'unless there were a world
independent of ourselves, there could be no application to
26the notion of objectivity at all.' And this impression 
is reinforced when he says that 'the possibility of success
-in the use o f .... forms of language and thought implies a
reference beyond these forms to something concerning which 
there can be objectivity.'2^ Moreover, he defends the idea 
of truth as correspondence to fact and believes that it implies
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realism 'in the sense that a necessary condition of there
being objective truth is that there should be an
28independently existing world.' But he goes on to qualify
this commitment to realism by denying that there are any 'brute
facts, contending instead that 'what is to count as a fact
depends on how we have come to see the world and upon the
conceptual structure that is presupposed in our s eeing it in 
29this way.' And that conceptual structure rests in turn
upon our form of life or sensibility, which constitutes'what 
is not a matter of convention, not simply a matter of agreement 
and thus something not negotiable.'^0 The breach with 
realism is now plain: certainly, a Popperian realist would 
maintain that it is the independently existing world that is 
not simply a matter of agreement, because it is entirely beyond 
the influence of human thought and language.
But Hamlyn's break with realism does not weaken his 
opposition to relativism. This is not quite as clear as it 
could be, because he uses the terms 'forms of life' and 'form 
of sensibility' as though they were synonymous; so they are, 
on one understanding of the former phrase, but it is ambiguous. 
As used by Wittgenstein, it is open to two interpretations,
-51which may be distinguished as the atomistic and the holistic.-'
52According to the atomistic view, which may be found in Winch, 
humanity exhibits a variety of forms of life; they occur at 
several levels, from what may be called 'macro-forms of life', 
such as science and religion, through middle-range forms 
associated with tribes, races, cultures or societies, to 'micro
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forms of life' centred on social institutions such as 
armies and monasteries. But, although the macro-forms 
transcend specific institutions and even societies, there 
is no distinctively human form life, that is, no form of 
life which is common to all mankind and to nothing else.
That there is such a form of life is, however, ¿just what the 
upholders of the holistic interpretation assert: the human 
form of life unites all human beings and differentiates them 
from all other creatures. The surface diversity of human 
conceptual schemes, they would say, conceals a deep invariant 
structure.
It is clear that Hamlyn adopts the holistic interpretation, 
for he elucidates the Wittgensteinian notion of a form of life 
in terms of the Kantian one of a form of sensibility. And he 
goes on to emphasise the anti-relativistic implications of the 
Kantian idea. The danger, it will be remembered, in the 
notion of forms of life, interpreted atomistically, is that 
they will be liable to constant change as their bearers - 
societies and social institutions of various sorts - are 
modified by social pressures. The point of the concept of a 
form of sensibility, or of the holistic interpretation of the 
concept of a form of life, is, by contrast, to limit the 
extent to which our conceptual framework can be altered: the 
» form of sensibility is a "given” in the sense that it is 
something that has to be accepted.'^ Hamlyn develops this 
idea in re;jecting what he categorises as idealist attempts to 
undermine ob;jectivity by showing that alternative conceptions
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of the world are possible. Agreeing that our conception 
of the world is something which we have inherited, he 
nevertheless denies that this entails a weakening of 
objectivity: ’although it does make sense to speak of rival
traditions of thought upon particular issues ....  it makes
no similar sense in connexion with our conception of the 
world as a whole.'' Is this argument to be understood as 
an empirical or a metaphysical one ?
It is interesting to consider it first as an empirical 
argument, even if that interpretation must ultimately be 
withdrawn. It would then be a direct rival to the 
subjectivist claim that conceptions of the world are socially 
relative in that they arise within and are causally affected 
by forms of life which are themselves the products of social 
forces. Such an argument would evidently undermine the 
objectivity of knowledge, and it would do so in just the way 
the idealist, in Hamlyn's terms, endeavours. The subjectivist 
is advancing an empirical hypothesis: conceptions of the world 
are the effects of social conditions. And so it might be 
thought that Hamlyn is trying to counter this argument with 
a competing empirical claim: there is a distinctively human 
form of life or sensibility which is causally efficacious in 
shaping certain central features of conceptions of the world. 
There is a uniquely human conception of the world because 
there is a uniquely human form of sensibility which produces it. 
It follows that, even if idealism is understood as an empirical 
thesis, it does not entail relativism, as Popper assumed,
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because some features of minds are shared by all human 
beings and so the world, at least in certain respects, is 
the same for everyone. As long as the idealist's 
insistence on the mind-dependence of the world is based 
upon the human form of sensibility rather than on forms of 
life, it lends no support to relativism. And so, even 
if Hamlyn were putting forward an empirical claim, he would 
not be undermining his own opposition to relativism.
But Hamlyn is not of course advancing an empirical 
hypothesis: to use the concept of the human form of 
sensibility is to subscribe to a broadly neo-Kantian enterprise. 
The best way to understand Hamlyn is to take him to be 
maintaining that the assumption that there is an independently 
existing world is part of our conceptual apparatus. The 
philosopher's task is to bring openly to consciousness the 
concepts and categories which are implicit in our thinking 
about the world. This interpretation of philosophy 
coincides with the Strawsonian picture of descriptive meta­
physics, which aims to 'describe the actual structure of our
thought about the world' and 'lay bare the most general
“56features of our conceptual structure .' ^ The metaphysician 
must recognise the importance of the concept of an 
independently existing world in our form of sensibility, while 
at the same time remembering that this causally independent 
world is mind-dependent in another sense. And this 
conception of metaphysics is of course the one that has 
informed the defence of metaphysical idealism in this chapter.
It might be objected, that Hamlyn's defence of
objectivity is incoherent, in that an empirical element
cannot be prevented from intruding into an otherwise meta-
37physical or conceptual p r o j e c t . T h e  objector would 
interpret Hamlyn's claim that certain matters are not 
negotiable as implying that the nature of the human brain and 
sense organs compel the use of certain concepts and modes of 
thought. In other words, the conceptual scheme which we 
employ in thinking about the world is in part the causal 
product of our brains and sense organs. And one constituent 
of that scheme is the concept of an independently existing 
world; we have a concept of something existing independently 
of ourselves as part of our conceptual framework. The human 
form of sensibility is, on this view, the causal product of 
human brains and sense organs; given that sensibility, we 
cannot help but suppose that there are things which exist 
independently of our thinking about them. So the concept of 
an independently existing world, of objective reality, is 
itself the creation of the brain and sense organs. But this 
presupposes the existence of objectively real brains and sense 
organs. And so, the objector concludes, Hamlyn's defence of 
objectivity is incoherent. The notion of the mind- 
independently real is held to be itself mind-dependent and the 
nature of the mind is then explained in terms of mind- 
independent ly real brains and sense organs.
The objection fails, however, because the relation between 
conceptual scheme and conception of reality is not, as the
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objector assumes, a causal one. In describing our conceptual 
framework philosophers are not characterising the cause of the 
world, for the relation between a concept and what it is a 
concept of is not a causal one. There is therefore no 
inconsistency in believing both that our form of sensibility 
partially determines the way we see and think about the world 
and that the world, or more specifically those parts of it 
known as human brains and sense organs, partially determines 
our form of sensibility. For the first determination is 
conceptual, the second causal. It is not that our concepts 
bring the world into existence but rather that, without them, 
it would be impossible to speak of it. And so the 
philosophical and the empirical claims cannot contradict one 
another, for they are on different planes. That the nature 
of the brain and sense organs influences our concepts and modes 
of thought is no doubt true. But that proposition does not 
compete with the thesis that, in describing our conceptual 
framework, the philosopher is also characterising necessary 
features of the world as it is known to and experienced by us. 
He is therefore, to restate the main argument of this chapter, 
describing the world simpliciter, for no other concept of the 
world is intelligible.
5.7 Summary.
In the present chapter, the view has been defended that 
the world exists independently of minds. The aim was to 
secure the idea of truth as correspondence to reality. But this
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aim has been pursued, not by defending metaphysical realism, 
the usual ally of the correspondence theory of truth, but by 
freeing metaphysical idealism from misinterpretation. Two 
sociological theses of idealist ancestry were discussed: it 
was agreed that social reality is mind-dependent, for this means 
no more than that many sociological propositions express 
institutional facts: but the claim that sociology creates the 
world it studies was rejected. Metaphysical idealism was then 
defended, by removing its relativist associations. It was 
noted that subjectivists are attracted to it and realists scorn 
it because both believe it to entail that uncongenial aspects of 
reality can somehow be conjured out of existence by a change in 
our habits of thinking and speaking. But this inference was 
shown to be invalid: metaphysical idealism is true, but not in a 
sense which entails, what is evidently false, that we can change 
the world in any way we wish. The forms of knowledge were 
again seen to be helpful, in showing how idealism can be true 
in a sense which is unencumbered by the implausible entailment 
and false in a sense from which the entailment cannot be 
detached. For the nature of metaphysical idealism is 
misconceived by some of its adherents and most of its opponents 
alike. They assume that it belongs to the empirical form of 
knowledge, or in other words that it is a thesis in the object- 
language, whereas it really belongs to the philosophical form 
of knowledge, as a thesis about the object-language within the 
meta-language. Metaphysical idealism is therefore consistent 
with empirical realism, for the former denies the mind- 
independence of the world within the philosophical form of
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knowledge, while the latter asserts it within the empirical 
form. ‘That is to say, the world is not the creation or 
causal product of the mind, but its specification must refer 
to mental acts and powers. The world as we know and 
experience it is the only world of which an intelligible 
concept can exist. The impossible consequences to which the 
realist objected are not after all entailed by metaphysical 
idealism, properly understood. Moreover, since the notion 
of truth as correspondence to reality presupposes empirical, 
not metaphysical, realism, the version of metaphysical 
idealism elucidated in this chapter can be accepted without 
prejudice to that important concept.
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Summary of Fart One
The conclusion of Part One is that the subjectivist 
critique of objective knowledge is invalid. For there is 
objective knowledge in the sense that there are bodies of 
propositions which it is rational to believe and which are true. 
The constituent theses of this general claim concern 
propositions, rational justification, criteria of rationality, 
truth and reality. It was first argued that an adequate 
theory of knowledge must include propositions as well as mental 
states and speech acts. The idea of objective knowledge as 
justified true belief was then elucidated and grounds were 
offered for thinking it to be epistemologically preferable to 
subjective knowledge as reliable true belief. Justification, 
as the distinguishing mark of objective knowledge, was analysed 
and found to consist in failed criticism. It was next argued 
that the criteria of rationality presupposed by this account 
of objective knowledge do in fact exist. The first step in 
the argument was that some beliefs belong to intellectual 
traditions, which incorporate criteria of rationality. This 
claim was then defended against the subjectivist objection 
that such criteria are socially relative and cannot themselves 
be rationally justified. In reply it was maintained that a 
distinction must be drawn between forms of life and the human 
form of sensibility; criteria belonging to the former are 
indeed socially variable and the justification of beliefs is 
limited to a particular form of life; but the latter embodies 
criteria which are indispensable to any sort of rational inter­
course with reality, from which it follows both that they are 
universally applicable and that they can be rationally
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justified. Attention then turned to truth, for the 
possibility of systematic dealings with reality involves the 
idea of correspondence between what we say and think about the 
world and the way the world actually is. In response to the 
subjectivist claim that truth consists, not in correspondence, 
but in coherence or pragmatic utility, an eclectic theory of 
truth was propounded. Truth was defined in epistemologically 
neutral terms, or rather in terms which do not differentiate 
between correspondence and coherence but which exclude 
pragmatic utility. The notion of forms of knowledge was 
introduced to explain how truth-criteria include both 
correspondence, understood as a family resemblance concept, 
coherence: the former is characteristic of the empirical 
form of knowledge, while the latter is used in the mathematical 
and philosophical forms. The preservation of a central role 
for correspondence raised a metaphysical question, for the 
idea of correspondence between thought and reality is vacuous 
unless the two are distinct and mutually independent. It was 
argued that, while the idealist claim that reality is mind- 
dependent is true within the philosophical form of knowledge, 
the realist thesis that reality exists independently of 
thought is true within the empirical form, which suffices to 
meet the requirements of truth as correspondence to reality.
In Part Two some methodological issues arising out of this 
defence of objective knowledge will be discussed.
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PART TWO
SUBJECTIVISM AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO
The main task of Part Two is to alleviate fears that 
objectivism threatens the integrity of sociology or 
places intolerable restrictions upon its practitioners.
For if the thesis that justified true belief is objective 
knowledge were thought to carry unacceptable methodological 
implications, its position as the foundation for a rebuttal 
of the subjectivist critique of educational knowledge would 
be in jeopardy. And so, before the objectivist 
epistemology of Part One can be used in Part Three to 
establish the potential objectivity of the methods and 
content of education, it must be shown to be compatible 
with the practice of sociology.
In chapter six the question to be discussed is whether 
objectivism undermines the sociology of knowledge. There 
are two subjectivist arguments to be considered. The 
first is that philosophy claims access to a realm of 
superior knowledge, from which its methodological views are 
derived, and that, since this claim is unfounded, no 
philosopher is ever entitled to say anything about the 
procedures of sociologists. If this conclusion were true, 
the present task would be unfeasible. It will, however, 
be replied that the argument misinterprets the intentions 
and scope of philosophical inquiry. The second subjectivist 
argument is that the sociology of knowledge can establish 
itself only by denying the possibility of objective
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knowledge. In reply it will be contended that knowledge 
is both objective and socially constructed, so that 
objectivism does not in any way curtail the sociological 
investigation of knowledge.
The position discussed in chapter seven is 
sociologism, the view that all beliefs, whether rational, 
irrational or ideological, are amenable to the same mode 
of sociological explanation. It will be contended in 
reply that, while sociology has a role to play in the 
explanation of all three classes of beliefs, its 
contribution to the explanation of rational beliefs is 
limited to the discovery of necessary conditions for their 
occurrence. In practice, however, this is neither a 
serious nor an unreasonable restriction on sociological 
inquiry.
Methodological relativism is examined in chapter eight. 
The argument is that there cannot be objective knowledge 
about actions and beliefs, because sociological explanations 
are relative to the rules and concepts of the agents and 
believers concerned. In reply, it will be suggested that, 
in so far as methodological relativism entails an 
uncritical acceptance of subjects' own explanations of their 
beliefs and actions, it must be rejected. Far from 
inhibiting the sociologist's investigations, objectivism 
widens their scope by justifying a critical attitude to the 
claims made by agents and believers.
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The intention of Part Two is, then, to show that 
objectivism, while it entails the falsity of three 
subjectivist methodological views, does not place 
unreasonable restrictions on sociologists. Indeed, 
the methodological implications of objectivism are no 
more than an explication of the procedures followed by 
many social scientists. It is not that objectivism 
seeks to narrow the scope of sociological inquiry, but 
rather that subjectivism is based on a misunderstanding 
of its methodological assumptions.
CHAPTER SIX. INCOMPATIBILISM.
Introduction : Philosophy and the Social Sciences.
It will be recalled that the ultimate aim of this thesis 
is to establish that certain subjectivist claims about 
education are unfounded. It has been seen in Part One that
this cannot be done without first examining the epistemol­
ogical foundations of subjectivism and showing them to be 
unsound. The main concern of Part Two is the methodological 
views implied by subjectivism. These views are interesting 
in themselves and they might be thought, if true, to entail, 
or at least support, the educational ideas propounded by 
subjectivists. Yet they are closely associated with the 
epistemological outlook favoured by subjectivists. And so 
their truth is rendered doubtful by the critique of 
subjectivist epistemology put forward in Part One. It is 
therefore clear that the implications of objectivism for the 
methodology of the social sciences must be made explicit and 
defended. This chapter will deal principally with the 
subjectivist account of the relation between epistemology 
and the sociology of knowledge, namely incompatibilism. 
According to this doctrine, epistemology and the sociology 
of knowledge are incompatible, in that traditional or 
objectivist epistemology entails the impossibility of 
sociological explanations of knowledge, from which it follows 
that sociologists of knowledge must establish the integrity 
of their own discipline by refuting objectivist theories of 
knowledge. The incompatibilist holds that the defence of 
the objectivity of knowledge undertaken in Part One renders
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the sociology of knowledge superfluous, indeed impossible. 
It will be argued that, far from this being so, an 
objectivist epistemology is compatible with the assumption 
on which the sociology of knowledge is based, that some 
aspects of knowledge are socially conditioned. But a 
preliminary task must first be accomplished: it must be 
established that philosophers are entitled to criticise 
the practices and principles of social scientists.
For it has been contended that it is beyond the
competence of philosophers to criticise the methods of
social scientists. Hindess argues that philosophers
claim to derive their methodological critiques from a realm
of esoteric knowledge to which they alone have access: 'It
is clear that methodology's claim to prescribe correct
procedures to the sciences must presuppose a form of
knowledge which is in some sense superior to that produced
in the sciences.....  Access to this special kind of
knowledge is thought to be provided by philosophy.' But,
he continues, philosophy cannot make good this claim,
because it is vitiated by the inescapable circularity of
epistemology. His argument in support of this contention
resembles the criterion problem, for he maintains that
'the epistemological specification of the criteria of the
validity of all knowledge must presuppose the validity of
the prior "knowledge" from which the specification is 
2derived.' The similarity with the criterion problem is
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also apparent in the example which Hindess provides of the 
allegedly circular reasoning characteristic of 
epistemologists. Referring to Mill's four methods of 
experimental inquiry, he argues thus: 'induction and the 
canons of inquiry provide a real knowledge of the world 
because the world is really structured by laws. And how do 
we know that ? By induction. The inescapable circularity
7and ultimate dogmatism of this position is evident.'-' The 
conclusion at which Hindess arrives is that, since there is 
no supra-scientific epistemology to guarantee that what 
science produces is knowledge, criteria of rationality are 
always internal to a particular science. And so nobody 
outside that science, in particular no philosopher, is 
competent to criticise them. Nor is any outsider entitled 
to recommend that practitioners of a particular science adopt 
some procedures and abjure others.
This account of the relation between philosophy and 
sociology is untenable, because it is based upon unsound 
assumptions concerning the nature of truth in the social 
sciences and the intentions and capacities of philosophers. 
There is, to be sure, a superficial resemblance between 
Hindess's claim that rational inquiry is limited to the search 
for incoherence in explanatory theories and the argument 
advanced in chapter one to the effect that justification is
lLunsuccessful criticism. But the burden of Part One is
that there is more to criticism than the quest for
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incoherence. While coherence is the criterion of truth
in the mathematical and philosophical forms of knowledge,
empirical propositions are judged in terms of correspondence
to reality. A rejection of correspondence is implicit in
Hindess's criticism of Mill. But Mill's position is a 
5methodist one' and so its refutation is no reason for 
believing that the objectivist defence of correspondence 
offered in Part One is invalid. Hindess is right in thinking 
that Mill's account of induction does not constitute a 
solution to the criterion problem, but wrong in concluding 
that no such solution can be found. Nevertheless, it could 
be argued that, while Hindess has not disposed of the idea of 
truth as correspondence to reality, he is correct to believe 
that it has no application in the social sciences.
Hindess's argument that coherence is the only criterion 
of truth in the social sciences is essentially an attempt to 
assimilate them to the mathematical or philosophical form of 
knowledge. Now it is true that some propositions in the 
social sciences are conceptual and stipulative and cannot 
therefore be evaluated in terms of correspondence to reality. 
For instance, it is a central proposition in microeconomics 
that under perfect competition the rational producer will 
supply the quantity of goods at which marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue. It would be quite mistaken to try to test 
this proposition against reality by finding out whether 
producers do in fact supply, or aim to supply, the quantity
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at which me = mr and concluding that the proposition is 
either confirmed or falsified. For the proposition that 
the optimal output is that at which me = mr sets the 
standard of rationality in production. So if we 
discovered that in the real world no producers acted on, 
or even understood, it, the proper conclusion would be, 
not that the proposition is false, but that no producers 
are rational. And so the proposition that the optimal 
output is that which equates marginal cost and marginal 
revenue is not an empirical one. But by no means all 
propositions in economics are conceptual and stipulative.
There are also many empirical propositions: for example, 
that the number of people registered as unemployed on 22nd 
December 1981 was just under three million, that there were
/ more new cars registered last August than in the preceding 
month and that nominal interest rates were higher than real 
interest rates throughout 1981. It is of course true that 
these propositions incorporate institutional concepts, both 
methodological and causal. The level of unemployment is 
in a sense the product of a decision about the criteria to 
use in measuring it; for example, it would probably be 
higher if the survey method favoured in many European 
countries and in the USA were used. Nevertheless, it 
remains true that it is an objective matter of fact that a 
certain number of people satisfy a definition of 'unemployed', 
even if there are other definitions that could have been 
chosen and the actual figure is undiscoverable because the 
available techniques of measurement permit only an estimate.
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So it is perfectly intelligible to speak of the 
proposition that just under three million people were 
unemployed in December 1981 as corresponding, or failing 
to correspond, to reality. That reality, the number of 
people out of work, however that condition is defined, is 
also the causal product of certain factors, such as 
government policy, the state of world trade and the 
competitiveness of British industry. And it is clear that 
propositions describing these factors will embody 
institutional concepts, such as those of government, policy, 
trade and Britain. Nevertheless, it remains true that it 
is an objective matter of fact that, for example, 
government policies have or have not added to the numbers 
of people who are ■unemployed. It is possible to imagine 
a world exactly like the real one except that different 
policies are followed; if unemployment were lower in that 
posited world, the proposition that government policies 
have added to unemployment would be verified. And so it is 
perfectly intelligible to speak of that proposition as 
corresponding, or failing to correspond, to reality, even 
though we can never carry out the comparative experiment 
that would enable us to know for certain which it does. It 
can therefore be concluded that the social sciences include 
propositions which are to be judged in terms of 
correspondence to reality. And in that case Hindess's 
claim that criticism can consist only in the search for 
incoherence must be rejected.
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The second reason for believing Hindess's account of 
the relation between philosophy and the social sciences to be 
unsound is that it rests on an untenable assumption about the 
nature of philosophical inquiry. For he argues that 
philosophy claims access to a realm of esoteric knowledge, a 
claim that is surely far from the minds of contemporary 
analytic philosophers. It is, however, natural to assume, as 
Hindess does, that if philosophers criticise the principles 
and procedures of social scientists they must be doing so from 
the standpoint of a superior kind of knowledge. After all, 
philosophy a second-order discipline: it investigates the 
concepts and criteria we, or some specialist sub-group of us, 
employ in speaking and thinking about the world, rather than 
the world itself. But it does not follow, and is not true, 
that philosophy is 'the queen of the sciences' or that 
philosophers are entitled to pontificate on other branches of 
inquiry. The aim of the philosopher is to criticise rather 
than prescribe. The philosopher may criticise the social 
scientist for using concepts which are ambiguous or 
unintelligibl6 or for adopting methodological principles which 
are incoherent or incomplete. He may also seek to identify 
the most fruitful explanatory procedures in use and to discover 
the limits of the applicability of some such procedures. None 
of this involves access to esoteric knowledge, for 
philosophical criticism is a contribution to the collective 
effort to make more consistent and systematic the criteria and 
methods of inquiry which are already in use. For, despite
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Hindess's insistence that each science has its own
peculiar canons of argument, there are concepts and criteria
which are indispensable to rational inquiry as such and
some which characterise a form of knowledge rather than a
7particular discipline. For instance, the concepts of 
action, meaning, rule and reason inform investigations in 
sociology, economics and history, and any attempt to explain 
human behaviour presupposes that it is not completely random 
but exhibits some regularities. It is therefore 
appropriate that methodological criticism should transcend 
the confines of a single academic discipline. And it is 
equally fitting that, in the division of academic labour, 
the philosopher should contribute to this endeavour. For 
he has a specialist's interest in, although no esoteric 
knowledge about, the precise use of language and the logic 
of arguments. The danger in Hindess's account is that it 
encourages the social sciences to stagnate; each science will 
atrophy if it is debarred from drawing on others for fresh 
perspectives and problems. Thus, Hindess's claim that each 
science be allowed to proceed in accordance with its own 
specific methods of inquiry echoes Erasmus's call to renounce 
the intellectual quest and conform to the customs of local 
society. Were this exhortation to be heeded, it is not the 
pretensions of philosophy that would suffer, but those of the 
social sciences.
Accordingly, the conclusion of this section is that 
there is no reason why philosophers should not criticise the
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methodological principles of social scientists. One such 
principle, the alleged incompatibility of epistemology and 
the sociology of knowledge, will be examined in the next 
section.
6.2 Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge.
Incompatibilism is the assumption that the objectivity 
of knowledge precludes its amenability to sociological 
explanation. Since most epistemologists have traditionally 
believed in the objectivity of knowledge, it has been widely 
thought that the sociology of knowledge can establish itself 
only by undermining the position of epistemology. Thus 
Hamilton observes of it that 'the history of the discipline 
....  has thus centred around its emancipation from
Qepistemology.' And Esland claims that objectivism, which 
is for him coextensive with the whole epistemological 
tradition, is 'directly challenged by the sociology of 
knowledge.'' The argument for incompatibilism is based on 
the premise that knowledge is a social phenomenon, that it is 
conditioned, perhaps even determined, by social antecedents 
and issues in social effects. If this were not so there 
could be no such discipline as the sociology of knowledge. 
That the sociology of knowledge flourishes therefore entails 
that knowledge is a social phenomenon, that sociologists 
investigate, among other things, the origins or sources of 
knowledge. But it is precisely the origins and sources of 
knowledge that have traditionally been studied by 
epistemologists. Since Bacon and Descartes established the
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tradition, the central question of the theory of knowledge 
has been 'How do you know ?'. And this has been assumed 
to be synonymous with the question 'What are the sources of 
your knowledge ?' . So the incompatibilist concludes that 
epistemology must concede its area of inquiry to the 
sociology of knowledge.
This argument overlooks the possibility that two academic 
disciplines may approach the same set of phenomena from 
different standpoints or with different interests. Certainly, 
the philosopher's interest in knowledge is not the same as 
that of the sociologist. A typical manner of initiating a 
philosophical inquiry into knowledge is to say, to someone who 
claims to know something, 'How do you know ?', intending the 
question to elicit a reason which supports the claim. This 
procedure reveals the philosopher to be a protagonist in a 
dispute. He and the knowledge-claimant are both participants 
in the same search for knowledge; they both have an interest in 
settling the question whether the claim is valid, that is, 
whether it is based on rational grounds (and perhaps, for the 
phrase 'valid claim to know' is ambiguous, whether it embodies 
a true proposition). And to settle that question they need, 
not to investigate, but to apply, criteria of right and wrong 
in rational argument. The sociologist's approach is rather 
different, for he regards a person who claims to know something 
as an object of study rather than an opponent in a dispute.
His attitude is that of an observer rather than that of an 
adversary. The intention is not to criticise and evaluate, to
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engage with the knowledge-claimant in an argument to determine 
whether he really knows what he claims to know, but to 
describe and explain, to understand why he has made this 
particular claim and what effects his having made it may 
have. So the sociologist is not interested in the claim 
itself or in the argument used to support it but in the 
motives that led to the claim's being made and in the 
consequences that the making of it may have. Accordingly, 
it is only at a superficial level that the philosopher and 
the sociologist study the same phenomena; it is becoming 
clear that one is interested in what is claimed, the other in 
the claiming of it.
The significance of this distinction lies in its being 
one of a family of distinctions which affect all the important
AAterms in epistemology. Thus, 'assertion', 'belief', 
'knowledge', 'thought', 'statement' and 'claim' are all 
ambiguous between (i) what is asserted, believed, known, 
thought, stated or claimed, that is, a proposition, and (ii) 
the act or state of asserting, believing, knowing, thinking, 
stating or claiming. These ambiguities are interesting 
"because, as Searle puts it, 'the conditions for the truth 
of the proposition are not the same as the conditions for the
12performance of the speech act of asserting that proposition.' 
Speech acts, in common with all meaningful actions, are 
performed with certain intentions in mind and in accordance 
with certain conventions. And so the performance of speech 
acts is bound to be influenced by the social situations in
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which speakers find themselves. What makes it appropriate 
to perform a given speech act is typically some aspect of 
the social context of performance. For instance, what makes 
it appropriate to assert that grass is green might be a 
parent's question during the course of a lesson on colour 
words. But what makes it appropriate for the child to 
respond by saying that grass is green must be distinguished 
from what makes it true that grass is green. What makes it 
true that grass is green is simply grass's being green, or, 
the fact that grass is green. And that is the way the world 
is regardless of whatever may or may not be said or thought 
about it. In the words of chapter five, language presupposes 
empirical realism; describing something (as green) presupposes 
that there is something to describe. The implication of this 
for the sociology of knowledge is that speech acts, the 
intentions and conventions surrounding them and their social 
consequences are proper and important objects of sociological 
inquiry, whereas propositions and their truth or falsity are 
not amenable to sociological explanation. Just as it would 
be a category mistake to claim that a speech act, or any 
action at all, was true in the sense that it corresponded to 
reality, so it would be similarly fallacious to suppose that 
the truth of a proposition could be socially determined or 
conditioned in any way.
Since so much depends on the distinction between 
propositions and speech acts, it is worth trying to clarify 
what, and what is not, involved in talk about propositions.
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For the question whether propositions exist, and, if so, 
in what sense, is a controversial one. The danger is 
that the postulation of propositions is often thought to 
entail unwise ontological commitments. But anxiety that 
positing propositions is affording back-door entrance to 
Platonic Forms, Scholastic essences or quiddities or 
Hegelian Absolute Ideas is groundless. An inventory of the 
world must include many items whose ontological status is 
far from that of the medium-sized material objects which we 
think of as ’things': songs and symphonies, rainbows and 
smoke, after-images and unspoken thoughts, toothaches and 
numbers clamour for inclusion, though each is in its own way 
less than wholly material. To baulk at arguments and 
theories, to reduce books to marks on paper and debates to 
vibrations in the air, is therefore arbitrary as well as 
misguided. For a world without rational arguments is not 
the world in which we live. And we cannot explain how an 
argument differs from the sound or marks through which it 
may be expressed without introducing the idea of something 
common to different sets of sounds or marks. The 
ontological argument, for instance, is the argument that it 
is regardless of whether it is advanced by St.Anselm or 
criticised by Gaunilon. What makes it the argument that it 
is is the propositions that compose it and the logical 
relations between them, not the particular sounds or marks 
in which it may from time to time be made manifest.^ 
Similarly, in the case of belief, we must distinguish what is 
believed from the mental states of those who believe it. As
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Armstrong puts it, philosophers are 'landed with' talk about 
propositions, because 'it is clear that different people may
' i  / Iall believe the same thing.' Thus, if nine men all
believe that the earth is flat, they believe the same 
proposition even though there are nine distinct belief 
states. And so the distinction between what is claimed and 
the claiming of it, or between the proposition and the speech 
act of asserting it, is only one of a family of such 
distinctions. The essential point implicit in them all is 
that what makes a proposition true or false, or an argument 
valid or invalid, is to be distinguished from what leads to, 
or prevents, a proposition's being asserted or believed, or 
an argument's being accepted or rejected. For propositions 
may be true or false, asserted or denied, believed or 
disbelieved, but they cannot be performed or omitted, nor can 
they be undergone or experienced. It is belief states that 
can be undergone or experienced and speech acts that can be 
performed or omitted.
The significance of this distinction between the truth 
of propositions and the antecedents of speech acts and belief 
states lies in its implications for traditional epistemology 
and the sociology of knowledge. The dichotomy between 
propositions and speech acts underlies that drawn between 
objective and subjective knowledge in chapter one.^ The 
objectivist thesis that the goal of rational inquiry is 
objective knowledge and that traditional epistemologists have 
propounded subjectivist theories which cannot accommodate this
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s i ¿rideal has been put forward by Popper. Epistemology, 
he argues, concerns the truth of propositions rather than 
the sources of claims to know propositions. But 
traditional epistemologists have conflated these questions, 
overlooking the fact that 'questions about origins or 
pedigrees have little bearing upon t r u t h . A c cordingly, 
the theory of knowledge must be reformed: 'the proper 
epistemological question is not about sources; rather, we 
should ask whether the assertion that has been made is true
St Q......  that is to say, whether it agrees with the facts.'
In holding that it is the sources of a claim to know that makes 
what is claimed true or false, traditional theorists committed 
themselves to subjectivism. This Popperian interpretation of 
the history of epistemology is interesting because it 
contradicts a central assumption made by subjectivists, who 
repudiate traditional epistemology on the grounds of its 
alleged objectivism. Thus, Esland maintains that 'the
objectivistic view of knowledge ....  is the view represented
in traditional epistemology ....  One finds it difficult to
disagree with the claim that this epistemology is
/ I Qfundamentally dehumanizing.' y It seems that Esland 
accepts that the truth or falsity of propositions is 
determined by their origins, but wants to insist that no 
propositions are really or absolutely true or false, because 
there are in fact no sources of knowledge uncontaminated by 
social pressures. If, for example, Bacon had been correct 
in thinking that truth is ultimately a matter of derivability
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from sense experience, then the discovery that sense 
experience can he influenced by the social situation of 
perceivers would indeed entail the social relativity of 
truth. And so, if traditional epistemologists had been 
right in identifying the truth of propositions with the 
origins of claims to know them, then the argument for the 
social relativity of knowledge and the redundancy of 
epistemology would be unassailable. But that argument is 
vitiated by its reliance on the erroneous assumption that 
what makes a proposition true is the antecedents of its 
assertion.
It is now clear how epistemology and the sociology of
knowledge can be reconciled. Questions about the truth or
falsity of propositions and about logical relations between
propositions can, and in fact must, be pursued quite
independently of questions about the causes and effects of
the performance of speech acts. This idea is implicit in
Frege's remark on laws of thought: 'Error and superstition
have causes «just as much as genuine knowledge. The
assertion both of what is false and of what is true takes
20place in accordance with psychological laws.' It is
more to the point in the present context to say that genuine 
knowledge (that is, knowledge such that if one knows that £ 
then £ is true), just as much as error and superstition, is 
arrived at in accordance with psychological (and, of course, 
sociological) laws. If this is so, then there is no reason
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for the sociologist to be attracted to any form of 
relativism, subjectivism or scepticism. Subjectivists, 
such as Esland, seem to assume that truth and social 
conditions are competing explanations of knowledge under­
stood as a series of speech acts and mental states.
Explaining the performance of a speech act or the occurrence 
of a mental state in terms of its antecedent social 
conditions would then entail denying that it was true. But 
to suppose that a speech act or a mental state is the kind 
of thing that can meaningfully be said to be true (or false) 
is to commit a category mistake. The dilemma which the 
subjectivist sociologist imagined he faced - either 
knowledge is objectively true and so escapes the influence 
of social conditions or it is socially conditioned and 
therefore is not true, that is, is not genuine knowledge at 
all - is a false one. It arises only because the ambiguity 
of 'knowledge' and associated terms is overlooked, so that 
truth and amenability to social influence are assumed to be 
mutually exclusive attributes of one and the same thing.
Once the ambiguity is acknowledged, the apparent dilemma 
vanishes.
In support of the argument that an objectivist 
epistemology is compatible with the sociological investigation 
of knowledge, some empirical questions posed by a 
subjectivist thinker will be reformulated in objectivist
terms
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6.3 Objectivism in the Sociology of Knowledge.
It has been seen that some sociologists believe that
objectivism must be refuted if the sociology of knowledge
is to establish itself. Against this view it was argued
in the preceding section that an objectivist epistemology
is compatible with the sociological investigation of
knowledge. In order to consolidate that conclusion, it
will now be shown that the empirical questions raised by
21a subjectivist sociologist, namely Esland, remain viable 
when reinterpreted on the assumption that objectivism is 
true.
There are two perspectives to Esland's empirical inquiry 
which lend themselves particularly well to objectivist 
translation. The first is what he calls the pedagogical 
perspective, which is concerned with teachers' assumptions 
about learning, the child's intellectual status and with 
teaching style. Within this perspective Esland asks the 
following questions :
(a) Which psychological theories - explicit or implicit 
- are dominant ?
(b) What assumptions are held about the qualities of 
responses from pupils which indicate whether 
learning is taking place ?
(c) How does the teacher define favourable outcomes - 
the 'good pupil' ?
(d) What is the definition of unfavourable outcomes - 
the 'bad pupil' ?
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The first question is clearly about speech acts and belief 
states; it implies that certain psychological theories are 
asserted by people whom teachers accept as authorities and 
that understanding these speech acts has, via belief states, 
certain perlocutionary effects on how teachers act.  ^ This 
idea is developed by the second question; teachers understand 
speech acts, believe the propositions asserted in them and 
their belief states influence their expectations about, and 
conduct towards, their pupils. Neither question raises the 
issue of the truth or falsity of the proposition asserted; 
all that is required is that teachers believe them to be 
true, regardless of their actual truth-value. And so the 
investigation of the issues raised by questions (a) and (b) 
is compatible with the objectivist principle that questions 
about the truth or falsity of propositions are independent 
of those concerning the antecedents and effects of speech 
acts and belief states.
A further dimension of Esland's empirical inquiry 
becomes apparent in questions (c) and (d) : concepts like 
'learning' and 'good pupil' are socially constructed in the 
sense that they embody institutional rather than brute
O ILfacts. While it is an objective matter of truth and 
falsity whether X has attributes Ai ..An, it is a matter of 
decision or convention that having Ai ... An is the criterion 
of X's being f. In other words, what responses pupils make 
is a matter of fact, of truth and falsity, but it is a matter
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of institutional fact that those responses count as evidence 
of learning. The notions of 'good pupil' and 'bad pupil' 
raise intractable philosophical issues, but, whatever 
analysis of 'good' is preferred, questions (c) and (d) are 
compatible with objectivism. Subjectivism in ethics, 
according to which a teacher who says 'X is a good pupil' is 
not stating a fact at all but expressing a value judgement, 
has more philosophical respectability than subjectivist 
epistemology but it is not necessary as a presupposition of 
Esland's inquiry. Even if it is claimed that a teacher who 
says 'X is a good pupil' is stating a fact, it is evidently an 
institutional fact he is stating, so that his judgement is 
ultimately relative to the values implicit in the decision 
about the criteria for being a good pupil.
The second perspective is concerned with the subject 
being taught and raises a new issue. Two of the questions 
Esland asks within this perspective are :
(c) How strongly articulated is the utility dimension 
of knowledge - e.g. 'pure' v. 'applied'; the 
subject or its technology ?
(d) What are criteria of utility - extrinsic : economic,
humanitarian, world-improving, social integration: or, 
intrinsic : developing particular qualities of 
awareness ? 25
These questions concern the criteria for the performance of 
speech acts and the view that such criteria are socially 
conditioned is of course compatible with objectivism, since it 
is a basic assumption that a distinction is to be drawn between
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the conditions for the truth of propositions and the
conditions for the performance of speech acts of
asserting propositions. The propriety of raising
questions such as (c) and (d) could be doubted only by
someone who subscribed to what has been stigmatized elsewhere
as Objectivist Dogma 1, that the truth of a proposition
26guarantees the appropriateness of asserting it. A 
proponent of this doctrine might well assume that the only 
criterion to be used in selecting content for the curriculum 
was the truth or falsity of the propositions competing for 
selection. But truth is only a necessary, not a sufficient, 
condition for selection; other considerations, to do with 
pupils' needs and interests, manpower planning, changing 
society and so on, arise from the fact that asserting a 
proposition is a social action. And so the objectivist 
distinction between what makes a proposition true and what 
makes it appropriate to assert it clarifies rather than 
prohibits sociological inquiry.
It may be the case that Esland's sociological 
investigations would never have been formulated if he had 
not been convinced of the rightness of his subjectivist 
philosophical presuppositions. But it does not follow that 
empirical inquiry and theoretical assumptions stand or fall 
together. It often happens that a thinker adopts an 
extreme position in announcing his intentions only to pursue 
in practice a more moderate and flexible line. This is 
what seems to have happened in this case. Since Esland's
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empirical questions are interesting and unexceptionable to 
the objectivist, and since subjectivism is unsound, it may­
be concluded that the subjectivist assumptions of his 
inquiry can be abandoned without loss of scope for 
sociological investigation and with a gain in philosophical 
credibility.
6.4 Summary
The aim of this chapter has been to refute 
incompatibilism, the thesis that philosophy and sociology 
must always be in conflict. Two forms of this doctrine 
were discussed. The first is that philosophers use their 
presumed access to superior knowledge to justify method­
ological recommendations to sociologists. In reply it was 
argued that this contention misunderstandsthe nature of 
truth in the social sciences and the intentions and 
abilities of philosophers. Philosophy is a second-order 
discipline with a legitimate interest in criticising the 
conceptual and methodological aspects of other academic 
subjects. The second version of incompatibilism is more 
specific: objectivism in epistemology attempts to prevent 
the full emergence of the sociology of knowledge, so that 
a necessary prelude to sociological inquiry into knowledge 
is the advocacy of subjectivist epistemological 
principles. But this overlooks the fact that knowledge is 
both objective and socially conditioned, a fact that is best
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elicited by analysing the ambiguous crucial terms of 
the theory of knowledge. Knowledge as a body of 
propositions is objective and it is socially conditioned 
as a collection of speech acts and belief states. 
Empirical questions in the sociology of educational 
knowledge can be translated into objectivist terms with 
no loss of interrogative power and an increase in clarity.
Nevertheless, the subjectivist may feel uneasy about 
one aspect of this settlement: if all belief states and 
speech acts are amenable to sociological explanation, 
what becomes of the distinction, elucidated in chapter 
two,27 between rational belief and ideology ? And this 
is a concern which the objectivist must share. It will 
therefore be the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN. SOCIOLOGISM.
7.1 Introduction
Sociologism is the contention that all beliefs, 
irrespective of whether they are rationally ¿justified or 
ideological, are amenable to the same sort of sociological 
explanation. It is implicit in the subjectivist claim that 
human thought is ineradicably ideological, so that beliefs 
which are held to be rationally justified are really of the 
same epistemological status as ones which are acknowledged
'“Ito be ideological. It can also be found in a general­
ization attributed by MacIntyre to Trevor-Roper: '"Whenever 
the social structure is of a certain kind, beliefs of a
certain kind will be generated independent of any rational
psupport they may or may not have." The methodological 
issue is whether the sociologist should precede his empirical 
inquiries with an evaluation of the beliefs he intends to 
investigate. Sociologism holds that he does not need to do 
so, because, as the subjectivist has shown, there are no 
rationally justified beliefs. But it will be argued that 
there are rationally justified beliefs and the sociologist 
needs to take cognizance of the fact. For these beliefs 
require explanation of a different kind from that which is 
appropriate to ideological or to irrational beliefs.
It is clear that this issue is related to the one 
discussed in the previous chapter. The question there was
whether knowledge can he both objective and socially 
constructed, while what is at issue here is whether a belief 
can be both rationally justified and socially generated.
These questions are best understood as aspects of a single 
complex issue concerning knowledge as justified true belief. 
There are two ways in which it might be thought that the 
sociological explanation of knowledge is dyslogistic, under­
mining its pretentions to be knowledge. Firstly, it might 
be argued that a sociological account of someone's claiming 
to know that £ entails that £ is false. The argument of 
the previous chapter was a reply to this position: that 
someone's claiming to know that £ can be explained as the 
outcome of social pressures is compatible with £'s being 
true. The sociologist seeks to explain acts of asserting 
and states of believing propositions and so neither can, nor 
needs, to doubt the truth of those asserted propositions 
that are also true. Secondly, it might be maintained that 
a sociological account of someone's believing that £ entails 
that his belief is not rationally justified. It is this 
claim that is now to be discussed.
An attractive strategy is to advance another 
compatibilist thesis. And indeed it will be argued that
some beliefs are both rationally justified and socially 
conditioned. But there is more to it than that, for it must be 
recognised that some beliefs are socially generated in a way 
that excludes any efforts rationally to justify them. Such a 
belief is irrational in that it is the immediate product
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of an emotion experienced in response to a social situation; 
the strength of the emotional response prevents any attempt 
to justify the belief; the truth-value of the proposition 
believed and the availability of grounds for thinking it true 
are simply not considered. Other beliefs are ideological, in 
the sense that efforts to justify them were imperfect; criteria 
which, wholeheartedly employed, would have revealed the 
unjustifiability of the belief were ignored or only superficially 
applied. For the belief to be ideological rather than the fruit 
of incompetence the failure must be a response to perceived 
social pressures or interests. Finally, some beliefs are 
rationally justified. Since rational activity is possible only 
under some social conditions, sociology has a part to play in 
the explanation of such beliefs. It is of this class of 
beliefs alone that compatibilism is true, for they are both 
rationally justified and socially conditioned.
The argument will proceed by considering a suggested 
answer to sociologism, which is found to be based on an 
unjustified premise and to present an over-simplified account 
of belief. From this critique the reply to sociologism fore­
shadowed above will be developed.
7#2 social Pressures and Intellectual Traditions.
Sociologism is based on the assumption that a belief 
cannot be both rationally justified and sociologically 
explaine<i, responding to this supposed fact by claiming that no 
beliefs can be rationally justified and all can be sociologically
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explained. A suggested reply to this contention shares 
the initial assumption, responding to it by dividing 
beliefs into two mutually exclusive categories, namely those 
that can be rationally justified and those that can be 
sociologically explained. The reply is put forward by 
MacIntyre, who argues that once a belief has been explained 
as the outcome of rational procedures any further explanation 
is superfluous. A belief can therefore be sociologically 
explained only if it was arrived at without reference to 
criteria of rationality.
A schema for the sociological explanation of beliefs is 
elicited by MacIntyre from Trevor-Roper's study of seventeenth 
century witchcraft. A social situation of a certain sort 
engenders an emotion, such as fear. Emotions are intentional, 
in that they presuppose beliefs and can be characterised only 
in terms of the object of belief. In the absence of an 
adequate intentional object, one will be supplied or even 
invented. Thus, belief in witches may be explained 'as 
brought into being by a need to supply a rationale for the 
emotion; and we explain the emotion as generated by the 
social structure.' According to MacIntyre, this model ot 
explanation is inappropriate for a certain class of beliefs, 
namely rational beliefs, which he defines as those which are
arrived at in accordance with accepted canons of argument.
b©Once a belief has been shown toy rational, explanation is at an 
end: 'The explanation of rational beliefs terminates with an
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account of the appropriate intellectual norms and procedures.'^ 
The assumption here is that it is impossible to give a 
sociological explanation of the intellectual traditions which 
are composed of these norms and procedures. MacIntyre 
defends this assumption by drawing an analogy between 
intellectual and artistic traditions: 'The notion of a causal 
explanation for the genesis of an intellectual tradition is 
like the notion of such an explanation for the genesis of a
style of painting. All attempts to give such explanations
6have foundered.' Only necessary, not sufficient, conditions 
for the emergence of a certain style can be specified.
The first objection which may be made to the argument 
that rational beliefs cannot be sociologically explained is 
that it is based on an assumption of uncertain status. The 
claim that all attempts to state necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the development of a style of thought or 
artistic expression have failed would be rejected as 
manifestly false by many historians of ideas. And in any case 
that claim, as it stands, leaves open the possibility that a 
causal explanation of the genesis of an intellectual or 
artistic tradition might yet be discovered. If MacIntyre's 
contention is, not merely that no such explanation has so far 
been given, but that none could in principle be formulated, 
then an argument must be offered in support of it. But no 
such argument is discernible in his paper. And so the 
assumption on which MacIntyre's argument is based is implausible 
irrespective of whether it is interpreted as a contingent or a
necessary proposition. Furthermore, even if it were true, 
it would not constitute a reason for accepting the 
conclusion that the explanation of rational beliefs must 
terminate with an account of the intellectual norms and 
procedures used in arriving at it. For the assumption is 
only that it is impossible to state necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the emergence of an intellectual or artistic 
tradition. It is evidently consistent with this claim that 
necessary conditions for such a development can be stated.
And that is surely enough to justify the sociological 
investigation of intellectual and artistic traditions.
The scope and limits of the rational explanation of 
beliefs can be further examined by considering another attempt 
to understand the development of intellectual traditions.
The Concept of an Intellectual Field.
The concept of an intellectual field is introduced by 
7Bourdieu, who uses it to characterise the autonomy which, 
he claims, belongs to the pursuit of knowledge and other 
intellectual and artistic activities. The intellectual field 
has gradually achieved relative independence of external 
legitimating authorities, such as the aristocracy or the church 
it has become 'a field of relations governed by a specific
Qlogic: competition for cultural legitimacy.' The 
significance of this idea lies in its suggestion that the norms
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and procedures characteristic of, among other things, 
academic disciplines are in part the product of intrinsic 
factors. The authorities who control the discipline 
'select and consecrate' the criteria of rationality- 
peculiar to it. To the extent that this is so, external 
factors, including social ones, are excluded from influence.
But it should not be thought that Bourdieu's position 
supports the claim that intellectual traditions or fields 
are not amenable to sociological explanation. All that is 
suggested is the more restricted view that no such tradition 
or field can be explained solely in sociological terms, 
because intrinsic factors associated with the specific logic 
of a particular tradition also play a part. The development 
of an intellectual field is therefore the outcome of the 
interaction between intrinsic and external factors, between 
rational and sociological forces.
Indeed, rational explanation, as understood by Bourdieu, 
is itself a kind of sociological explanation, for the 
intellectual field is a social structure in its own right.
His use of the notion of a creative project confirms this 
interpretation. A creative project is the work of an 
individual artist or intellectual within a given field. The 
intention informing his deployment of this concept is to 
transcend the familiar conflict between (i) intrinsic 
aesthetic theory, according to which the work of art is a self- 
contained system 'itself defining the coherent principles and 
norms necessary for its interpretation'^ and (ii) external
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aesthetic theory, which seeks to relate the work of art to 
the social and economic conditions of artistic creation, 
often at the cost of 'detrimentally diminishing' it.
Agreeing that socio-economic conditions are important,
Bourdieu maintains that external aesthetic theory fails to 
realise that they become a specifically intellectual 
influence only by 'being reinterpreted, according tc the
10specific logic of an intellectual field in a creative project.'
The novelty of the concept of a creative project is that it
constitutes an adjustment between determinism and a
determination: 'All influence and constraint exercised by an
authority outside the intellectual field is always refracted
11by the structure of the intellectual field.' Thus, the
intellectual's relationship with his social class is affected 
by his position within the intellectual field.
It is therefore clear that Bourdieu's account of the 
development of the intellectual field exemplifies the 
compatibilist position, in that, far from seeing rational and 
sociological explanations of belief as mutually exclusive, he 
presents rational explanation as itself a mode of sociological 
explanation. Bor the intellectual field, defined by the 
norms and procedures used in interpreting and evaluating 
creative projects, is nevertheless a social structure, which 
mediates the influence on creative projects of external 
social and economic factors. And so two criticisms of 
MacIntyre's account of intellectual traditions are appropriate
in the light of this discussion of the concept of an 
intellectual field. The first is that the conclusion 
of the previous section, that the explanation of rational 
beliefs does not end with a description of the norms and 
procedures used in arriving at them, is upheld. For 
external factors, including sociological ones, affect 
creative projects, although their influence may be distorted 
by the structure of the intellectual field. The second 
criticism is that the incompatibilist assumption shared by 
MacIntyre and the adherents of sociologism is false, in 
that the explanation of a belief as the outcome of rational 
inquiry is itself a form of sociological explanation.
There are, however, important qualifications to be made 
to this endorsement of compatibilism, the first of which 
reveals a valuable insight in MacIntyre's view of the 
rational explanation of beliefs.
Intellectual Traditions and Criteria of Rationality.
The question is whether compatibilism is true of all 
rational beliefs, or in other words, whether the rational 
explanation of belief is always a mode of sociological 
explanation. Bourdieu would say that it is: 'Any attempt 
to consider propositions arising from a synchronic study 
of a state of the field as essential, transhistoric or
transcultural is ....  condemned.' MacIntyre, on the
other hand, regards all intellectual norms and procedures, 
not as belonging to any particular tradition, but simply as
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the criteria of rationality: 'For the criteria are neither 
ours nor theirs, but simply the criteria.'1  ^ The issue can 
be reformulated in the terms used in chapter t h r e e a r e  
all criteria of rationality specific to various forms of 
life, as Bourdieu would claim, or are some of them 
constitutive of the human form of sensibility (a view which 
supports MacIntyre's position, though he does not commit 
himself to it in preference to other possible foundations 
for his ideas) ?
It has already been argued that both context-dependent 
and context-independent criteria of rationality exist.^ 
Briefly, without postulating context-dependent criteria, 
which are specific to a particular form of life, we cannot 
understand the phenomenon of communication breakdown; 
equally, unless we posit universally applicable criteria of 
rationality, we will be unable to explain the more 
pervasive phenomenon of communication success. Indeed, 
without such criteria no rational intercourse with the world 
would be possible. It might also be argued that, without 
universal criteria of rationality, it would be impossible 
to justify the classification of criteria belonging to 
different forms of life as criteria of rationality, for that 
description presupposes that they have something in common. 
But this is not a conclusive argument, because it overlooks 
the possibility that 'criteria of rationality' signifies a 
family resemblance concept. It is nevertheless reasonable 
to assume that a case has been made out for the existence of
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context-independent criteria of rationality.
There are two implications of this conclusion for 
the question whether compatibilism is true of all rational 
beliefs. Firstly, some beliefs are themselves 
constituents of the human form of sensibility. As such, 
they are necessary conditions of systematic transactions 
with the world. It might be thought that they cannot 
therefore be explained as the products of a particular 
social structure. For example, my belief that I am not the 
only conscious being in the universe is a presupposition of 
my having any interpersonal relationships at all. For 
unless the proposition that there are conscious beings other 
than myself is true, and unless I believe it to be true, I 
would be incapable of seeing anything as a person. And so 
my belief is a presupposition of social life and cannot 
therefore be the outcome of a particular set of social 
circumstances. Accordingly, we are entitled to use such 
a belief as a criterion of rationality and this is just what 
philosophers do in trying to decide whether the Cartesian 
Dualist is logically committed to solipsism. For to assume 
that if Cartesian Dualism entails solipsism then Cartesian 
Dualism must itself be false is to set up the belief that 
solipsism is false as a criterion of rationality. It cannot 
however be concluded that there are some beliefs of which it 
is true to say, with MacIntyre, that their explanation 
terminates with an account of the intellectual norms and 
procedures used in arriving at them. For to show that a
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belief is presupposed by rational activity is not to 
establish that that belief is held and that rational 
activity is taking place. There are environments in which 
intelligent creatures capable of rational activity could 
never have developed. And there are people who do not 
engage rationally with their fellow human beings and the 
world in general. It is a philosophical question whether 
certain beliefs are presupposed by rational intercourse 
with reality; it is an empirical, and in part a sociological, 
question whether conditions exist in which such beliefs can 
be held and rational activity proceed. Thus, the absence 
of social pressures of a certain sort may be a necessary 
condition of rational engagement with the world. And so a 
complete account of rationally ¿justified beliefs must 
include a sociological component, even if the beliefs are 
constitutive of the human form of sensibility.
The second implication is that the compatibilist 
thesis exemplified by Bourdieu's account of intellectual 
fields is true of a much larger class of beliefs. The 
beliefs which constitute the human form of sensibility, or 
which are entailed solely by its constituent principles, 
while of fundamental importance to our understanding of, 
and action in, the world, are small in number. Many 
more beliefs are arrived at in accordance with criteria of 
truth and rationality which are specific to a form of 
knowledge or even to an academic discipline within a form.
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An adequate explanation of these elaborate theoretical 
beliefs must refer to concepts and criteria peculiar to 
the form or discipline in question. Propositions and
theories put forward in academic disputes (other than 
philosophical ones) and other formal situations may be 
assumed to have satisfied, if only tacitly, the criteria 
which the human form of sensibility embodies. The 
dispute between monetarists and Keynesians, or the question 
whether functionalism or Marxism gives a better account of 
peiigion in modern industrial societies, will not be 
settled by finding that one member of each pair of competing 
theories entails solipsism or the denial of the existence of 
space and time. Of course it is true that any one of those
theories would be rejected if it were found to fail to 
correspond to reality or cohere with established knowledge.
But what counts as correspondence or coherence depends upon 
the characteristic concepts and criteria employed in the 
discipline. Thus, it was argued in chapter four that 
correspondence is a family resemblance concept; agreement 
between thought and reality means something different, in 
practice, for the economist and for the physicist, but there 
is nevertheless a family resemblance between consulting the 
retail price index and taking readings from a voltameter. 
These particular interpretations of features of the human 
form of sensibility, which are embodied in forms of life such 
as intellectual traditions, are unlikely to be immune from 
social influences.
The main lesson to be drawn from the preceding 
discussion is that it is important to distinguish between 
explaining a rational belief and explaining a tradition.
The norms and procedures which constitute an intellectual 
tradition or field as the tradition or field that it is, that 
is, so to speak, its norms and procedures rather than the 
norms and procedures drawn from the human form of sensibility, 
are socially variable and likely to have originated in a 
response to social conditions. And so Bourdieu is correct 
in maintaining that an intellectual field can be influenced 
by external social and economic forces, mediated by the 
internal structure of the field itself. But MacIntyre is 
mistaken in holding that it is impossible to state necessary 
and sufficient conditions for, that is, to give a causal 
explanation of, the genesis of an intellectual tradition. 
However, what he says is true of a rational belief, as distinct 
from the tradition in accordance with whose criteria it was 
arrived at. For the complete explanation of a rational 
belief must include a reference to the fact that it has 
satisfied, even if only implicitly, the tradition-transcending 
criteria characteristic of the human form of sensibility. And 
so MacIntyre is right to draw attention to the criteria of 
rationality, but wrong in thinking that they are identical 
with the whole range of context-specific criteria. Finally, 
Bourdieu is wrong in eschewing context-independent, or 
itranscultural', criteria altogether.
229.
The results of the foregoing discussion, as they affect
the classification of beliefs, may now be summarised. Two
kinds of rational beliefs have so far been identified, on the
basis of the generality of the criteria used in justifying
them. If we observe a person's actions and conclude that he
believes in the existence of other minds, we impute to him no
more than is indispensable if he is to lead a fully human life.
His belief is rational in that it is part of the human form of
sensibility. It cannot be explained as the product of a
particular set of social conditions. For, while the absence
of social pressures of a certain sort may be a necessary
condition of the occurrence of a given belief-state, no set of
social circumstances constitute the necessary and sufficient
conditions for its occurrence. It has been seen that the same
is also true when the criteria used in assessing the belief are
characteristic of a specific form of life, as they will be if
the belief concerns objects or events whose existence or
occurrence presupposes that certain descriptions are taken 
s\q beenseriously. Since the belief could not have/judged in terms
of the criteria actually used if the requisite social
conditions had not obtained, and since it is also rational, it
follows that a rational belief of this kind can be partly
explained in sociological terms. But only partly, for social
c o n d it io n s  do not cause rational beliefs. A comprehensive
acco u n t of the necessary and sufficient conditions for holding
a rational belief of either kind must therefore include a
sociological element. And so compatibilism is true of rational
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beliefs: all rational beliefs are amenable to sociological 
investigation, albeit of limited scope, particularly in the 
case of beliefs which are indispensable to rational inter­
course with reality.
Having delineated two sorts of rational beliefs, it is
now appropriate to turn to irrational and, later, ideological
thebeliefs. What, then, are/implications for sociological 
investigation of distinguishing rational from irrational 
beliefs ?
Irrational Beliefs.
It is clear that a distinction must be drawn between 
rational and irrational beliefs, for to explain someone's 
believing that £ as the outcome of rational procedures is very 
different from explaining it as the immediate product of an 
emotion. Some linguistic analysis will enable the subsequent 
argument to be more readily understood. To refer to rational 
and irrational beliefs is, some would insist, to perpetrate 
a solecism. MacIntyre seems to make this point in saying that 
it is truth and falsity rather than rationality and 
irrationality that may properly be predicated of beliefs. 
'Rationality', in contrast, 'is predicated of the attitudes, 
dispositions and procedures of those who believe.'"^ And 
Reddiford expresses the same view: 'the propositions that we
assert when we express our beliefs may be false ......
c o n s is t e n t  or inconsistent with other beliefs ....  and may,
or may not, be supported by the evidence. But it is we who
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have reasons.... who act rationally......in holding
?obeliefs.' It would therefore be better to substitute
talk of rationally held beliefs for talk of rational beliefs
and better still to speak of someone's rationally believing
something. However, apart from being cumbersome, this
suggestion is based on a false premise. For it is perfectly
proper to predicate rationality and irrationality, as well as
truth and falsity, of beliefs, because 'belief' is ambiguous
between the proposition believed and the mental state of the 
21believer. And so the locution 'rational belief' may be 
employed without misgivings, as long as it is recognised as 
an elliptical way of speaking about someone's being rational 
in believing something.
It follows that beliefs are neither intrinsically 
rational nor intrinsically irrational; in other words, the 
same proposition can be believed on rational grounds or 
without grounds at all. Suppose that a certain sort of social 
situation gives rise to the emotion of fear and that members 
of the social group in question supply an object for their 
fear by forming the belief that there are witches. Evidently 
this is an irrational belief; there are no grounds for 
believing the proposition that there are witches to be true.
But the original belief may be elaborated into a complete 
belief-sys^em» internally consistent and equipped with criteria 
for applying the concept 'witch'. It would then be possible 
to argue in accordance with generally accepted canons about the
232.
truth or falsity of the belief that, say, Susan Nonsuch 
is a witch. Moreover, belief in witchcraft might explain 
otherwise mysterious phenomena and be consistent with all 
the other beliefs held by members of the community. There 
would therefore be rational grounds for holding not only 
particular beliefs of the form 'S is a witch' but also the 
general and fundamental belief that witches exist, even 
though it had originated as an irrational response to a 
social situation. And so a system of beliefs, an 
intellectual tradition, may have an irrational and 
sociologically explicable genesis. Theological speculation, 
for instance, is a rational activity, yet it is possible that 
it developed out of emotional needs occasioned by the 
intransigence of the natural and social worlds.
A corollary of the fact that beliefs are intrinsically 
neither rational nor irrational is that the same belief may 
be rational for one person but not for another. The same 
proposition may be believed by one person on rational grounds, 
while someone else believes it for the emotional satisfaction 
that ensues. Thus, A might believe in God because he is 
convinced of the validity of the argument from design and has 
what appears to him to be compelling evidence for the truth 
of its premises, while B's belief is prompted by a need for 
consolation. Again, C might believe that Susan Nonsuch is a 
witch because there is evidence that she has done things that 
only witches can do; he reasons in accordance with the only 
criteria available to him. So he can hardly be convicted of
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of irrationality, even though his belief is false.
Certainly he cannot be blamed for his belief in the way that
aD, who believes that Susan Nonsuch is/witch out of sheer
fright at her appearance, could be censured for stereotyping.
A belief can be arrived at in all manner of ways, of varying
degrees of rationality: the same proposition may be believed
after valid inference from true premises or from false
premises; after invalid inference from true, or from false,
premises; after hunch or guesswork, haruspication or divine
afflatus; after wishful thinking; or after any of a wide range
of emotions. Thus, there is no such thing as an intrinsically
22rational belief.
MacIntyre's attempt to show that the distinction between 
rational and irrational beliefs coincides with that between 
non-socially generated and socially generated beliefs therefore 
fails. For it is not true that the class of rational beliefs 
and the class of socially generated beliefs are mutually 
exclusive. This is true in the sense that the same 
proposition may be believed on rational grounds or from 
irrational motives, as explained in the preceding paragraph.
But it is also true if 'belief' is taken to refer to a mental 
state. A belief state may have as its object a proposition 
which is consistent with the believer's other beliefs and has 
survived attempts to falsify it. But the rationality of 
Relieving this proposition may be only a necessary condition of 
the believer's believing it, because there could be another 
proposition which is inconsistent with the first but equally
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consistent with his other beliefs and unfalsified. And so 
there is room for a socially generated emotion to tip the 
balance, so to speak, between the two propositions, in 
which case the resultant belief state will be the joint 
product of rational procedures and irrational processes. It 
follows that, whether we interpret 'belief' as proposition 
or mental state, MacIntyre is wrong in thinking that there 
are beliefs which are 'intelligible only in terms of an 
antecedent process of reasoning and could only be generated 
as the outcome or such a process.'^ For there are no such 
beliefs; all beliefs can be the product either of reasoning 
or of the emotions or of interaction between reason and 
feeling.
Nevertheless, the distinction between rationality and 
irrationality in believing is a crucial one for the framing 
of sociological inquiries. For it is possible for a belief 
state to be the outcome of rational procedures alone; E's 
believing that £ may be perfectly rational and quite untainted 
by emotional pressures, while F's believing that r may be an 
impulsive response to a social situation. Where MacIntyre 
errs is in implying that we could tell by inspecting the two 
belief states which is rational and which irrational. 
Rationality and irrationality are predicates, not of 
propositions nor even of belief states in themselves, but 
rather of belief states taken together with the procedures or 
jrncesses that led up to them. An irrational belief is a 
belief state plus the emotional response which caused it.
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Another class of beliefs, which is of particular 
interest in the sociological investigation oi educational 
knowledge, is that of ideological beliefs. They are best 
thought of as occupying a position between rational and 
irrational beliefs.
7.6 Ideological Beliefs.
24Ideological beliefs have already been defined. They
differ from irrational beliefs in that an attempt to justify 
them/ has been made and from rational beliefs in that the attempt 
was unsuccessful or incomplete. The two main points of 
the definition are as follows: a belief is ideological if, 
and only if: (i) it has nor been justified, either because 
it has failed the appropriate critical tests or because it 
has not been submitted to all the tests available; and (ii) 
it differs from other unjustified beliefs in that the errors 
or omissions of reasoning are not the product of mere 
incompetence but are necessary conditions for success in 
convincing someone of the truth of the proposition believed. 
Thus, a socially generated motive, the need to persuade 
someone to share one's belief or even to believe something 
one docs not oneself believe, overrides the rational pursuit 
of knowledge. Clearly, the sociological investigation of 
beliefs must be guided by an awareness of the distinctive 
nature of ideological beliefs. An attempt to define 
ideological documents will now be examined in the light of 
the tripartite distinction between rational, ideological and 
irrational beliefs. The question is whether the sociologist,
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in framing such a definition and in investigating beliefs 
so defined, needs to take account of this distinction.
It has been argued that sociologists must recognise the 
fact that 'valid and invalid knowledge is problematic in 
different ways.' ^ Smith and Stockman take this to imply 
that it is mistaken to consider the social processes 
generating knowledge in isolation from questions concerning 
its validity. A work by Berger and Luckmunn is held to
exemplify this fallacy: 'the philosopher is driven ....  to
differentiate between valid and invalid assertions about 
the world. This the sociologist cannot possibly do.'^ 
Sociological inquiry need not be preceded by an evaluation 
of assertions as valid or invalid, because both sorts of 
assertions are proper objects of such inquiry. 'The 
sociology of knowledge must concern itself with whatever 
passes for knowledge in a society regardless of the ultimate 
validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such 
knowledge.' Against this, Smith and Stockman hold that
the sociologist cannot formulate problems precisely until 
he has distinguished valid from invalid knowledge in terms
of 1 standards that are generally accepted by the scientific
28community of the day.'
The appearance of a disagreement between Smith and 
Stockman and Berger and Luckmann is misleading, for their 
views are in fact quite compatible. They seem on the face 
of it to be contradictory only because Smith and Stockman
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assume that valid and invalid knowledge are the same things 
as valid and invalid assertions aoout the world. If this 
were so, Smith and Stockman would be denying what Berger and 
Luckmann had asserted. But what Smith and Stockman present 
as a single issue, whether valid and invalid knowledge are 
problematic in different ways, is more perspicuously 
exhibited as two distinct questions: (i) whether true and 
false propositions (or, as Berger and Luckmann would have it, 
valid and invalid assertions about the world) are problematic 
in different ways; and (ii) whether rational and ideological 
beliefs are problematic in different ways. There are two 
reasons for thinking that Berger and Luckmann address them­
selves to question (i). Firstly, they use the phrase 'valid 
and invalid assertions about the world1. The term 'assertion' 
is ambiguous between the proposition and the speech act of 
asserting it. 7 It is only in the former sense that an 
assertion can properly be said to be about something, for to 
say of an action, whether it is one of asserting a 
proposition or opening a door, that it is about something lacks 
any clear sense. Secondly, Berger and Luckmann claim that 
the philosopher, but not the sociologist, seeks to establish 
•the ultimate status of what the man in the street believes 
to be "reality" or "knowledge". Since ¿judgements about the 
rationality of beliefs are inescapably provisional, because a 
proposition it is rational to believe to be true may turn 
out to be false, 'the ultimate status' of what the man in the 
etreet believes can only be its truth or falsity. Smith and 
Stockman, on the other hand, are evidently concerned with
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question (ii); 'valid knowledge' seems to be used, or 
rather misused, by them as a synonym for 'rational belief', 
for its definition omits any reference to truth. It may 
therefore be concluded that the appearance ox a 
disagreement between the two pairs of writers is deceptive. 
Since true and false propositions alike are asserted in 
accordance with sociological laws, the sociologist is not 
called upon to differentiate them, and Berger and Luckmann 
are vindicated. But explaining a rational belief, while it 
may involve reference to the social conditions which permit 
rational activity to take place, is different from 
explaining an irrational belief. And both can now be seen 
to be different from explaining an ideological belief. For 
only in the case of ideological beliefs is it necessary to 
consider the interaction of reason and socially generated 
emotion in order to explain why the generally accepted 
criteria of rationality were not adhered to. Since this 
insight is shared by Smith and Stockman, they too are 
vindicated; only their interpretation of Berger and Luckmann 
was at fault.
7.7. Summary.
Sociologism, the view that all beliefs are problematic 
in ¿just the same way, is a corollary of the subjectivist 
claim that no beliefs can be rationally justified. In 
reply the variety of beliefs has been emphasised. A three­
fold division has been proposed. Firstly, there are
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rational beliefs, which are arrived at after a competent 
application of criteria of rationality; this class of beliefs 
may be sub-divided into those assessed in terms of criteria 
drawn fi’om the human form of sensibility and those evaluated 
in accordance with criteria belonging to specific forms of 
life, as well as the universal ones. Secondly, there are 
irrational beliefs, which arise out of emotional responses to 
social situations. Thirdly, there are ideological beliefs, 
which result from efforts to apply criteria of rationality 
which are vitiated by needs arising from social pressures. A 
■by-product of the argument is the realisation that 'rational', 
'irrational' and 'ideological' are predicated, not of 
propositions nor of belief states simpliciter, but rather of 
belief states together with their antecedent procedures and 
processes.
The main conclusion of this chapter is, then, that all 
beliefs are amenable to sociological explanation. However, 
only in the case of irrational beliefs can sociology, together 
with other subjects, such as psychology, offer a complete 
explanation. Social pressures frustrate the proper 
application of reason to give rise to ideological beliefs.
And sociology has only a limited role to play in the 
explanation of rational beliefs, in discovering the social 
conditions without which reason cannot flourish.
Thus, chapters six and seven, taken together, have shown 
ÿhat the sociological investigation of knowledge and belief is
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perfectly feasible on objectivist methodological assumptions. 
There is no conflict between objectivism and sociology as 
such, but only between objectivism and the erroneous 
subjectivist view of sociology. It will be argued in the 
next chapter that there is indeed one area in which 
objectivism can free sociology from unnecessary constraints 
which subjectivism would impose upon its inquiries.
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HHAPTER EIGHT. METHODOLOGICAL RELATIVISM.
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the discussion concerned the 
implications of the subjectivist claim that there are no 
rational beliefs for the sociologist to investigate. More 
specifically, it was the form of such explanations that was 
under examination; the question was whether there is one form 
of sociological explanation that is appropriate for all 
beliefs or whether the sociologist is obliged to differentiate 
several kinds of beliefs and tailor the form of his 
explanation accordingly. In this chapter attention will be 
focused on the content of sociological explanations; the 
question is whether the nature of a social scientist's subject 
matter imposes any restrictions on the propositional content 
of his explanations. And it is actions rather than beliefs 
that constitute the primary objects of the sociological 
explanations to be considered, with beliefs being of interest 
only as reasons for action. Thus, the central question of 
this chapter is to be formulated in terms of what the 
sociologist can say about what people do, and why.
g g The Limitations of Methodological Relativism
The subjectivist argues that the fact that the 
sociologist seeks to understand what people do, rather than 
what material objects and other non-human constituents of the 
world are like, imposes important restrictions on what he can 
say about the objects of his investigations. The question 
he raises is what we should do when the social scientist's
explanation of an action is not the same as that offered 
by the agent himself. A cardinal tenet of subjectivism 
is that there are no universally applicable, or context- 
independent, criteria of rationality. It is held to 
follow from this that the social scientist will frequently, 
perhaps even normally, find that the criteria and concepts 
he employs in trying to explain a person's actions are not 
shared by the agent, because agent and social scientist 
inhabit different forms of life, each with its own criteria 
of rationality. Do we prefer the social scientist's 
explanation or do we accept instead the agent's own reasons 
for acting as he did Y The customary subjectivist response 
to this dilemma is to take what the agent says as 
authoritative and to insist that sociological explanations 
of actions cannot be acceptable unless they are confined to 
the use of the concepts and criteria actually employed by 
the agent in explaining why he acted as he did. Whereas the 
natural scientist is free to study phenomena which he has 
identified in accordance with 'his own' criteria, the social 
scientist cannot do the same in investigating social
phenomena, because, as Winch puts it, 'their being ....
social .... depends entirely on their belonging in a certain 
way to a system of ideas or mode of living.' Thus, on this 
view, the truth of sociological explanations is relative to 
the concepts and criteria, to the form of life, of those 
whose actions are being explained, in that employing only 
those concepts and criteria is a necessary condition of the
truth of the explanations. Before evaluating this claim it 
is important to distinguish it from a more extreme version 
of methodological relativism.
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This is the view that the exclusive employment of
agents' concepts and criteria is, not just a necessary,
but also a sufficient condition of the truth of
sociological explanations of action. This is an extreme
statement of methodological relativism in that it entails
an uncritical acceptance of agents' own explanations of
their actions. This radical form of relativism has been
attributed to Winch by two critics. But, while it is
indeed untenable, the argument which shows that it is is
available to the methodological relativist as well as his
critics. And so this criticism calls only for caution or
moderation in propounding methodological relativism, not
pfor its repudiation. The first critic, MacIntyre, appears
to interpret relativism (as expounded by Winch in op.cit.,
note i) as entailing the exclusive appropriateness of the
interview in the understanding of social life. He argues
that the social scientist must go beyond the ideal native
informant's views, because such an approach would produce
no more than 'a lifeless body of laws, regulations, morals
and conventionalities which ought to be obeyed but in
reality are often only evaded.'^  Thus, we must distinguish
the professed or acknowledged rules of a society from the
actual behaviour of members of that society. Since Winch
takes the object of sociological inquiry to be precisely
such behaviour as rule-governed, he has, according to
MacIntyre, conflated a vital distinction. The second
4criticism is put forward by Lukes, who maintains that 
relativism renders the concepts of false consciousness and 
ideology unusable in sociological research. It is impossible,
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he claims, to characterise a person's beliefs about his 
society as false or distorted without 'reliable, non- 
relative means of identifying a disjunction between social 
consciousness or collective representations on the one hand 
and social realities on the o t h e r . T h e s e  are powerful 
objections, but they apply only to an extreme formulation 
of methodological relativism, not to the doctrine as such.
It is true, as MacIntyre and Lukes assume, that a theory 
which entails an uncritical acceptance of agents' 
explanations of their actions and renders the notions of false 
consciousness and ideology useless is unacceptable. But it 
does not follow that methodological relativism must be 
repudiated, because its critics seem to be reading more into 
it than its more cautious proponents intend. For method­
ological relativism can be divested of its alleged implications 
while remaining recognisably itself. The point is that the 
objections apply only to the view that the employment of 
agents' criteria and concepts, and no others, is a sufficient 
condition of the truth of sociological explanations, as well 
as a necessary one. A judicious statement of methodological 
relativism can meet the objections by drawing out some 
implications of the universalizability of rules, principles 
and criteria. In so far as A is a rational agent, then, if 
A acted in accordance with principle 2 in circumstances C, 
and if C resembles C*in all relevant respects, then A will 
act in accordance with 2 in Principles of action, in
common with criteria of rationality in believing, go beyond
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the circumstances in which they were originally implemented.
What is interesting in the present context is the fact that 
someone might fail to perceive that what he did on a past 
occasion commits him, on pain of inconsistency, to do the 
same on a future occasion, the circumstances of the two 
occasions being alike in all relevant respects. An agent 
who acts differently on two such occasions in a sense 
disagrees with himself; there is a contradiction between what 
he does at time t/| and what he does at time t£, in that a 
general principle extracted from his action at time t/| will 
contradict a general principle elicited from his action at 
time t2- And if he professes to be guided by the general
rule implicit in his action at time 11, then he is guilty of
Odeception. It is now becoming clear how universalizability 
allows the methodological relativist to accommodate criticism 
of agents' explanations and the concepts of false consciousness 
and ideology.
The general argument is that universalizability is enough 
to enable the methodological relativist to question the 
accuracy of agents' explanations of their actions. In reply 
to the first objection, that relativism entails an uncritical 
acceptance of whatever the agent, or informant, says, it can 
be pointed out that he may be unaware, or only imperfectly 
aware, of the general rules of conduct implicit in his actions. 
The interviewee can err or attempt to deceive; he may profess, 
sincerely or insincerely, to be guided by a rule but fail to 
act in accordance with it when the circumstances are appropriate*
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And so a reply to the second objection emerges: evidently 
there is scope for a sociological explanation of the 
discrepancy between professed and effective principles. If 
the discrepancy arises out of the agent's self-deception, 
the explanation will make use of the notion of false 
consciousness. People have, for instance, extolled the 
liberty of the individual while owning slaves or living in 
a society based on slavery. If the discrepancy appears to 
be part of an attempt to promote certain social interests, 
then the concept of ideology, understood in terms of the
qanalysis offered in the previous chapter and m  chapter two, 
will be of use. If, for example, the act in question is that 
of asserting a proposition jd, then a sociological explanation 
wij.l be appropriate if (i) £ is not what would be asserted if 
the purpose of the speech act was simply to speak the truth, 
and (ii) asserting that 2 is believed by the agent to be 
uniquely conducive to the furtherance of the interests he 
supports. So, if the discrepancy between what a rational 
inquirer would assert and what is actually asserted can be 
explained as the outcome of certain interests, the utterance 
is an ideological one. It is therefore clear that method­
ological relativism need not be committed to the implausible 
view that a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth 
of a sociological explanation of an action is that it should 
use only those concepts and criteria employed by the agent.
But it is possible that the objections urged by MacIntyre 
pnd Lukes have been answered at too high a price. For it might
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be suggested that the universalizability counter-argument, 
deployed on the methodological relativist's behalf to meet 
those objections, seeks to support relativism by means of a 
notion that is inconsistent with it. And indeed it is true 
that universalizability applies indifferently to any form of 
life, except the rudimentary one of people whose behaviour is 
so unpredictable that it ceases to be rule-governed at all. 
Either rationality, in the sense of a sustained attempt to 
live one's life according to rules, is merely one form of 
life among others or it is a constituent of the human form of 
sensibility, in which case there is something over and above 
forms of life. Clearly, only the first disjunct is compatible 
with a thorough-going relativism, but it cannot be accepted, 
bee-use it implies that one could belong to a form of life 
without being rational, without trying to follow rules. And 
this is evidently impossible: it is an integral part of the 
concept of a form of life that it defines a pattern of rule- 
pjoverned behaviour. The second disjunct, on the other hand, 
involves a concession by the methodological relativist, but is 
acceptable. Indeed it has already been put forward as an 
explanation of communication success and a presupposition of 
any systematic intercourse with reality. If the
methodological relativist still wishes to make use of the 
universalizability counter-argument, he must admit that, just 
as communication breakdown is by no means inevitable or even 
common, so it is far from universally true that agent and social 
scientist do not have any shared concepts and criteria.
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This, the methodological relativist might maintain, is 
not the fatal concession it might appear to be, for the 
shared criteria of rationality are insufficient to enable 
agent and social scientist to agree on a description of the 
action. The case might resemble that of the monk and the
soldier, in which what, to the monk, is a shrine is, to the 
soldier, a barricade. What, from the monk's point of view, 
is an act of sacrilege is, in the soldier's eyes, a tactically 
sound offensive move against his enemy. And so the 
methodological relativist might conclude that there will be 
occasions when agent and social scientist cannot agree how to 
describe the action, let alone how to explain it. However, 
this does not establish the relativist's main principle, that 
a necessary condition of the truth of a sociological 
explanation of an action is that it should employ only those 
concepts and criteria used by the agent. For no reason has 
yet been given for conferring a privileged status on the 
concepts and criteria of the agent.
There is, however, an argument available to the method­
ological relativist which constitutes a prima facie case for 
just such a decision. The argument concerns the concept of a 
social action. In general an action is something someone 
does, as distinct from something that happens to him: for 
instance, jumping off a cliff is an action, but being pushed 
off or falling off a cliff are not. There are some actions 
the social context of which is of little significance in 
explaining why they were performed; turning round to look at a
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beautiful sunset or brushing away a wasp are examples of
such actions. The social scientist is interested in another
class of actions, those that are given a meaning by the
context of rules and conventions in which they are performed.
These are social actions: 'A social action may be said to
i2have a meaning for the agent performing it.' And Skinner
shows how widely this definition is accepted among social 
scientists of different schools of thought. The importance 
of this concept of social action to the methodological 
relativist is that it entails that a social scientist cannot 
be said to be trying to explain the action that A performed 
unless he describes it in terms of A's own criteria and 
concepts. For unless he does so, he will not be considering 
the meaning that the action has for A, and so, since a social 
action is defined in terms of its meaning for the agent who 
performed it, he will not be addressing himself to A's action 
at all. The methodological relativist will insist that, if 
the social scientist interprets A's behaviour in terms of his, 
that is, the social scientist's, concepts and criteria, he 
necessarily misinterprets what A did. If a social action is 
the action that it is only by virtue of the meaning it has 
for the agent who performed it, then a social scientist who 
seeks to explain it in his terms is doomed to misunderstand it. 
He will explain a fiction of his own making, not the action 
that the agent performed.
The question is whether this argument establishes the 
methodological relativist principle that a necessary condition
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for the truth of sociological explanations of actions, that 
is, social actions, is that they use only those concepts 
and criteria employed by the agents themselves. It will now 
be argued that this principle cannot after all be accepted 
as it stands, but that an approximation to it is tenable.
There are three ways of interpreting the principle. Firstly, 
it can be taken literally and strictly, as asserting that a 
sociological explanation cannot be true unless it confines 
itself to the reasons for action actually used by the agent 
A in giving an account of his action to an observer 0, who 
simply records what A says without comment. Secondly, it 
might be interpreted more liberally, as insisting that the 
explanation must be restricted to reasons for action either 
volunteered by the agent, as in the first reading, or accepted 
by him after 0 has introduced them. Thirdly, a still looser 
interpretation of the principle allows the sociologist to 
employ reasons for action neither already in use by A nor 
accepted by him as long as they are intelligible to him. An 
example of a social action will now be constructed and the 
three interpretations tested against it.
Suppose 0 wishes to explain why A goes for a long walk 
every Sunday afternoon. He asks A, who replies that he 
believes that walking will help to preserve his health and 
that Sunday afternoon is his only spare time. 0 then 
discovers that A's mother-in-law visits A and his wife every 
Sunday afternoon and that A and his mother-in-law do not get 
on with each other. It naturally occurs to 0 that A might be
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be lying or deceiving himself and that an alternative 
explanation of his conduct should be considered. Accordingly, 
he frames an inductive generalisation to the effect that A 
goes for a walk whenever his mother-in-law visits his wife, 
adding a ceteris paribus clause to take account of A's broken 
ankle, 'flu, snowstorms and so on. This new explanation 
would be perfectly intelligible to A, who might even accept 
it and use it himself in reply to future inquiries about his 
habit of walking for miles every Sunday afternoon. Reflection 
upon one's own experience suggests that it is not unusual to 
have more than one reason for doing something. Human nature 
being what it is, it is only to be expected that someone 
should sometimes offer the 'wrong' reason in telling someone 
else why he did something; in other words, he may offer a 
reason that was in his mind but was not the effective reason 
on that occasion. The three interpretations can now be 
examined in the light of this example.
The first is evidently untenable, for it entails the 
extreme statement of methodological relativism already 
dismissed. Restricting explanations of social actions to 
professed reasons entails that the use of agents' concepts 
and criteria, to the exclusion of all others, is a sufficient 
condition for the truth of such explanations, not ¿just a 
necessary one. And, ¿just as it is incompatible with the 
application of the concepts of false consciousness and 
ideology» so, in the example described above, is it inconsistent 
with increasing self-knowledge, exemplified by A's realisation,
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after talking to 0, that he was really avoiding his mother- 
in-law rather than taking fresh air and exercise. An agent 
may be an unreliable witness of his own actions and any 
methodological principle which fails to recognise this cannot 
be accepted. The universalizability of rules of conduct 
allows the methodological relativist to acknowledge the 
unreliability of people's explanations of their own behaviour, 
at the cost of renouncing this first interpretation of his 
central principle.
The issue, then, is between the second and third inter­
pretations. What is to be decided is whether 0's explanation 
of A's action must be accepted by, as well as intelligible to, 
A. It is difficult to imagine grounds for insisting that the 
explanation must be endorsed by A if it is to be established 
as the correct explanation of what he did. For this would be 
to imply that claims to knowledge in the social sciences are 
ultimately to be adjudicated, not by those who are qualified in 
these disciplines, but by those who may be quite untutored in 
their procedures. There must be a better way of preventing 
social scientists imposing their criteria on the agents whose 
actions they are studying than allowing agents to impose their 
criteria on social scientists. It is surely clear that 
flexibility and discretion are called for: whether an agent's 
tenaciously defended explanation should be overruled by an 
observer must be decided on the merits of the particular case. 
SUpPose» I°r instance, that A's mother-in-law switches her 
visits from Sunday to Saturday afternoons. If A also alters
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his routine so that he goes for walks on Saturdays and 
stays indoors on Sundays, 0 will be entitled to disbelieve 
his asseverations that his sole reason for walking is a 
desire to safeguard his health. But in practice the 
situation will often be less clear than this. Thus, A's 
mother-in-law may simply stop visiting his wife altogether 
and A may subsequently drop his afternoon walks. If he still 
insists that the only reason why he used to go for long walks 
was in order to preserve his health, 0 is entitled to be 
sceptical. But it is not certain that A is being disingenuous. 
It is possible that after all these months he has become 
thoroughly bored with walking and prefers to run the risk of 
obesity and ill-health. This change of heart could simply 
have coincided with the cessation of his mother-in-law's 
visits. And A himself may be sure in his own mind about the 
purity of his motives, while being embarrassed about 
appearances. In view of circumstances such as these it seems 
unwise to lay down an a priori principle that either the agent 
or the observer is always in the right. Consequently, the 
second interpretation is untenable.
What, then, of the third interpretation ? Is a necessary 
condition of the truth of sociological explanation of actions 
that they be confined to concepts and criteria which are 
■intelligible to the agents who performed them ? In answering 
this question it is important to distinguish between the 
technical terms and investigatory procedures of social 
scientists on the one hand and criteria for identifying actions
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on the other. There is surely nothing to be said for 
prohibiting the use of concepts such as alienation, anomie 
apd ideology on the grounds that they are beyond the 
capacity of some agents to understand. But this is not 
true of criteria for identifying actions. For it follows 
from the definition of a social action that what makes such 
an action the action that it is is the meaning it has for 
the agent performing it. The mistake implicit in the 
extreme version of methodological relativism is that of 
conflating the meaning an action actually has with the 
meaning the agent professes it to have. So it is sometimes 
appropriate to identify a social action in terms of concepts 
and criteria other than those used by the agent. But, if 
the aim of such identification is to elicit a meaning which 
the agent has overlooked or concealed, then it is plain that 
only concepts and criteria which are intelligible to him can 
be used. For a meaning that cannot be understood is no 
meaning at all. This can be illustrated by returning to 
the case of A's Sunday afternon walks. Although A and 0 
agree on a minimal description of A's action as 'going for 
a walk', this does not capture its social meaning. As a 
social action, what A does is identified by 0 as 'avoiding 
bis mother-in-law' and by A himself as 'looking after his 
health'. It does not follow that, because the two 
descriptions do not coincide, whatever 0 might claim to be 
talking about, it is not A's social action, for actual and 
professed meanings may diverge. If, however, A did not know
what a mother-in-law was, then O's description of A's 
social action as 'avoiding his mother-in-law' could not 
designate a possible but unacknowledged meaning for A. 
Accordingly, it must be concluded that a necessary condition 
for the truth of an explanation of a social action is that 
it should only employ criteria which are intelligible to the 
agent.
Summary
It has been argued that, while an extreme form of 
methodological relativism is untenable, the doctrine does 
contain an important truth concerning the explanation of 
social actions. In its extreme version it entails an 
uncritical acceptance of agents' professed meanings, of their 
explanations of their actions in preference to the accounts 
offered by social scientists. The theory can however be 
reformulated so that this entailment is discarded, for the 
universalizability of principles of action allows a 
distinction to be drawn between actual and professed meanings. 
Reliance on the notion of universalizability, and a 
recognition of context-independent criteria of rationality, 
constitute a retreat by the methodological relativist. But 
be can still assert his central belief: that a necessary 
condition of the truth of an explanation of a social action 
is that it should employ the agent's concepts and criteria. 
This claim is ambiguous, but analysis reveals a sense in which
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it is true: a necessary condition for the truth of an 
explanation of a social action is that it should use only 
those concepts and criteria which are intelligible to the 
agent.
This version of methodological relativism is 
consistent with objectivism, as expounded in this thesis, 
but not with subjectivism, because it depends on context- 
independent criteria of rationality. Thus, objectivism 
allows the sociologist to question, and on occasion to 
reject, the explanations of their actions offered by agents. 
And it thereby reinforces the conclusions of the previous 
two chapters, namely, that subjectivists have misunderstood 
sociology and that, once both objectivism and sociology are 
correctly interpreted, there is no conflict between them.
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Summary of Part Two.
It has been argued in Part Two that objectivism does 
not threaten the position of sociology, particularly the 
sociology of knowledge. Subjectivists distrust 
objectivism in part because they believe that its 
methodological implications are hostile to sociology. And 
it is true that, if objectivism entailed the illegitimacy or 
impossibility of sociological investigations into knowledge, 
or if it permitted them only under cripplingly restrictive 
conditions, then there would be rational grounds for 
questioning its validity. It was therefore important to 
establish that the objectivist epistemology put forward in 
Part One is free of unacceptable methodological implications.
Two conclusions were reached in chapter six. The first 
was that philosophy, as a critical discipline, is able to 
make valid comments upon the conceptual and methodological 
aspects of other disciplines. The second was a compatibilist 
thesis to the effect that, knowledge being both objective and 
socially constructed, there is no reason to think that 
epistemology, as the critical study of objective knowledge, 
comes into conflict with the sociology of knowledge, as the 
empirical study of the social context of subjective knowledge.
Many sociologists would,of course, agree with the 
compatibilist view. It is the erroneous subjectivist inter­
pretation of sociology, not sociology itself, which was 
attacked in chapter six.
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Another subjectivist misunderstanding was exposed in 
chapter seven. The subjectivists' mistrust of rationality- 
leads them to hold that the presence of reason does not make 
any difference to the sociological explanation of belief.
At the root of this conviction is the fear that to admit 
that some beliefs are rationally justified would be to place 
them altogether beyond the scope of sociological inquiry. In 
response it was concluded that three classes of beliefs must 
be distinguished, not to place one (or more) of them outside 
the competence of sociologists, but to show the appropriateness 
of a different mode of sociological explanation in each case.
The subjectivist claim discussed in chapter eight was 
that, if objectivism were true, sociologists would have to 
impose their own concepts and criteria on the people whose 
beliefs and actions they sought to understand, thus failing to 
do justice to their subject-matter. Opposed to this view is 
the extreme methodological relativist argument that agents' 
accounts of their own actions and beliefs must be uncritically 
accepted. The conclusion reached in chapter eight was that 
both extreme positions are untenable: a moderate version of 
methodological relativism affords the valuable insight that a 
necessary condition for the truth of a sociological 
explanation of an action is that it should use only those 
concepts and criteria which are intelligible to the agent. 
Accordingly? sociologists are entitled to question, and on 
occasions to overrule, agents' explanations of their own 
actions and beliefs.
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Thus, the conclusion of Part Two is that the 
objectivist epistemology put forward in Part One does not 
constitute an obstacle to the sociological investigation 
of knowledge, belief and action. And so Parts One and 
Two have set out an epistemologically and a methodologically 
defensible version of objectivism. That doctrine can now 
be used as the foundation for an examination of the 
subjectivist critique of educational knowledge, which is to 
be undertaken in Part Three. In particular, two points 
can be carried forward. The first is that it follows from 
what has been said in Part One that there is no general 
epistemological reason for thinking that there cannot be 
objective educational knowledge. Secondly, the implication 
of what has been shown in Part Two is that, while educational 
institutions are amenable to sociological explanation of one 
sort or another, this does not in itself undermine their 
claims to be the guardians of knowledge and reason.
The validity of the subjectivist critique of educational 
knowledge cannot therefore simply be inferred from a general 
epistemological or methodological position. The ground has 
now been prepared for an examination of educational 
knowledge on its own merits, a task that will be undertaken 
in Part Three.
PART THREE
THE SUBJECTIVIST CRITIQUE OP EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
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Introduction to Part Three
The purpose of the subjectivist attack upon objective 
knowledge was to show that knowledge in general cannot be 
objective, from which it would follow that educational 
knowledge could not be objective. Educational methods and 
content would thereby be revealed as instruments of 
indoctrination and exploitation. It was established in Part 
One, however, that there can be objective knowledge, in the 
sense of justified true belief. And in Part Two the fear 
that objectivism would restrict sociological inquiry was shown 
to be groundless. Consequently, the subjectivist critique 
of educational knowledge cannot be accepted on general 
epistemological or methodological grounds. The subjectivist 
must therefore produce arguments concerning educational 
knowledge in particular. It is the aim of Part Three to 
evaluate such arguments. In order to do so, two sorts of 
educational knowledge must be distinguished : (i) there is the 
knowledge expressed, or claimed, in teachers' and examiners' 
judgements about pupils; and (ii) there is the knowledge which 
teachers are employed to impart to their pupils.
The first sort of educational knowledge is examined in 
chapter nine. The subjectivist claim is that the categories 
and standards used by teachers in assessing the performance of 
their pupils are arbitrary, reflecting the interests of the 
dominant class rather than expressing objective facts about 
pupils. Three formulations of this general claim are 
discussed: Performativism and Relativism are rejected, but
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Institutionalism is found to contain an important truth.
This is that facts about pupils are institutional rather 
than brute facts. The question is whether the interests 
they reflect are those of a form of life (that of the 
dominant class) or of the human form of sensibility.
The possibility of answering this question in terms of 
the other kind of educational knowledge is explored in 
chapter ten. If the curriculum can generate purely 
educational categories and criteria, they could be used as 
the basis of impartial judgements about pupils. The 
subjectivist argues that the curriculum is nothing more than 
a means of social and political indoctrination, for even 
objectivism is an ideology, that of educators. The claim 
that the nature of knowledge forms an objective foundation 
for educational judgements is, the subjectivist alleges, 
the professional ideology of teachers.
The reply is given in chapter eleven. The aim is to 
establish a conceptual connexion between objective knowledge 
and rational action. The idea of acting for a reason is 
found to presuppose five principles, which constitute the 
rational form of sensibility. These principles give rise 
to five forms of knowledge, which constitute the pre­
conditions of acting for a reason in the world as we know it. 
It follows that objective knowledge, organised in accordance 
with the forms, is a precondition of rational intercourse 
with reality.
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The conclusion of Part Three, and of the thesis as a 
whole, is, then, that there can he objective educational 
knowledge. Rational action is impossible without access to 
objective knowledge. Accordingly, educational institutions, 
to the degree that they accumulate and transmit objective 
knowledge, serve the interests, not of a particular social 
group, but of all human beings in so far as they are rational 
agent s.
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CHAPTER NINE. EDUCATIONAL JUDGEMENTS
9.1 Introduction
The subject of Part Three is the subjectivist critique 
of educational knowledge, which aims to unmask education, 
revealing it to be a process, not of discovering, but of 
manufacturing facts about pupils. A major element in this 
critique is the claim that the concepts and categories 
teachers use in assessing pupils are social artefacts rather 
than parts of the unchanging fabric of the universe. Two 
main points will be made in reply to this claim. The first 
is that some expressions of the subjectivist claim are 
intellectually unsound: in particular, two statements of it, 
namely performativism and relativism, incorporate ratiocinative 
errors. The second point is that the claim, admittedly true 
in a sense, simply does not have the implications its 
proponents believe it to possess: to show that something is a 
social creation, rather than a natural process, is not ipso 
facto to prove its undesirability.
The issue to be discussed in this chapter is, then, the 
subjectivist claim that teachers' judgements about their 
pupils are based on criteria and concepts which are socially 
constructed. Thus, Young contends that 'existing 
categories that for parents, teachers, children and many 
researchers distinguish home from school, learning from play, 
academic from non-academic, and "able" or "bright" from "dull" 
or "stupid", must be conceived of as socially constructed, 
with some in a position to impose their construction or
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meanings on others.' The imposition of meanings may,
another writer suggests, have a very immediate social goal,
concerned with classroom interaction: 'The imputation of
normal attributes to pupils by teachers does not tell us
objectively about pupils .... For the teacher, social control
may depend on his being able in the classroom to maintain
ppublicly his definition of the situation.' But of course 
the exigencies of teacher-pupil confrontation do not . 
exhaust the social significance of educational classification. 
Edgley, for instance, claims that 'the evidence points 
strongly to the suspicion that behind the current industrial 
demand for a more educated workforce lies the hope that more 
education of the kind suggested will help to restore among 
students the discipline needed in the subordinate ranks of 
industry's political hierarchy.'^ And, according to 
Althusser, schools constitute an Ideological State Apparatus 
whose function is 'the reproduction of the relations of 
production, i.e. of capitalist exploitation.' In 
transmitting knowledge, schools, it is claimed, also transmit 
exploitative social relations, which are manifested in the 
criteria used by teachers to assess and control pupils.
This view of the social significance of schooling is 
based on the thesis that the knowledge which teachers claim 
to have about their pupils is socially constructed. The 
first version of this thesis will now be discussed.
1
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9»2 Performativism.
Performativism is the view that teachers and 
examiners, in claiming to know certain things about pupils, 
are not asserting anything at all, but doing something.^ 
When for example, a teacher says 'Julie is a B stream pupil' 
he does not state a fact about Julie but does something to 
her, in this case, allocates her to a stream. This inter­
pretation of the claim that teachers manufacture rather than 
discover knowledge about pupils is based on a distinction 
between constatives and performatives, that is, between 
utterances in which a proposition is asserted and those in 
which something is done. Thus, an observer who says 'The 
Admiral's daughter named the ship Virago' is reporting a 
fact, or asserting a proposition, whereas the Admiral's 
daughter, in saying 'I name this ship Virago' is not 
reporting a fact, or asserting a proposition, about what she 
is doing, but actually doing it. She is not saying that 
she is naming a ship but actually naming it. Similarly, 
when a referee says 'Keegan is offside', he 'is not 
asserting a true or false proposition; he is making a 
proposition true or false in the context.'
This argument may then be extended to the sphere of 
education. An examination board's list of successful and 
unsuccessful candidates does not report a collection of 
facts about the candidates; rather is it the case that its 
publication counts as passing some and failing others. The 
board does something to candidates instead of reporting
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facts about them. The conclusion is then drawn that 
whether a candidate passes or fails an examination does 
not depend upon his or her possession of certain 
characteristics, but results from the examination board's 
having performed one action rather than another. And, 
if its decisions are unconstrained by the facts, as they 
now appear to be, they are arbitrary and merely reflect 
the interests and prejudices of members of the examination 
board. Accordingly, the knowledge that candidate C has 
attained standard S is the knowledge that some authority 
has performed a certain action, not the knowledge that C 
possesses certain characteristics. Just as the Admiral's 
daughter's naming a ship Virago does not reflect pre­
existing facts about it but brings into being the new fact 
that it is called Virago, so the board's passing C does 
not tell us anything about C except that the board have 
performed a certain action with respect to him.
There are grounds for rejecting this argument in the
fact that the distinction between constatives and
performatives on which it is based is unsound. Having
introduced the dichotomy, Austin abandoned it on finding
himself unable to discover a criterion for differentiating
between constatives and performatives as discrete classes
7of utterances.' Instead, he came to see the constative 
and the performative as aspects of utterances in general, 
introducing the notion of illocutionary force to delineate
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the performative dimension. For instance, a referee who 
utters the sentence 'Keegan is offside' in the appropriate 
circumstances is saying something which is true or false, 
that is, he is asserting a proposition; he is also 
performing an illocutionary act, in this case, giving Keegan 
offside. And in general whenever someone in authority says 
that someone has measured, or failed to measure, up to some 
standard, he is both asserting a proposition and performing 
a further illocutionary action, such as pronouncing a 
verdict or passing or failing an examination candidate.
The utterance of someone in authority who says that C 
measures up to S can be divided into a proposition and an 
illocutionary act. The proposition can be assessed for 
truth or falsity: the judgement that C measures up to S must 
be made on the basis of C's having attributes Ay| ... An , 
possession of which is the defining characteristic of the 
class of things which measure up to S. The proposition that 
C measures up to S is true if and only if G has A^ ... An. 
Whether or not C has A^ ... An is an objective matter of fact 
nothing the authority can do or say can make it true that C 
has A-i ...An , can bring it about that C has Ai ...An , if C 
does not already possess those attributes. It follows 
that nothing the authority can say or do can make it true (or 
false) that G measures up to S; the only proposition he can 
make true is the proposition that C was deemed (rightly or 
wrongly) to measure up to S. But the proposition that C was 
deemed by the appropriate authority to measure, or fail to
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measure, up to S does not entail that C actually does measure, 
or fail to measure, up to S, because authorities can err.
However, the possibility that authorities can err 
cannot arise if it is uenied that, in issuing a verdict or 
pronouncing a judgement, they assert a proposition. If, in 
pronouncing that G measures up to S, an examination board 
makes it true that C measures up to S, then it is in principle 
"beyond criticism. Of course it will often be the case that a 
particular judgement, once issued, cannot in practice be 
challenged: what matters for the conduct of the game is the 
decision the referee actually made, regardless of its rightness 
or wrongness. But the futility of dissent in a particular 
case is no reason to deny the possibility that authorities are 
in general fallible. Unless this possibility is admitted, it 
is difficult to see the point of the activities of external 
assessors, moderators, HMIs and LEA advisers, not to mention FA 
assessors of referees. For none of these activities would make 
sense if it were not for the fact that authorities, in issuing 
verdicts and pronouncing judgements, assert propositions which 
may "be true or false.
It can therefore be concluded that teachers, in making 
educational judgements about their pupils, are asserting 
propositions as well as doing things. And so, it may be 
thought, their judgements are constrained by the facts, by the 
things objectively are, by external reality.way
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9 . 3  Relativism.
The second unacceptable interpretation of the 
subjectivist claim seeks, however, to undermine this 
conclusion. Relativism is the view that there is no 
objective or external reality which is the same for every­
one; there are as many 'realities' as there are forms of 
life. On this view, the claim that propositions are 
constrained by the way things objectively are must therefore 
be rejected. This extreme statement of conceptual
Qrelativism was discussed and rejected in chapter three.
It is now appropriate to consider an attempt to apply this 
extreme form of relativism to the question of the 
epistemological status of educational judgements.
The main problem the relativist encounters in applying
his theory to specific issues is that it restricts the
grounds he can have for rejecting opposing views. Take,
for instance, Esland's repudiation of 'the objectivistic
theory of knowledge', which he characterises as follows:
'The individual consciousness recognises objects as being
"out there", as coercive, external realities. Their
continuing presence provides the probabilities on which rational
qaction can be based .... '' It is clear that he wishes
entirely to dispense with the concept of truth as
correspondence to fact, for it presupposes the existence of
10external reality. And so he cannot dismiss the
objectivistic theory of knowledge on the grounds that it is 
false, that is, fails to correspond to reality. Accordingly,
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he seeks to Justify his rejection of objectivism by
adverting to its allegedly repugnant social consequences:
'Objectivism has been firmly embedded in the norms and
rituals of academic culture and its transmission .....
Educational psychology has been a powerful legitimating
agency and rationalisation for objectivism. As such, it
11has become an important form of social control.'
This appeal to the educational and social effects of 
objectivism undermines the relativist case against it, 
because it presupposes the very notion of truth that has, 
putatively, been discarded. The claim is that objectivism 
has been used to warrant certain educational policies and 
that these policies have had wider social effects. What 
makes it true, if it jLs true, that objectivism has had these 
consequences is not that people say that certain things have 
happened as a consequence of objectivism but that these things 
have actually happened. The relativist claim can be true 
only if there is an external world which is the same for every­
one, not Just for those who inhabit the same form of life. 
Since this is Just what the relativist, on this extreme 
interpretation, denies, his doctrine is incoherent.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that there is nothing 
0f value in relativism. It has already been argued that the 
truth lies in objectivism with respect to the material world 
relativism with regard to some aspects of the human social
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world. This compromise view will now be examined in an
educational context.
12
.¿I- Inst itutionalism.
Institutionalism is a compromise position which
recognises the influence of social factors on educational
selection and assessment, while acknowledging the fact that,
as Flew puts it, 'teachers’ perceptions may be in part
veridical.' ^ It builds upon a point made by Pring: 'That
we distinguish between cats and dogs may be due to certain
social conditions; that we can so distinguish has something
14-•to do with cats and dogs.' Similarly, our classification
of pupils into A, B and G streams or into GCE and CSE groups 
or into examination passes and failures is no doubt 
influenced by the power structure of society; that we can so 
classify them has something to do with the pupils themselves. 
In clarifying this interpretation of the claim that teachers' 
knowledge about their pupils' performance is socially 
constructed, it will be helpful to recall the distinction 
between brute and institutional facts. '
It will be remembered that institutional facts pre­
suppose the existence of a social institution, whereas brute 
facts do not. For instance, someone who says 'The sky is 
blue' or 'I saw a great spotted woodpecker in the trees this 
morning' states a brute fact, because the sky, birds and 
trees existed long before human beings and their institutions
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and may well survive their demise. By contrast, examples 
of institutional facts include the following:'Mr.Smith 
married Miss Jones; the Dodgers beat the Giants three to two 
in eleven innings; Green was convicted of larceny; and 
Congress passed the Appropriations Bill.' It is clear
that concepts such as 'marriage' and 'larceny' are 
institutional, in that saying that Prince Charles married 
Lady Diana or that someone was convicted of larceny does not 
make sense in the absence of the relevant institution. And 
this fact enables a sense to be given to the claim that 
teachers' knowledge of their pupils' performance is socially 
constructed such that the claim is true: this knowledge makes 
use of concepts which presuppose the existence of social 
institutions; it is knowledge of institutional facts.
Not all of the things that are said about pupils are 
statements of institutional facts. Some such things are 
concerned with individuals as physical objects rather than 
people; for instance, 'Christopher is taller than Paul'. 
Others, such as 'Alison has twisted her knee' or 'Caroline 
does not get enough sleep', refer to them as biological 
organisms. Still others, such as 'It was Simon who made 
Robert's nose bleed', are about people as participants in 
rudimentary forms of social interaction. But the ones that 
are most interesting in the present context are those that 
are concerned with pupils as pupils, that is, as members of a 
particular social institution and so as objects of teachers'
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«rid examiners' evaluations. Examples of such judgements 
include 'Julie is a B stream pupil', 'C stream pupils are 
not expected to pass "0” level History','Pupils from working- 
class backgrounds cannot work autonomously', 'Nigel is "A” 
level material' and 'Jessica is an articulate and 
conscientious girl'.
If a teacher knows an institutional fact about a pupil, 
then a fortiori he knows something about that pupil. Mackie 
makes a similar point, albeit in another context: 'Given any 
sufficiently determinate standards, it will be an objective 
issue, a matter of truth and falsehood, how well any
17particular specimen measures up to those standards.' ' 3ut 
the teacher's knowledge is socially constructed, for the 
truth or falsity of what he says is relative to the standard 
used in grading pupils. Thus, when he says 'Julie is a B 
stream pupil', he asserts a proposition which is objectively 
true or false relative to a given standard of evaluation. 
Whether Julie has or has not attained a certain standard of 
educational performance is an objective matter of fact; if 
it is true that she has attained such a standard, then it is 
true 'for anyone', that is, it is true simpliciter. But 
acknowledging that fact does not in itself endorse the 
standard of evaluation employed.
Objectivity and Standards.
The conclusion of the previous section was that 
recognising that someone meets a certain standard does not
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necessarily commit one to approving of the use of that 
standard. If the implications of this point are to be 
appreciated, the notion of a standard must briefly be analysed. 
On some occasions the usage of 'standard' is purely 
descriptive, meaning no more than usual, customary, normal or 
expected; for example, a social survey might reveal a standard 
distribution of some attribute among a sub-group, by which is 
meant simply that the distribution among the sub-group is the 
same as that among the population as a whole. When 'standard' 
carries evaluative connotations, they are sometimes 
deprecatory, as in the case of a motoring writer who sums up 
a new model as 'a standard l-£ litre hatchback', implying that 
it does not merit any particular attention from car buyers, 
that there is nothing special about it, that it is ordinary, 
of no more than average quality. But when the word 'standard' 
occurs in educational contexts, it generally bears a favourable 
evaluative import. We speak of pupils or students as having 
reached or attained a given standard, implying that meeting a 
standard is an achievement rather than a lapse or a failure and 
so that standards are worth meeting. A book might be referred 
to as the standard work on a certain subject, suggesting, not 
that it is average, but that it surpasses all other works on 
the subject and is therefore worthy of imitation and of being 
accepted as an authority. Thus, the typical use of 'meets or 
measures up to a given standard' in educational discourse is to 
oommend.
Nevertheless, the use of such locutions has a descriptive 
as well as a prescriptive dimension. There is no
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contradiction in holding both that Julie is a B stream 
pupil and that classifying pupils as A, B or G stream is 
a worthless, and even damaging, practice, although a 
disclaimer would be needed to override the usual 
presumption that making use of a standard implies 
acceptance of its appropriateness or desirability. It is 
simply that those who report the outcome of a test are 
normally those who have devised and administered it and 
who may reasonably be presumed to be satisfied with it. The 
point is that deciding to judge something in terms of a 
certain standard and reporting the fact that something 
measures up to that standard are distinct. The difference 
between standards and facts is elucidated by Popper in the
following words: '....  through the decision to accept a
proposal .... we create the corresponding standard; yet 
through the decision to accept a proposition we do not create
yj Qthe corresponding fact.' To adopt an example from Mackie, 
it is a factual question how well a particular sheepdog has 
performed in trials, but, if one wants to keep the dog only 
as a pet, the results of the trials can reasonably be ignored
/IQin choosing the animal. 7 What is not a factual matter is 
our choice of standards of assessment, for values are 
ultimately involved. We could choose to commend pupils for 
being inarticulate, unpunctual, lazy, morose, untidy and 
academically incompetent and to classify them as A stream.
We do not do so because we do not regard such attributes as 
valuable.
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And so there is some truth in the claim that teachers' 
knowledge about the educational performance of their pupils 
is socially constructed, in that such knowledge rests 
ultimately on the values which inform our choice of 
standards. It might be thought that this conclusion 
concedes the main issue to the subjectivists. But this is 
not so. Bor to show that educational judgements are based 
on standards and values is not to prove that there is anything 
wrong with them. To establish that educational standards are 
not part of the natural order of the universe but are instead 
social creations is not to demonstrate that they are corrupt. 
Those who think otherwise are guilty of the extreme 
misanthropic prejudice with which Rousseau opened Emile: 'God 
makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become 
evil.' This is not a sentiment that accords well with 
subjectivists' distaste for the supposedly 'dehumanising' 
effects of objectivism.
To this the subjectivist will probably reply that 
standards are not indicators of merit but merely arbitrary 
ways of excluding children of certain backgrounds from certain 
social benefits. They are chosen, not because they reflect 
objective qualities, but because they are most likely to be 
achieved by white middle class children. It must be 
admitted that in one respect standards are arbitrary: there 
is no law of nature that underwrites the decision to fix the 
pass mark for an examination at, say, 40% rather than 30% or 
^0%. But this sort of arbitrariness is a feature of many non­
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educational laws and standards and is surely better under­
stood as the most that human ingenuity can do in the face 
of the complexity of life. For the age of consent, the 
voting age, speed limits and the maximum permissible level 
of alcohol in the blood for driving are all arbitrary in 
just the same way. 39# from a pupil from a disadvantaged 
background on a bad day may represent a greater achievement 
than 45# from a pupil from a favourable home background in 
optimum conditions. Similarly, a fifteen-year-old girl 
may be more emotionally mature than one who is sixteen, and 
travelling at 40 mph in a roadworthy car may be less 
dangerous than driving at 30 mph in a vehicle with deficient 
brakes and bald tyres. A great deal can be, and is, done 
to mitigate the worst effects of imposing sharply defined 
boundaries on the shadowy patterns of real life. The more 
we can replace the simple pass/fail, guilty/not guilty and 
child/adult dichotomies with more sensitive instruments of 
selection and assessment, the better and less arbitrary will 
our judgements be. Nevertheless, to ensure that subtle 
discriminations supersede crude ones, to substitute the 
gradations of a spectrum for the opposite sides of a binary 
division, presupposes that there are real discriminations 
there to be recorded. And this is just what the subjectivist 
denies. It is therefore clear that applying standards with 
greater sensitivity will not get to the root of the 
subjectivist's misgivings about them.
If the criteria used by teachers and examiners in 
selecting and assessing pupils are to be defended against 
the subjectivist critique, it seems, then, that they must 
be shown to have some sort of objective basis. Since it 
has been found that such criteria reflect human values and 
interests, it follows that they can have an objective 
foundation if, and only if, these values and interests are 
themselves objective. The general theme of Part One was 
that the basis of objectivity is the human form of 
sensibility. And so the direction the argument must now 
take is clear: the task is to discover how, if at all, the 
human form of sensibility can be used as a foundation for 
educational standards. It is natural to begin by
considering educational knowledge of the second sort, namely 
the curriculum. For the nature of knowledge itself, as 
manifested in the school curriculum, might provide a bridge 
between the human form of sensibility and the knowledge of 
pupils professed by teachers. Educational criteria and 
categories could then be shown to transcend merely social 
interests and subjectivists would no longer be able to argue 
that we are faced with a choice, unconstrained by rational 
considerations, between ultimate values: education for or 
against industrial society ? This line of thought merits 
serious attention and the next chapter will be devoted to a 
critical examination of it.
Summary.
Three versions of the subjectivist claim that educational
standards are socially constructed have been discussed. Two
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of them have been rejected, Performativism because it is 
based on an unsatisfactory philosophy of language and 
Relativism because it is incoherent. But a compromise 
position has been accepted: Institutionalism is the view 
that teachers' knowledge of their pupils' performance is 
knowledge of institutional rather than brute facts. The 
standards embodied in educational institutions reflect 
values and interests. This is not necessarily a 
vindication of the subjectivist view that schooling reflects 
the interests of the dominant class, because it may be 
possible to base educational judgements upon values and 
interests which belong to the human form of sensibility.
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CHAPTER TEN. THE CURRICULUM.
10.1 Introduction
The question to he investigated in this chapter is
whether the curriculum can underwrite the objectivity of
educational judgements by generating criteria of assessment
which are unaffected by outside social pressures. The
subjectivist returns a negative answer to this question.
Young, for instance, argues that the 'curriculum as fact',
by which he means the curriculum seen as reflecting the
structure of objective knowledge, is 'a historically specific
social reality expressing particular production relations
among men.' Similarly, the traditional curriculum,
arising out of the forms of knowledge and divided into
subjects, is an important part of what Friere calls the
•banking concept' of education, which, he claims, 'is well
suited to the purposes of the oppressors, whose tranquility
rests on how well men fit the world the oppressors have
pcreated, and how little they question it.' Another writer 
has drawn attention to 'the hidden curriculum of schooling': 
Illich contends that the experience of being taught the 
traditional curriculum in the accepted way 'develops the habit 
Qf self-defeating consumption of services and alienating 
production, the tolerance for institutional dependence, and 
the recognition of institutional rankings.'^ And so, 
according to these writers, the curriculum, overt and hidden 
alike, is nothing but a means of social and political 
domination. Yet, ironically, the traditional curriculum has
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also been criticised on the grounds that it does not do 
enough to produce the managers and technologists that 
industry requires. It seems that the structure of the
controversy about the curriculum and social interests is 
not as simple as it might at first appear to be.
Ideologies in Educational Debate
An interesting attempt to understand the nature of
the curricular debate has been made by Evetts, who
distinguishes between idealist and progressive educational
5interpretations. These consist of theories, attitudes 
and opinions which 'hang together in such a way as to make 
them alternative schemes or models of the relationship 
between man, education and society.' The educational
idealist believes that education is an effective social and 
occupational selector (p.118); he maintains that education 
is being corrupted by the introduction of technical, as 
distinct from practical or traditional, knowledge (p.44-); 
and he favours the existence of an intellectual elite 
entrusted with the preservation of a realm of high culture, 
which can only be debased by efforts to propogate it. The 
idealist interpretation comprehends an objectivist 
epistemology, which is used to warrant a view of the pupil 
as a passive receiver of bodies of knowledge (p.4-9). By 
contrast, the educational progressive sees 'the knowledge- 
ideal' as a repressive influence and places a higher 
priority on the development of unique individuals than on 
the maintenance of academic traditions (p.49).
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This typology of educational interpretations is over­
simplified in that it conflates two distinct and 
historically significant polemical standpoints in the 
idealist interpretation. The schism is latent in the 
idealist view of educational selection, which is ¿justified 
sometimes on the grounds that it is necessary for 
industrial efficiency and sometimes because it is claimed 
that academic standards cannot otherwise be maintained. It 
becomes manifest in the idealist account of knowledge.
Oakeshott criticises one idealist belief, namely that 
educational standards must be maintained for the sake of 
economic efficiency, from the standpoint of another, that 
the infusion of technical knowledge into education corrupts 
it.? Consequently, it is not clear whether the true 
position of the educational idealist is that high educational 
standards are a means to economic efficiency or that the 
intrusion of technical knowledge constitutes a decline in 
those standards.
It seems, then, that the idealist-progressive dichotomy 
does not faithfully reflect the structure of the debate 
about the curriculum, which involves three distinct view­
points. Certainly, three separate interests can be 
identified: the economy, which uses the output of the 
education system, pupils, who are, so to speak, processed by 
it, and teachers, who provide its input of knowledge. These 
interest groups correspond to the three schools of 
educational thought distinguished by Williams: industrial
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trainers, public educators and old humanists. This 
tripartite division of educational opinion reflects the 
impact upon a traditional educational system, whose purity 
the old humanists sought to defend, of two major socio­
economic changes which occurred during the nineteenth century 
in Great Britain. The first development was the growth of 
industry and the consequent demand for literate, numerate and 
technically competent personnel, while the second was the 
extension of the franchise to the working class and its 
consequent insistence on education as a basic human right. 
Williams suggests that the industrial argument was challenged 
from two sides: the public educators maintained that the 
curriculum should reflect the needs of pupils as future 
citizens rather than those of pupils as future operatives;
the old humanists emphasized man's development as a spiritual
9being as well as his place in the material world. But, 
although both the public educators and the old humanists 
resisted the subservience of the education system to the needs 
of the economy, their views were ultimately incompatible, 
because the old humanists feared the vulgarisation of high 
culture if it were made more widely available.
It is clear, then, that the subjectivist thinkers who 
argue that the curriculum cannot underwrite purely educational 
judgements are the heirs to the tradition of progressive 
educational thought. The position of the objectivist is less 
certain, for the dissolution of the idealist interpretation 
appears to necessitate a choice between the old humanists and
the industrial trainers. Perhaps the more obvious 
ideological home for objectivism is old humanism. For 
objectivism seems to imply an attractive argument to the 
effect that the human form of sensibility gives rise to 
the forms of knowledge, which in turn determine the 
structure of the curriculum. Thus, educational judgements 
would ultimately rest on considerations of what is pre­
supposed by rational intercourse with reality. And so 
they would transcend the limited concerns of the public 
educators and the industrial trainers. It can however be 
argued that the forms of knowledge cannot be derived in 
this way from the human form of sensibility and accordingly 
that old humanism cannot be presented as the expression of 
an objectivist approach to education. Instead it is 
revealed as the affirmation of an ideology, which differs 
from those of the public educators and the industrial 
trainers only in representing the interests of a group 
within the education system, namely teachers.
Would this outcome mean that the exposition of an 
objectivist epistemology was in vain ? Would not the human 
form of sensibility have been shown to be useless as a 
foundation for the curriculum and so for the supposed objectivity 
of educational judgements ? It would be premature to draw such 
conclusions. For it will be contended that there is an 
alternative way of using the human form of sensibility and 
the forms of knowledge to underwrite the objectivity of
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the curriculum and of the educational ¿judgements based 
upon it. This argument will be expounded in the next, 
and last, chapter.
The immediate task is to show that the debate over 
the objectivity of the curriculum is possible. For any 
attempt to provide foundations for such objectivity pre­
supposes that it exists, or, in other words, that there is 
a distinction to be drawn between teaching and indoctrination. 
And so in the next section it will be argued that such a 
distinction can indeed be sustained by the considerations 
adduced in defending the possibility of rational belief 
and criteria of justification in Part One.
10.3 Teaching and Indoctrination
The correct analysis of the concept of indoctrination 
is a subject of considerable dispute. In recent years 
controversy has centred on the question whether
iOindoctrination is a matter of content, method or intention. 
The view to be argued for in this section is that intentional 
indoctrination occurs to the extent that a teacher's 
utterances are deliberately ideological. The way will then 
be open to argue in the next section that a teacher's 
utterances will be non-ideological as long as they are based 
upon an objective curriculum and that an objective curriculum 
is one which is organised in accordance with the forms of 
knowledge. The task of the final chapter will then be to 
justify the claim that the forms of knowledge confer 
objectivity on the curriculum.
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The view that intentional indoctrination occurs to 
the extent that a teacher's utterances are ideological 
would be disputed by subjectivists, who hold that all 
allegedly rational beliefs, and the utterances that 
express them, are m  fact ideological. This denial
that there are any rational beliefs and utterances entails 
that genuine teaching is impossible. All a teacher can do 
is to add his voice to the influences affecting pupils' 
beliefs, such influences being ineluctably irrational or 
ideological. An argument of this form is put forward by 
Helm, who rejects two suggested definitions of indoctrination, 
as coming to hold a belief without evidence and holding a 
belief for which there is no possible justification, on the 
grounds that distinguishing justifiable from unjustifiable 
beliefs presupposes a 'presumably objective yardstick' when
12'there cannot be objectivity with regard to value systems.'
Applying this general principle to teaching and
indoctrination, Helm rejects the conventional account of
the distinction, according to which indoctrination differs
from teaching in 'presenting a one-sided view of the world',
because 'we necessarily do this a n y w a y . A  more
appropriate definition of indoctrination is, he claims,
'the moulding of behaviour and opinions in accordance with
14external influences essentially biassed in nature.' This 
definition encompasses 'the indoctrination we receive as a 
result of the value system we are subject to in society. 
Consequently, 'indoctrination is a process that is occurring
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all the time by means of the value systems intrinsic to all
social institutions ....  The teacher must necessarily
attempt to affect the pupils' beliefs as part of the learning 
,16process.
This account of indoctrination is unsatisfactory,
because it fails to distinguish between the different ways in
which people come to believe that certain things are true.
The last sentence quoted, to the effect that teachers cannot
help but affect their pupils' beliefs, is perfectly true but
does not entail that teachers cannot help but indoctrinate
17their pupils. In chapter seven ' it was argued that people 
can come to hold beliefs in three different ways: as a result 
of rational thought, as the consequence of an emotional 
response to a social situation or as the result of an attempt 
at rational thought which is flawed by the intrusion of social 
pressures. To claim that teaching is no different from any 
other way in which beliefs can be affected is to overlook 
these important distinctions. There are two aspects to these 
differences in how people come to hold their beliefs: 
intention and reason. Teaching and indoctrination are alike, 
and unlike other ways in which beliefs are acquired, in 
involving intention; they differ in that teaching, but not 
indoctrination, takes place in accordance with appropriate 
criteria of rationality. These two claims will be examined 
and defended in the rest of this section.
2 8 9
The concept of indoctrination comprehends the 
indoctrinator's intentions: if a speaker S is to be said to 
have indoctrinated a hearer H, it is not enough that H came 
to believe something as a consequence of S's having said it.
S has indoctrinated H into the belief that 2  if, and only 
if, S intends to induce in H the belief that jd. The 
presence of an intention is therefore a necessary condition 
of indoctrination; the necessary and sufficient conditions 
will be stated in full towards the end of this section.
The intention condition is of course controversial.
White, for example, while eventually concluding that 
indoctrination must be deliberate, is attracted to the idea 
that a person indoctrinates 'not only if he intends to implant 
a belief unshakably, but also if he is merely responsible for 
such implanting, even without intending this.' Degenhardt
goes further, giving three reasons for rejecting the
■'I Qintention condition. ' Firstly, it is not helpful for a 
teacher who wants to know what to do in order to avoid 
indoctrinating his pupils. Secondly, a teacher might be so 
biassed that he cannot help slanting his presentation, even 
though he does not intend to do so. Thirdly, covert ways 
of influencing beliefs may be more effective than open 
attempts to exert such influence.
These reasons for relaxing the intention condition are 
unconvincing. An adequate answer to the first argument 
is that intention is only a necessary, not a sufficient,
2 9 0 .
condition of indoctrination. A complete account will 
include a reference to criteria of rationality from which 
the indoctrinator has departed. It will certainly be 
helpful to the teacher anxious to avoid indoctrination to 
know what the appropriate criteria are. Thus, a teacher 
of economics seeking to detect any elements of 
indoctrination that might be affecting his teaching must ask 
himself questions of the general form 'Has this theory been 
falsified ?' or 'Are there other explanations of the same 
phenomena that have better withstood critical tests ?'.
And to answer such questions he must know what evidence and 
what critical tests are appropriate in economics.
The second and third reasons offered by Degenhardt for 
discarding the intention condition resemble the points made 
hy Helm, for they say in effect that indoctrination is so 
pervasive that retaining intention as part of its definition 
will oblige us to remove the stigma of indoctrination from 
some of the most powerful, and perhaps dangerous, ways of 
affecting beliefs. The road to indoctrination may be paved 
with good, that is, non-indoctrinatory, intentions. That 
people mean well is no guarantee that their actions will not 
have harmful effects. So, it seems, would the argument 
against the intention condition proceed.
Now it must be agreed that teachers and others can 
influence pupils' beliefs without intending to do so. But
291
affecting pupils' beliefs in this way does not amount to 
indoctrination. It certainly does not follow that such 
influences are unimportant or harmless, for they may have 
far-reaching effects, beneficial or damaging, on pupils' 
self-esteem and future prospects. Teachers must therefore 
be sensitive to the unintended side-effects which their 
educational judgements may have. Nevertheless, it is 
important to distinguish unintentionally affecting pupils' 
beliefs from intentionally indoctrinating pupils. This 
general argument will now be elaborated in connexion with 
the particular claims made by Degenhardt.
The second reason for relinquishing the intention 
condition is that a teacher may, from bias, unintentionally 
slant his presentation of a theory or an idea. What is 
being suggested here is that the concept of bias should be 
subsumed under that of indoctrination. Indoctrination 
occurs both when a teacher intentionally sets out to induce 
a belief which cannot be rationally justified and when his 
bias for or against a theory leads him to present it in a way 
that exaggerates or overlooks its claims to be accepted. It 
is far from clear that anything is gained by classifying 
both cases as indoctrination. There is a real difference 
between someone who intentionally sets out to get someone 
else to believe something even though he knows that there is 
no evidence for its truth and someone whose prejudice leads 
him to do what he does not intend to do. The paradign case
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of indoctrination is the inculcation, typically by rote 
learning, of a religious or political dogma. This is a 
very different thing from the actions of a teacher who, 
while making every effort to be impartial, is betrayed by 
bias of which he is unaware into doing less (or more) than 
justice to a theory he is teaching. It should not be 
assumed that indoctrination is necessarily more reprehensible 
than bias, for a teacher might be guilty of culpable 
negligence in refusing to acquaint himself with new research 
which refutes a favoured theory. The difference between 
indoctrination and bias is not that one is more blameworthy 
than the other, nor that it is more capable of causing harm, 
but rather that only indoctrination involves intention.
The third reason for abandoning the intention condition
is that implicit and unacknowledged influences may be more
powerful than overt efforts to proselytize. This may well
be true, but it does not follow that covert attempts to
affect beliefs should be classified as indoctrination. An
example cited by Degenhardt concerns the administration of a
school, which embodies judgements about pupils, such as that
pupils 'categorised on the basis of exam performance should
20be thought of and educated in very different ways,' which 
are influential precisely because they are undetected and 
so cannot be resisted. There is a sense in which it is not 
only unobjectionable but positively worthwhile that pupils 
should be treated differently on the basis of exam 
performance. For example, a requirement that pupils be
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allowed to embark on GCE 'A' level courses only if they have 
passed a minimum number of subjects at '0* level is 
perfectly reasonable. Of course the different treatment 
pupils receive is different in educationally relevant ways.
The problem is that pupils will become imbued with certain 
ideas and assumptions about themselves, perhaps about their 
worth as human beings, as a result of being categorised on 
the basis of exam performance and treated accordingly. There 
is no doubting the serious effects educational judgements 
can have on pupils' self-respect and attitudes. But it is 
possible to recognise these effects without subsuming them 
under the concept of indoctrination. What is happening is 
that pupils notice certain aspects of educational arrangements 
and draw conclusions about themselves. They are learning 
unofficially, by finding things out for themselves rather 
than by being taught them. Perhaps in many cases they are 
acquiring false or groundless beliefs about themselves. Any­
way, they are not being indoctrinated. If a teacher saw what 
was going on and preserved or even strengthened the 
arrangements which induced the pupils' beliefs with the 
intention of reinforcing those beliefs, then he would be 
indoctrinating them. But until such an intention is formed 
pupils are simply being influenced by their environment.
It might be objected that this is a rather negative line 
of argument: all that has been said is that we can identify 
the phenomena pointed out by Degenhardt without having to
classify them as cases of indoctrination. But, since they 
do have something in common with indoctrination, in that 
they involve the acquisition of beliefs which have not been 
rationally justified, it might be thought more appropriate 
to accommodate Degenhardt's insight by distinguishing 
intentional from unintentional indoctrination. And indeed 
this suggestion is acceptable, as long as it is not thought 
to entail that indoctrination can be either intentional or 
unintentional without it making any difference. Intentional 
indoctrination is a distinct phenomenon. Moreover, it is 
one which is particularly interesting in connexion with class­
room teaching, for both activities are intended to influence 
beliefs. Thus, the importance of the concept of intentional 
indoctrination is that it enables a clear distinction to be 
drawn between genuine teaching, based on rationally justified 
beliefs, and abuses of teaching, or intentional indoctrination, 
based on beliefs which have not been rationally justified. 
There are therefore three distinct phenomena: (i) teaching;
(ii) the abuse of teaching, or intentional indoctrination; 
and (iii) the unintended effects on pupils' beliefs of the 
social institutions within which teaching takes place, or 
unintentional indoctrination. It has been argued that 
intention differentiates (ii) from (iii): it will now be 
maintained that reason distinguishes (i) from (ii).
The difference between teaching and indoctrinating 
intentionally is that the speech acts of the teacher are non- 
ideological utterances, whereas those of the intentional
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indoctrinator are ideological. The distinction between 
ideological and non-ideological utterances was explained in 
chapter two. Ideological utterances are defined as follows :
A's assertion that £ is ideological iff
(1) A is attempting to convince H that jd
or that £ and therefore r
or that jd and therefore H ought to do x
(2) A asserts that thereby implying that he has 
evidence for the truth of £
(5) A does not have evidence for the truth of £.
There is of course more to the concept of intentional 
indoctrination than this; otherwise, it would be superfluous, 
merely another name for ideological utterances. In fact 
intentional indoctrination is a sub-species of ideological 
utterance in general, characterised by two further features.
The first feature which distinguishes intentional 
indoctrination from other ideological utterances concerns 
the nature of the non-ideological utterance from which it is 
an aberration. Intentional indoctrination occurs only in
contexts which are ostensibly educational, in which, that is 
to say, someone professes to be teaching or instructing or 
initiating. There is the implication that the indoctrinator 
is superior to his audience in terms of knowledge, experience 
Qr authority. The ideologue, on the other hand, need have
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no such pretensions; any authority he may have is likely to 
be charismatic rather than institutional. And so 
intentional indoctrination is the sub-class of ideological 
utterances which occurs when the corresponding non- 
ideological utterances would amount to teaching. In other 
words, if it were true that A had evidence for the truth of j>,
A would then be teaching H that 2, rather than simply trying 
to prove to H that £ by rational argument.
The second feature which converts an ideological
utterance into a case of intentional indoctrination involves
the ascription to A of a perlocutionary intention. If someone
is to he said to be asserting something, there are certain
intentions which he must be presumed to possess; he must, for
example, intend his audience to understand what he says and
to grasp the illocutionary force of his utterance, that is, to
recognise that it is a statement rather than a question or the
O ']expression of a wish. But he might have the further
intention of producing an action or state of affairs by means 
of the assertoric act he has performed. For instance, A 
could not be said to have asserted that smoking is bad for 
your health unless some H understand his words and recognise 
that A intends him to believe that smoking is bad for his 
health. But, supposing that A has the further perlocutionary 
intention of persuading H to give up smoking by telling him 
that it is bad for his health, it is not necessary that this 
intention be fulfilled for A to be said to have asserted that 
smoking is bad for H's health. Thus, perlocutionary intentions
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concern the merely contingent effects that utterances may
have. The interesting thing about intentional
indoctrination is that it involves a perlocutionary
intention, in addition to those implicit in the assertorie
act which is the vehicle of indoctrination. The nature
of this intention is accurately reported by White: the
22indoctrinator intends to implant a belief unshakably. 
l’or it is clear that indoctrination involves, not just 
inducing beliefs for which there is no evidence, but 
implanting them so strongly that they will be immune to 
criticism.
Two further conditions may therefore be added to the 
definition of intentional indoctrination :
(4) The context of A's utterance must be such 
that, if conditions (3) and (5) are not 
satisfied, then A teaches H that £
(5) A intends unshakably to implant in H the 
belief that £.
This definition of intentional indoctrination evidently 
presupposes the existence of criteria of rationality, in 
terms of which the evidence for or against a belief can be 
assessed. Subjectivists repudiate the distinction between 
justified and unjustified beliefs, on the grounds that there 
are no objective criteria of rationality. It has already 
been argued that there are universally applicable criteria
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2'5of rationality. If this were not so, rational discourse,
and indeed any systematic transactions with the world, would 
be impossible. Since teaching, as distinct from 
intentional indoctrination, is a form of rational discourse, 
it too would be impossible. And so the distinction between 
teaching and intentionally indoctrinating depends upon those 
criteria of rationality which are constitutive of the human 
form of sensibility.
The human form of sensibility is, then, the foundation 
of the distinction between teaching and intentional 
indoctrination. But to establish the possibility of teaching 
as a mode of rational discourse is very far from showing that 
the teaching of school curricula as they actually exist 
exemplifies such discourse. For those curricula may not 
provide adequate safeguards against intentional indoctrination 
and other irrational ways of affecting beliefs. The mere 
fact that teaching is conceptually distinguishable from 
intentional indoctrination is no guarantee that teaching is 
what actually takes place in schools. If educational 
curricula are such that pupils from certain social backgrounds 
cannot but pick up certain beliefs about themselves which 
adversely affect their attitudes and expectations, then some 
of the misgivings of writers such as Young, Friere and Illich 
would surely be vindicated. It might be replied that the 
acquisition of certain beliefs by pupils is an unavoidable 
by-product of educating them. This answer will deserve to
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allay subjectivist and progressive anxieties only if the 
educational judgements which give rise to such effects are 
seen to be founded on the presuppositions of teaching as a 
mode of rational discourse. They must, that is to say, be 
based upon curricula which embody the presuppositions of 
rational discourse and systematic dealings with the world. 
But how is this transition froi^fhuman form of sensibility 
to the curriculum to be effected ? The forms of knowledge 
might seem to provide a promising route: the human form of 
sensibility generates the forms of knowledge and the forms 
of knowledge structure educational curricula. An attempt 
to follow the first stage of this path, the derivation of 
the forms of knowledge from the human form of sensibility, 
will be examined in the next section.
An Attempted Transcendental Deduction of the Forms of Knowledge.
It might be thought that objective knowledge is a simple 
accumulation of propositions, all of which can be tested 
against each other and against experience in just the same 
way. This view is denied by philosophers who hold that 
knowledge can be differentiated into forms or disciplines, 
into spheres or universes of discourse, into modes of 
experience or realms of meaning. According to a leading 
exponent of this doctrine, propositions belong to forms of 
knowledge, each of which has its own characteristic central 
concepts, a distinctive logical structure, a set of criteria
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for testing its expressions against experience and 
particular methods of exploring experience. A theory
of this kind might seem to pi'ovide a means of ensuring 
the objectivity of the curriculum: forms or disciplines 
of knowledge would serve as a bridge between objective 
knowledge and the school curriculum. This suggestion 
faces two difficulties: the objectivity of the forms must 
first be established and they must then be related to the 
curriculum. It is the first problem which will occupy 
the rest of this thesis; in the present section an attempted 
transcendental deduction of the forms from the reactions of 
primitive consciousness will be examined and ultimately 
rejected; in the next chapter the thesis will conclude with 
a proposal for an alternative deduction, from the rational 
form of sensibility. A brief comment on the second problem 
is, however, appropriate before considering the objectivity 
of the forms.
It would be difficult to deny that, if there are forms 
or disciplines of knowledge, education, which is at least 
in part concerned with the transmission of knowledge, must 
in some way take account of the fact. But it certainly 
does not follow that a school curriculum can be satisfactory 
only if its structure reflects that of the forms; for 
example, it does not follow that if there are seven forms 
pupils should be taught seven subjects, one from each form. 
Some such misinterpretation of the forms of knowledge 
doctrine seems to underlie the objection that the forms are
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nothing but a rationalisation for the 'traditional' grammar 
school curriculum.^ This view of the forms, whether as 
the basis of advocacy or criticism, cannot be sustained, 
for there are significant discrepancies between the 
traditional academic curriculum and the forms of knowledge. 
Geography and foreign languages are hard to place, while 
sociology belongs to a form of knowledge but is not part of 
the traditional curriculum. Moreover, skills which are
characteristic of one form may be acquired and exercised 
while learning subjects belonging to another; statistical 
techniques, for instance, are used in the natural and in 
the social sciences as well as in mathematics. So it is 
clear that there is no isomorphism between the forms and 
the curriculum.
There is, however, a more promising way of using the
forms of knowledge in curriculum theory. Official
documents concerning the school curriculum often use the
27forms as a framework of analysis. Curriculum 11-16, for
instance, gives a checklist of 'areas of experience',
intended to guide the construction of a common curriculum,
which corresponds rather closely to a typical statement of
28the forms of knowledge. It is argued that there are 
certain areas of experience which an adequate curriculum 
must cover, but it is not suggested that each area must be 
correlated with a curricular subject. Thus, concepts which 
are characteristic of one form of knowledge or area of 
experience may be introduced in subjects belonging to another.
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Concepts such as specialization, mutual dependence, 
co-operation and competition are constitutive of the 'other 
minds' or historico-sociological form of knowledge. But 
their use in the curriculum need not be restricted to history 
and the social sciences, for they may appropriately occur in 
literature, religious education and commerce, not to mention 
subjects which are designed to cut across traditional 
boundaries, such as world studies, environmental science and 
community studies. It seems, then, that the forms of 
knowledge, or something resembling them, can be used in 
analysing the curriculum. But a curriculum which covers 
all the forms will be objective only if the forms are them­
selves objective. An attempt to establish the objectivity 
of the forms will now be examined.
The leading exponent of the forms of knowledge theory 
maintains that the basis of their objectivity is our 
language and form of life. Hirst repudiates the approach 
envisaged at the end of the previous section, which sees the 
forms as emerging from the human form of sensibility: 'That 
there exist any elements in thought that can be known to be 
immune to change, making transcendental demands upon us, I 
do not accept.' 7 Yet he goes on to say that rationality 
is 'a matter of developing conceptual schemes by means of 
public language in which words are related to our form of 
life, so that we make objective judgements in relation to some
■z qaspect of that form of life.'-' It is not altogether clear 
what Hirst means by 'our form of life'. While it cannot be
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the human form of sensibility, which states the conditions 
of any rational intercourse with reality and is therefore 
immune to change in response to social developments, it is 
equally plain that it cannot be the socially variable forms 
of life of conceptual relativism.^ Perhaps Hirst has in 
mind a sort of mezzanine floor between these two storeys: 
our form of life would be susceptible of change, but only 
very gradual change; and although it would also be less than 
universal, it would still be widespread rather than local. 
This interpretation of the phrase 'our form of life' does 
seem to be implicit in another comment on the forms of 
knowledge: 'That other domains might, in due course, come 
to be distinguished, is in no sense being prejudged; for
the history of human consciousness would seem to be one of
-52progressive differentiation.'^
This position is still, however, a form of relativism, 
for, if the forms of knowledge change as our form of life 
develops, they are unlikely to remain unaffected by social 
conditions. For social change is by no means exclusively 
localised and short-lived: the rise of modern science and 
its impact on society is an example of a broad social 
phenomenon stretching over several centuries and many 
societies. And large-scale developments of this kind are 
among the targets of the subjectivist critique. Young, for 
instance, implies that scientific inquiry itself is no more 
than one form of life among others:' ....  like the feudal,
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clerical and market dogmas of earlier centuries, the dogmas 
of rationality and science become open to enquiry: the 
necessary preliminary to conceiving of alternatives. And
so it might be argued that, if the forms of knowledge are 
to provide a genuinely objective basis for the school 
curriculum, they must be grounded in something less mutable 
than our form of life. They must be shown to be the one 
possible manifestation of the permanent and universal human 
form of sensibility. It is this line of thought that seems 
to inform Brent's attempt at a transcendental deduction of 
the forms of knowledge.
Brent claims that the forms of knowledge are 'necessary
35to any valid human construction of r e a l i t y . I n  order to 
establish this, he adopts a Kantian strategy of the sort 
rejected by Hirst. The question which Brent sets out to 
answer is: 'In other words, how- to use our classical Kantian 
terminology - can we move from a metaphysical exposition, which 
describes the conceptual order by means of which we make 
objective judgements, to a transcendental deduction, which 
justifies this o r d e r ? ' . I n  view of what was said about 
truth, the forms of knowledge and the human form of sensibility 
in chapter four,^ two comments are appropriate. Firstly, 
Brent's metaphysical exposition of the forms is consistent 
with the syncretistic account of truth-criteria put forward 
in chapter four. What correspondence and coherence amount to 
in practice is not constant over all academic disciplines; the 
treatment of correspondence as a family resemblance concept is
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particularly consonant with the view that truth-criteria
38vary from one form of knowledge to another. Secondly,
and in sharp contrast to the first point, the idea of a
transcendental deduction of the forms receives no support
at all from the syncretistic theory of truth. Far from it,
for it seemed that only two forms of knowledge could be shown
39to be derivable from the human form of sensibility. These
are the empirical and the mathematical, which are 
developments of the ideas of correspondence and coherence, 
respectively. Thus, implicit in the argument of Part One 
is a presumption against the viability of Brent's planned 
■transcendental deduction.
The transcendental basis of the forms of knowledge is, 
according to Brent, the human form of sensibility. A form 
of knowledge is an elaboration of a primitive reaction; the 
rudimentary human consciousness is progressively differentiated 
into the forms of knowledge. There are only so many 
reactions a man looking at, say, a mountain can give; each 
reaction gives rise to a question; the kind of question he 
asks in turn determines what can be accepted as an appropriate 
answer; and efforts to arrive at an answer generate a form of 
Icnowledge. Thus, the basis of the empirical form of knowledge 
is the following reaction-question set :
»(a) How curious i There is white on top, green underneath 
and purple in the centre.
(i) What causes the white, green and purple, and why do
4-0they appear as such ?'
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And so Brent concludes that it is such 'reactions that
constitute the primitive differentiation of consciousness,
which has become developed and refined into the empirical/
mathematical/religious/ethical/aesthetic/historical-
disociological schema as we have it today.'
This attempted transcendental deduction of the forms
42of knowledge has recently been exhaustively criticised.
Two of the many objections made by Marshall et al., are of 
particular interest: these concern the lack of uniqueness 
proofs and the differentiation of the primitive consciousness 
into reactions. Marshall et a intake Brent to be trying to 
establish that 'the forms of K necessarily lie at the 
foundations of any truth j u d g e m e n t s . A n d  so, they 
maintain, it is not enough to show that the forms do in fact 
underlie our truth-judgements; it must be proved that they 
are the only possible foundation of such judgements. In 
Brent's terms, a metaphysical exposition of the forms is not 
enough; they must also be transcendentally deduced. But, 
according to Marshall et al., Brent's transcendental 
deduction does not include a uniqueness proof, that is, an 
argument to show that a particular form is the only possible 
foundation for the truth-judgements which, it may be accepted, 
are in fact characteristic of it. This verdict is just what 
would be expected in the light of what was said in chapter 
four. But why are there no uniqueness proofs in Brent's 
argument for the forms ? Is their omission merely an over­
sight and, if so, could it be rectified ?
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A consideration of the second objection makes it clear
that the answer to that question must be no. It is clear
that, given Brent's strategy, the only way in which the
forms could be shown to be the one possible foundation for
our truth-judgements would be to prove that the reactions
out of which they develop are the only possible reactions
available to primitive consciousness. Marshall et al,,
appear to be correct in thinking that Brent fails to establish
this. Indeed it is difficult to see how he could do so.
For, in the first place, there does not seem to be a one-to-
one correlation between reaction and form. Consider the
44following last of forms with their parent reactions:
Reaction
How curious I 
How vast it is 1 
How beautiful it is I 
How good it is 1 
How old it is !
How awesome it is !
Form
Empirical
Mathematical
Aesthetic
Ethical
Historical-sociological 
Religious
As Marshall et al., point out, curiosity could initiate the 
mathematical and the historical-sociological forms as well as 
the empirical form.^ And it is far from obvious that the 
mathematical form has its origins in a reaction concerned 
exclusively with size and not at all with number. Again, an 
appreciation of the beauty of the natural world is 
characteristic of a major tradition in religious thought. 
Similarly, the reaction expressed by 'How good it is i' is 
just as likely to lead men to worship what produced it as is
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a recognition of awesomeness; primitive people's gods 
include beneficent providers as well as uncontrollable and 
dangerous forces. In t:e second place, the number of
possible reactions on looking at a mountain scene is much 
greater than those listed by Brent. Marshall et al., draw 
attention to the many emotional reactions overlooked by Brent 
indifference, favourable reactions such as excitement, 
pleasure and joy, and unfavourable ones, such as 'frustration 
resentment, confusion, defiance, suspicion, disgust, anger, 
contempt , etc.,' It is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that the main criterion Brent used in selecting the reactions 
listed above is that they should each express a central 
concern of one of the forms of knowledge. In the absence of 
a criterion of selection that is independent of the forms, it 
is inevitable that the transcendental deduction collapses 
into circularity.
Thus, Brent's transcendental deduction of the forms of 
knowledge fails. Either the reactions of primitive 
consciousness on which they are said to be based are an 
arbitrary selection from the whole range of possible 
reactions or they have implicitly been chosen because they 
reflect the characteristic concerns of the forms. In the 
first case the forms lack any systematic foundation and in 
the second case the argument is circular. In both cases the 
lack of an independent criterion for the selection of 
reactions vitiates the transcendental deduction.
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Thus, the subjectivist critique of educational 
knowledge remains so far unanswered. But the failure 
of one attempt to provide a transcendental deduction of 
the forms of knowledge does not entail that such a 
deduction is in principle impossible. Indeed it will be 
argued in the next chapter that the forms can be 
transcendentally deduced from the rational form of 
sensibility.
10 •5 Summary.
Two positive conclusions have been reached in this 
chapter. . Firstly, it has been shown that teaching is 
conceptually distinguishable from intentional indoctrination. 
Secondly, it has been found that one way of ensuring that 
pupils are taught rather than intentionally indoctrinated is 
to construct a curriculum capable of generating objective 
educational judgements. However, an attempt to use the 
forms of knowledge to guarantee the objectivity of the 
curriculum collapsed when it became clear that the forms 
cannot be transcendentally deduced from the reactions of 
primitive consciousness. And so an answer to the 
subjectivist critique of educational knowledge remains 
attainable but so far unachieved.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN. A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OP THE FORMS
OF KNOWLEDGE.
11.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to propose a transcend­
ental deduction of the forms of knowledge, or something 
resembling them, from the rational form of sensibility.
Forms of knowledge or areas of experience would then be 
available as an objective foundation for the school 
curriculum. A curriculum which covered all the forms or 
areas could in turn give rise to objective educational 
judgements. In this way criteria would be generated for 
distinguishing teaching from intentional indoctrination and 
the subjectivist critique of educational knowledge would be 
answered. This chapter is, then, an attempt to establish 
the truth of the first premise in an argument put forward as 
a reply to the subjectivist critique: that something 
resembling the forms of knowledge can be shown to have an 
objective basis. It will be remembered that an attempt 
to do this was examined and rejected in the previous chapter. 
Accordingly, the first task of this chapter is to analyse 
the reasons for the failure of Brent's transcendental 
deduction of the forms from the reactions of primitive 
consciousness. The requirements of a valid transcendental 
deduction will thereby be clarified. The chapter will 
conclude with a proposed transcendental deduction of the 
forms from the rational form of sensibility.
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11.2 The Requirements of a Transcendental Deduction of the 
Forms of Knowledge.
Why, then, did Brent's transcendental deduction of 
the forms collapse ? The reason given at the end of 
the previous chapter was that it lacked an independent 
criterion for selecting the reactions of primitive 
consciousness out of which the forms were said to have 
developed. Without such a criterion there could be no 
uniqueness proofs, that is to say, there could be no 
arguments establishing that the forms embody, not merely 
the criteria we in fact use in making truth ¿judgements, 
but the only set of criteria we could use in making such 
judgements. This diagnosis of the failure of Brent's 
argument raises the question whether uniqueness proofs 
are an indispensable part of a transcendental deduction 
of the forms.
Brent's critics, Marshallet al., would insist that 
they are, for they take him to be trying to show that 
'the formsof K lie at the foundations of any truth
A¿judgements.1 And indeed Brent claims that the forms are
2'necessary to any valid human construction of reality.'
It might be objected that this does not commit Brent to 
offering uniqueness proofs, because there might be more 
than one 'valid human construction of reality' or more 
than one coherent and comprehensive set of truths. 
Admittedly, the objector might continue, it is true if 
there is only one valid human construction of reality (or
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coherent and complete set of truth judgements) and if 
the forms of knowledge do underlie any such construction 
then there can be only one set of forms. But why, he 
asks, assume that only one human construction of reality 
can be valid, and why impute this belief to Brent ?
Perhaps he thinks that there is a disjunction of equally 
valid constructions of reality, each uniquely related to 
its own set of forms. It would then be enough to 
establish the unique relation between each construction and 
a set of forms and to show that each set of forms arises 
from reactions available to primitive consciousness. There 
would be no need to prove that the reactions themselves are 
the only ones to be found in primitive consciousness. And
so the problem of an independent criterion for their 
selection would not arise.
The objector's interpretation cannot, however, be 
accepted, for it is quite at variance with Brent's announced 
intention to refute relativism. Thus, he denies that the 
claims to truth of different interest groups are irreconcilable 
and that knowledge is culture-bound on the basis of the claim 
that there is 'at the basis of all human speech acts a 
common and universal framework of judgement that enables 
assessment to be made of particular truth claims that 
emanate from particular societies and social groups.'
Moreover, Brent's main criticism of Hirst's account of the 
forms of knowledge is precisely that it is an inadequate 
defence against relativist attacks on the objectivity of the
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curriculum. Hirst's interpretation of objectivity as 
linguistic inter-subjectivity entails that 'his theory can 
solve nothing, produce no new consensus on curriculum 
planning that can command rational assent across cultures; 
rather it simply justifies our traditional curriculum by an 
inadequate conventionalist strategy.'^ And so Marshall 
et al,, are correct in thinking that Brent is committed to 
offering uniqueness proofs as part of his transcendental 
deduction of the forms.
Yet there are occasions when Brent seems to adopt a 
strategy that is almost indistinguishable from Hirst's.
Having accepted Hirst's view that the forms of knowledge 
are to be defined in terms of very general categorial 
concepts, he also agrees that these 'categorial concepts 
are liable to change.' It is not clear whether there is a 
significant difference between saying that there is one set 
of forms which is liable to change and saying that there are 
several sets of forms, each of which eventually gives way to 
its successor. What matters is the rate of change.
Suppose that the unique set of forms of knowledge are thought 
to change so gradually that most of its constituent forms 
remain substantially unaltered over a period of time 
measured in historical epochs rather than generations. There 
is evidently a real difference between this single evolving 
set of forms and forms which change so quickly that few 
persist throughout a generation, for in the latter case it is
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appropriate to speak of many sets of forms in rapid 
succession, albeit with some overlap. So there are three 
possible interpretations of the forms of knowledge: a 
single unalterable set, a single slowly evolving set or a 
series of sets.
These interpretations may be classified as transcendental, 
evolutionary and relativist. Brent's position is 
evolutionary, despite the initial appearance to the contrary, 
for it is now clear that there are two ways of denying 
relativism. Thus, he maintains that the 'development of 
this agreement in a human form of life, as Wittgenstein 
describes it, or this form of sensibility, as Kant describes 
it, can be set in an evolutionary perspective.'^ Yet it is 
¿just this interpretation which he presents as a transcendental 
one. 'It should not be thought,' he suggests, 'that, if the 
form of human sensibility is subject to evolutionary change, 
then it cannot form the transcendental basis for the 
curriculum.' Since this view is inconsistent with the 
threefold typology of interpretations Just introduced, either 
that typology must be revised or Brent is wrong in thinking 
that his argument for the forms can be both evolutionary 
and transcendental.
And so a return is made to the question whether a 
transcendental deduction must involve uniqueness proofs.
For it is now clear that Hirst would say that it must and 
that therefore his own argument for the forms is not a
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transcendental one, whereas Brent would say that it need not 
and that his argument for the forms is not therefore 
precluded from being a transcendental one. Clearly, if 
Brent has a good reason for describing his argument as 
transcendental, the triune typology and, more importantly, 
the uniqueness requirement must be relinquished. And in that 
case it might be thought that the verdict of the previous 
chapter would have to be reversed: it would have to be admitted 
that Brent's transcendental deduction had succeeded in 
providing an objective basis for the curriculum. That 
deduction failed, it was argued, because it lacked an independent 
criterion for the selection of reactions of primitive 
consciousness. But, if the uniqueness requirement is dropped, 
the arbitrariness of the chosen reactions does not invalidate 
the deduction. It is enough that the reactions be common and 
enduring; they do not have to be unique and immutable. It will, 
however, be argued in the next section that this suggestion is 
untenable.
^ j Subjective Reactions and Objective Reason.
It will be argued in this section that the requirement 
that a transcendental deduction must include uniqueness proofs 
cannot be abandoned without jeopardizing the refutation of 
relativism. For the lack of an independent criterion for the 
selection of reactions of primitive consciousness entails that 
there are no grounds for excluding impulsive actions and 
subjective experiences from a list of such reactions. And so 
the reactions of primitive consciousness may occur involuntarily
316
and. a fortiori without rational deliberation. Moreover, 
unconsidered actions and mental states are likely to be 
influenced by the social circumstances in which the agent 
or subject finds himself, no matter how rudimentary and 
undeserving of the title 'society' they may be. Thus, 
Brent's transcendental deduction fails because it attempts 
to ground the forms of knowledge in subjective reactions 
rather than objective reason. An alternative argument for 
the forms emerges from this conclusion: a transcendental 
deduction must seek to derive the forms of knowledge, not 
from the particular and contingent reactions of individuals, 
but rather f om the universal and necessary presuppositions 
of rationality. In this way the uniqueness requirement will 
be satisfied and a relativist interpretation of the forms 
refuted. Furthermore, the forms of knowledge can then be 
used as the link between the human form of sensibility and 
the curriculum.
The first stage in this argument concerns the concepts 
of action and reaction. It would be generally agreed that 
actions are to be distinguished from events on the grounds 
that an action is the bringing about of something whereas an 
event is merely a happening. Actions, but not events,
involve the idea of agency, of the exertion of power. But
t tl©there is more than the idea of agency to/concept of human 
action. 'The paradigm case of a human action is,' according 
to one influential account, 'when something is done in order 
to bring about an end.'^ Two distinct ideas are implicit in 
this definition: firstly, the agent must have a goal or an
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end in view; secondly, he must believe that the action he is
to take constitutes an appropriate means to that end. In
relating means to ends, and, more controversially, in
choosing ends, an agent must follow rules, including
linguistic and logical rules, rules of evidence, moral norms
and social standards. 'Man is,' as Peters says, 'a rule-
10following animal.' Man is also, as an earlier philosopher
said, a rational animal. And indeed the concept of acting
for a reason has been analysed in a broadly similar way to
that of human action as defined by Peters. According to
Davidson, 'Whenever someone does something for a reason ....
he can be characterized as (a) having some sort of pro
attitude towards actions of a certain kind, and (b) believing
11....  that his action is of that kind.' The pro attitudes
consist of a variety of wants, desires, urges, moral views, 
principles, prejudices, goals and values, from which it is 
clear that reason is accorded only a limited part in the 
determination of preferences. But the question whether an 
action is of one kind rather than another is one that is to 
he settled entirely on the basis of reason. It can therefore 
he concluded that action, if it is to be human action, must 
involve acting for a reason at least to the extent that the 
agent is capable of identifying his action as an action of a 
certain sort or as a means to an end he wishes to bring about.
The concept of reaction can now be examined in the light 
of the preceding analysis of the idea of human action or 
acting for a reason. The word 'reaction' is ambiguous, having
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three main meanings. In the first place, a reaction may­
be a considered reciprocal or responsive action, that is, an 
action taken for a particular kind of reason, namely, a 
desire to complement or reply to an action already taken by 
someone else. I'or instance, when a journalist asks a 
politician for his reaction to some recent event, the 
politician's utterance will typically have a certain 
illocutionary force and perlocutionary intention. If he says 
what he says in order io win votes or reassure foreign opinion, 
he is reacting to the event in a deliberate, perhaps a 
calculated, manner. A fortiori he is acting, or reacting, for 
a reason. The paradigm case of this sense of reaction is 
when someone is asked for his reaction to something that 
someone else has said about him, for then the question has 
the form 'What is your reply ?'. In its second meaning a 
reaction is an immediate or first impression. In some 
circumstances, for example, a television news reporter may 
ask a public figure for his reaction to some recent event, 
intending to elicit an expression of emotion, such as anger, 
resentment, indignation, shock, outrage, regret, surprise, 
delight or amusement. Here the interviewee acts for a reason 
in reacting, or replying, to the reporter's question, but in 
doing he also expresses his emotional reaction to the event.
To the degree that the mental state in question is a first 
impression, it will resemble an event or occurrence rather 
than an action. In expressing what he felt, the interviewee
is drawing attention to something that happened to him rather
tothan/something that he did. And the stronger or more
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genuine the feeling, the more clearly is it an event, over 
which the subject of experience has no control, rather than 
an action-for-a-reason, which must be within the agent's 
capacity to perform or withhold. This leads to the third 
sense of reaction, in which a reaction is a response to a 
stimulus. Thus, a reflex action is a reaction but not an 
action-for-a-reason, because it was not taken for a purpose; 
indeed a reflex action is not, strictly speaking, taken at all, 
because it cannot be withheld. Similarly, a reaction in this 
sense may be no more than a bodily change, as when a patient 
suffers a reaction to penicillin. What are the implications 
of this analysis of the notion of a reaction for Brent's 
transcendental deduction of the forms of knowledge ?
The conclusion must be that the reactions of primitive
consciousness are not genuinely transcendental, for they are
either socially conditioned rather than primitive or primitive
but merely subjective and accidental features of consciousness.
The reason for claiming that the reactions of primitive
consciousness are socially conditioned is that their complete
expression involves utterances having illocutionary force and
perhaps perlocutionary intent. And so they are reactions in
the sense of responsive actions-for-a-reason: the agent has a
goal or end in view and is following rules. For instance,
empirical questions are said to arise out of the reaction
expressed as follows: 'How curious ! There is white on top,
12green underneath and purple in the centre.' Clearly, this 
utterance presupposes the existence of a language complete with 
rules for identifying colours and spatial locations. Further,
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its illocutionary force is that of an act of describing some­
thing and the utterer may reasonably be presumed to intend, 
via a perlocutionary effect, to arouse his hearer's interest 
in, or at least draw his attention to, what he is describing.
And this presupposes a form of social life, even if it need 
not be so complex and organised that it can properly be called 
a society. Then there is the question of which reaction 
would be evinced on a particular occasion. Why, for example, 
does a man looking at a mountain react to it by expressing 
intellectual curiosity rather than awe, or find himself asking 
practical questions rather than experiencing its beauty ? Take 
the reaction that gives rise to ethical questions: 'How good
<1Zit is 1 Under its shadow men grow corn and feed one another.' ^
Such a reaction presupposes a settled agrarian community; it
could not occur in a nomadic way of life based on hunting. So
the reactions of supposedly primitive consciousness are in fact
reactions of socially conditioned consciousness and are not
therefore transcendental even in the limited sense preferred 
14by Brent. And they certainly cannot constitute the
foundation of forms of knowledge which are 'necessary to any
15valid human construction of reality.' ^
It might however be objected that this criticism of Brent's 
reactions doctrine applies only to an incautious statement of it. 
The expression of reactions was too elaborate and should be 
confined to the initial exclamations. If the reactions of 
primitive consciousness are taken to be no more than what is 
eXpressed in utterances such as 'How curious 1' or 'How good it 
2_q 1' , then it will be seen that they are primitive and
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transcendental in that they presuppose nothing hut human 
nature. Their articulation in sentences such as 'Under its 
shadow men grow corn and feed one another' belongs to a later 
stage of consciousness. Perhaps, the objector might go on, 
reactions give rise to questions and questions to forms of 
knowledge in a similar way to that in which, according to a 
suggestion of Wittgenstein, primitive expressions of pain give 
rise to exclamations and exclamations to sentences.^ But
the objection cannot save Brent's argument. On the objector's 
interpretation, the reactions of primitive consciousness are 
reactions in the second, and possibly in some cases the third, 
sense. Thus, the reaction expressed by saying 'How beautiful 
it is 11 is a first impression, that is, a mental state 
occurring on the occasion of seeing the mountain and without 
any intervening deliberation. And if this is not yet 
absolutely primitive, a reaction could be said to be what is 
expressed by, say, 'Ah !', Just as the most primitive 
expression of pain is, in Wittgenstein's account, a child's 
cry of 'Ouch I'. Reactions of these sorts are subjective in 
that they may vary from person to person, depending on the 
individual's psychological constitution. That reflex actions 
are much the same for everybody is merely a matter of 
contingent regularity; there is no necessity about it. And so, 
while it is true that reactions now presuppose only an isolated 
human consciousness, not a form of social life, it is equally 
true that they presuppose only its subjective aspects. If the 
reactions of primitive consciousness are merely subjective 
feelings, then anger, frustration or boredom have as much right
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11.4-
to be included in Brent's list as intellectual curiosity 
or aesthetic experience.
It is therefore clear that Brent's transcendental 
deduction fails because it is based on features of human 
life which are either socially conditioned or subjective.
The source of the trouble seems to be that Brent's 
argument is essentially anthropological, in that it 
considers men only as members of a biological species. A 
genuinely objectivist argument for the forms of knowledge 
must be based on the concept of man as a rational being or, 
in Peters' words, a rule-following animal. The first step 
of such an argument will elucidate the idea of the human 
form of sensibility, not in the sense of the reactions of 
primitive consciousness, but rather as the form of 
sensibility of a rational or rule-following being. The 
question is not what reactions people happen to have but 
what the conditions of rationality, of rule-following, must 
be.
The Rational Form of Sensibility.
It has been argued that Brent's transcendental deduction 
of the forms of knowledge fails because it is anthropological; 
it is based on contingent, that is to say, either socially 
conditioned or subjective, features of human consciousness. 
Now it is true that knowledge, considered as speech acts 
and mental states, is causally dependent upon certain 
contingent features of human beings as biological organisms,
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such as their possession of sense organs and nervous 
systems. But these features of our human constitution 
are not conceptually connected with our capacity for 
rational thought. A distinction must be drawn between 
two sorts of constituents of the human form of sensibility: 
the causal conditions of the acquisition of knowledge and 
the presuppositions of rationality. Brent1s mistake was 
to try to ground the forms of knowledge in the former 
instead of the latter. It is no doubt true that if 
people had never experienced curiosity or awe or any of a 
range of other psychological states knowledge would not 
have developed as it has. But it does not follow, nor is 
it true, that, once those reactions occurred, knowledge had 
to evolve as it has. And knowledge as it is could have 
developed out of other reactions than those that actually 
initiated its evolution. A transcendental deduction of 
the forms must however be based upon 'the fundamental 
structure of ideas in terms of which alone we can make 
intelligible to ourselves the idea of experience of the 
world.'^
In view of the anthropological nature of Brent's 
interpretation of the human form of sensibility, the phrase 
•the rational form of sensibility' will be used to denote 
the presuppositions of rationality. The intention is to 
specify the form of life or sensibility of a rational being, 
that is, of man in so far as he is a rational or rule­
following animal. What belongs to an individual human being
\IA. 1
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in virtue of his own psychological and biological 
constitution and the particular social circumstances in 
which he finds himself will therefore be excluded. All 
that matters for a specification of the conceptual framework 
without which a rational engagement with reality would be 
impossible is what belongs to a person as a rational or 
rule-following being. The paradigm case of rationality 
is acting-for-a-reason. And so the rational form of 
sensibility must elucidate what is implicit in the idea of 
acting-for-a-reason. It will now be argued that five 
concepts or principles constitute the rational form of 
sensibility: (i) the concept of an intrinsic good: (ii) the 
principle of induction; (iii) the concept of an instrumental 
good; (iv) the principle of universalizability: and (v) the 
concept of other minds.
The concept of an intrinsic good. Rationality is, it is
A Qassumed, essentially a matter of acting for a reason.
Acting for a reason typically involves the selection of means 
to ends: A performs action m because he believes it will bring 
about end £. But A might want to bring about e only because 
be believes it will enable him to achieve some further end _e*; 
so e is not an end in itself but only an intermediate end. 
Evidently, if an infinite regress is to be avoided there must 
be an end that A desires for its own sake. And so acting for 
a reason presupposes the existence of intrinsic goods, objects 
or states of affairs which are desired for their own sake.
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This is still true if acting for a reason is defined, as 
Davidson defines it, in terras of performing an action 
because it is an action of a certain type. A performs 
action a because it belongs to type t_; t can be defined 
either as the bringing about of an end to which performing 
a is a means or simply as the type of which a is a token, 
in which case a is an example of an action performed for its 
own sake. This account of acting for a reason corresponds 
to Weber's typology of rational action. ^  Zweckrational 
action is action taken to bring about a goal; thus, A 
performs m to secure e_, where m is the lending of money to 
B and e is the earning of interest. Wertrational action is 
the class of actions performed because they exemplify a 
value; for instance, Captain Langsdorff, having ordered the 
scuttling of the Graf Spee, committed suicide because it was 
the only honourable thing to do. Both sorts of rational 
action presuppose the existence of intrinsic goods, either 
as the ultimate end which an action is intended to bring 
about or as the reason why an action is seen as an end in 
itself.
It is, as so often in philosophy, important to be clear 
about what is not being said. It is not being asserted that 
acting for a reason presupposes that some things are 
intrinsically desirable, that is, that some things are worthy 
of being desired for their own sake. All that is being 
claimed is that it is necessarily true, true by virtue of 
the meaning of 'acting for a reason', that some things are in
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fact desired for their own sake. It might therefore be
objected that the pursuit of intrinsic goods in this
neutral sense subordinates reason to subjective or
irrational preferences. A neutral account of intrinsic
goods entails, in Hume's famous words, that 'reason is,
and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.' And so
it might be argued that a specification of the rational
form of sensibility must include a normative account of
intrinsic goods, that is, a statement of what things are
worthy of being desired by a rational being. A complete
answer to this objection, which r ises one of the central
questions of moral philosophy, is beyond the scope of this
thesis. But a brief reply must be made. It is true
that, while reason can place limits on what can be desired
for its own sake, it cannot stipulate an exhaustive list of
what a rational being ought to desire as ends in themselves.
Thus, it is irrational to try to achieve two goods if the
attainment of one entails the loss of the other. But this
restriction leaves many combinations of intrinsic goods as
complex goals for the rational being to pursue. As
Hescher puts it, 'the range of human purposes cannot be
20settled on theoretical, a priori grounds.' And he cites
Kant as saying that 'all elements which belong to the 
concept of happiness are empirical, i.e., they must be taken 
from experience.' Nevertheless, it does not follow that
rationality is in any sense relative to, or dependent upon, 
irrational factors. This can be seen by considering the 
idea of an instrumental good. In order to do this it is
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necessary first to understand the place of the principle 
of induction in the rational form of sensibility.
The principle of induction, A complete account of the
rational form of sensibility must go beyond the properties
of acting for a reason and deduce what the world must be
like if a rational being desiring intrinsic goods is to be
able to flourish in it. If a rational engagement with the
world is to be possible, the world must conform to the
principle of induction. It must be the case that the world
exhibits a substantial degree of regularity. For without
some pattern and uniformity in nature it would be impossible
to form rational expectations about the future course of
events and acting for a reason would therefore be
inconceivable. In a world where the principle of induction
did not apply, in 'the chaotic universe', even everyday
22actions such as walking would be unfeasible. So unless
the persistence of external objects and a certain constancy 
in the capacities of one's own body can be taken for granted, 
instrumental reasoning even of so rudimentary a nature as 
'I shall walk to the bus stop in order to catch the next bus 
to the station' would be impracticable. Rational action 
therefore presupposes the principle of induction. But, 
important though it is, this conclusion by no means exhausts 
the significance of the principle of induction.
3 2 8 .
Instrumental reasoning presupposes, not only a certain 
degree of regularity on the part of nature, but also at 
least a modicum of recalcitrance. For the attempt to find 
an effective means to the end that is desired for its own 
sake would not be made if the end were attainable immediately 
and without the slightest effort. A rational being will 
choose the most direct path to its goal; rational action is 
efficient in that it seeks the maximisation of intrinsic 
goods from the minimum use of resources, including effort 
and ingenuity. If the desire for an intrinsic good somehow 
caused its own immediate gratification, if wishful thinking 
made it so, then there would be no need for instrumental 
reasoning at all. That it occurs, that much effort and 
ingenuity goes into the discovery or invention of effective 
means to desired ends, entails that the world inhabited by 
rational animals poses problems and erects obstacles to their 
will»
The non-chaotic universe is therefore both an 
opportunity and an obstacle to the rational being. Without 
some regularity in nature reasoning about means-end relation­
ships would be impossible; without some particular 
regularities such reasoning would be unnecessary.
The concept of an instrumental good. It has been argued that 
rational beings desire intrinsic goods and that the world 
prevents the easy satisfaction of such desires. Techniques
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for circumventing the barriers that obstruct the way to 
such goods must therefore be found; that is to say, there 
is a need for instrumental reasoning. And so, granted 
that there are intrinsic goods and that the world makes 
their attainment difficult, there must be instrumental 
goods. There must, in other words, be actions that are 
performed not for their own sake but because they are 
believed to be helpful in bringing about states of affairs 
which are desired for their own sake. It is now possible 
to understand why it is that the extra-rational nature of 
intrinsic goods does not detract from the rationality of 
instrumental thinking.
Three points can be made in reply to the relativist 
argument, to the argument, that is, that instrumental 
thinking is irrational because it is ultimately directed 
towards the achievement of an irrational, or extra-rational, 
end. Firstly, relativists tend to exaggerate the 
diversity of ends and so over-estimate the likelihood of 
deadlock in moral argument (that is, argument concerning what 
is good, intrinsically or instrumentally). There are
generally several possible means to a given end, from which 
it follows that there are fewer intrinsic goods than there 
are instrumental ones. Thus, even if the relativist case 
were to be accepted it would not follow that rational 
argument about morality is impossible. For there would 
still be scope for rational argument about instrumental 
goods, about the most efficient means to an agreed end or
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about whether an end should be abandoned in view of the cost of 
the means of attaining it. horal disagreement would not at 
once degenerate into expressions of dogmatic commitment to 
irreconcilable ends. Secondly, the need for instrumental 
goods is often overlooked, so that it seems that moral debate 
consists entirely of the advocacy of conflicting ends. Once 
again, there is much scope for rational discussion before 
intrinsic goods, pursuit of which cannot be rationally 
¿justified, enter the debate. Thirdly, and most importantly, 
the relativist case is based upon a false assumption: that the 
end governs the means in such a way that reasoning about a 
suitable means to a certain end is relative to that end. It 
then seems that the truth of a principle of action, of the form 
'Doing m* is the most reliable way of bringing about e*', is 
relative to the desired end. And this may be taken to entail 
that certain propositions, about means, are true only for those 
who desire the end to which they are said to be conducive. But 
in fact means-end generalizations are true, if they are true at 
all? f°r everyone. And that is just to say that true means- 
end generalisations are true simpliciter. If, for instance, it 
is true that reflating the economy by £5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  will 
reduce unemployment by half a million, then it is true, not 
¿just for those who see reducing unemployment as an intrinsic 
good, but for everyone. Its truth is not relative to the ends 
cf those who wish to assert it as part of an argument for 
reflating the economy by £5 *0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  in order to bring down 
unemployment. Of course, if no one wanted to reduce
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unemployment the generalisation might never have been 
discovered. But this entails only that the intrinsic 
goods we desire determine how we use reason, not that what 
reason tells us is similarly determined. Thus it is the 
regularity of the world in the face of the human desire 
miraculously to by-pass its established ways that under­
writes the rationality of moral argument by obliging us to 
reason about instrumental goods.
4.^ 4. The principle of universalizability. It has been argued 
that rationality presupposes the possession of certain 
properties by rational beings (desires for intrinsic and 
instrumental goods) and on the part of reality (some degree 
of regularity). Since acting for a reason involves 
following rules, it is also true that rationality presupposes 
the existence of rules. What, then, is essential about 
following a rule ? This again is a major philosophical 
issue in itself and only a brief answer, drawing on material 
introduced in Part One, can be given.
If instrumental reasoning is to take place it is clear 
that the rational being must be able to identify similar 
situations as similar and to act in the same way in the same 
circumstances. Seasoning involves rule-following and both 
descriptive rules and prescriptive rules have the property 
of universalizability. If two situations are to be 
recognised as similar in all relevant respects, the rational 
animal must be able to use and understand general terms,
332.
terms, that is, which apply to more than one particular.
Thus, if R says that x is f because it has characteristics 
c ...£*, then R is committed, on pain of inconsistency, to 
saying that ^ is f if %  possesses c...c*. And R would not 
be so committed were it not for the universalizability of 
descriptive rules. Similarly, a rational being R will be 
guided by universalizable rules of conduct. If R performs 
action a in circumstances C, then R will perform a in C* as 
long as C and C* are alike in all the relevant respects.
And so in general it can be said that any rule, whether of 
meaning or of conduct, is, necessarily, universalizable. For 
unless it applies beyond the particular occasion on which 
it was first used it is not a rule at all.
The concept of other minds. The last feature of the rational 
form of sensibility can be derived from another property of 
rules, namely the fact that they are necessarily public.
From this it follows that the world of the rational being 
must include other rational beings, for one could not be said 
to be following a rule unless there were other rational 
beings to check one's putatively rule-governed behaviour. If 
the idea of following a rule is to make sense, if, that is, 
the idea of performing an action or a series of actions as 
conforming to a rule is to be intelligible, it must be 
possible, in principle, for someone trying to follow a rule 
to distinguish actually following it from only, and sometimes 
mistakenly, believing that he is following it. And so it
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must further be possible for him to check his belief that he 
really is following the rule he is trying to follow against 
an independent criterion, that is, a criterion independent 
of his beliefs about his actions. For it is not simply that 
another belief, most probably a memory about a past action, 
may <just as easily be mistaken as the original one, but 
rather that, if a person's beliefs are the only way he has of 
checking whether he is successful in trying to follow a rule, 
then mistakenly believing that one is following a rule would 
be indistinguishable from correctly believing that one is doing 
so. A rule one can inadvertently make up as one goes along is 
not a rule at all. There must therefore be at least the 
possibility of a public check on one's actions. This of
course is a statement of the private language argument 
associated with Wittgenstein, who slimmed it up as follows:
i....  it is not possible to obey a rule "privately": otherwise
thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as 
obeying it.' ' If this conclusion is accepted it follows that 
there must be a community of rational beings and that any one 
of its members must possess the concept of other minds, must, 
in other words, be aware of rational beings other than himself 
if he is to be able to distinguish thinking he is following a 
rule from actually following it.
These, then are the five presuppositions of rationality. 
Without these postulates acting for a reason would be
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impossible. The brief arguments in support of the pre­
suppositions are not claimed to constitute a conclusive case 
for them; to do that would be the work of a thesis in itself.
But it is claimed that enough has been done to establish a 
•prima facie case for them as the complete set of presuppositions 
of rationality. Acting for a reason has been seen to 
presuppose (i) intrinsic goods as the ultimate goals of 
action; (ii) a non-chaotic universe which obstructs their 
immediate attainment yet is the condition of their eventual 
achievement; (iii) instrumental reasoning, made both possible 
and necessary by the non-chaotic universe, in accordance with
(iv) universalizable descriptive and prescriptive rules; and
(v) a community of rational beings as the basis of such rules. 
There is nothing subjective about these presuppositions; they 
are not reactions of primitive consciousness which may vary 
from one individual to another. For they depend, not on 
empirical matters, such as the psychological constitution or 
the social circumstances of the individual, but rather on the 
necessary presuppositions of acting for a reason. They are 
therefore true of any individual in so far as he is a rational 
being. And so the rational form of sensibility constitutes 
an objective foundation. But a foundation for what ? Can 
anything resembling a set of forms of knowledge be based upon
it ?
The Rational Form of Sensibility and Forms of Knowledge.
It was argued in the preceding section that the concept 
of rational action gives rise to five postulates which 
constitute the rational form of sensibility. In this section
it will be maintained that these five postulates in turn 
generate something akin to a set of forms of knowledge. The 
idea of acting for a reason is an extremely exiguous one, 
relying on the notion of a rational being existing in a 
minimal environment. Consequently, the rational form of
sensibility states the presuppositions of acting for a reason
mostonly in the schematic terms. It does not tell us what is 
presupposed by acting for a reason in a world approximating 
to our own. And so it seems that, while acting for a reason 
presupposes the rational form of sensibility, acting for a 
reason in the world as we know it presupposes a concrete 
version of the rational form of sensibility. It will indeed 
pe argued that this is just what forms of knowledge are. Just 
as acting for a reason in the world as we know it is an 
application of the formal idea of acting for a reason, so a 
set of forms of knowledge can be seen as a specification of 
the purely formal notion of the rational form of sensibility.
To state the argument so baldly is to risk appearing to 
pe more convinced of its validity than its speculative nature 
v/ould warrant. It is not being suggested that a particular 
list of forms of knowledge, whether put forward by Hirst or 
implicit in The Curriculum 11-16, is the one and only
24possible objective foundation for the school curriculum.
What is being suggested is, firstly, that there must be an 
objective foundation for the curriculum if there is to be 
teaching rather than intentional indoctrination and objective
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educational knowledge rather than educational ideologies; and 
secondly, that something resembling forms of knowledge, areas 
of experience or realms of meaning can be presented as a 
strong candidate for such a role. Accordingly, the task of 
•the subsequent argument is, so to speak, exploration rather 
-than settlement.
Nevertheless, a significant degree of correspondence will 
be found between the principles and concepts which constitute 
-the rational form of sensibility and a widely recognised set of 
forms of knowledge. The argument will again take the form of 
a transcendental deduction: the aim will be to establish what 
must be true if acting for a reason in a world approximating 
to our own is to be possible. We can ask what a rational 
being would be unable to do if a particular form of knowledge 
did not exist or was inaccessible to him. And if it is found 
that he would be unable to apply one of the concepts or 
principles which constitute the rational form of sensibility 
we can conclude that acting for a reason in a world approximating 
to our own presupposes that form of knowledge. Thus, acting 
for a reason is the formal equivalent of the concrete notion of 
acting for a reason in the world as we know it and the rational 
form of sensibility is the schematic counterpart of the 
substantive idea of a set of forms of knowledge. It was found 
that five principles and concepts are presupposed by the idea of 
acting for a reason: intrinsic goods, induction, instrumental 
goods, universalizability and other minds. There are usually 
said to be seven forms of knowledge: empirical, logico-
mathematical, ethical, aesthetic, religious, historico— 
sociological and philosophical.
The principle of induction and the empirical form of knowledge. 
The argument for the empirical form of knowledge is relatively 
unproblematic and has already been foreshadowed in Part One.
It was maintained in chapter three that in the chaotic 
universe, in a world where the principle of induction does 
not hold, everyday activities such as walking, as well as 
more complex ones such as scientific inquiry, would be 
impossible. ^ If the empirical form of knowledge is the 
elaboration of the principle of induction, there must be an 
indispensable aspect or area of rational action in the world 
as we know it which could not exist without it. The 
empirical form may be defined in terms of its characteristic 
ideal, namely truth as correspondence to empirical reality.
What would rational beings in a world approximating to our 
own be unable to do if there were no such thing as truth in 
this sense and so no empirical form of knowledge ? It was 
argued in chapter four that if there were no means of 
dividing propositions into those that correspond and those 
that fail to correspond to empirical reality, then asserting 
one proposition would be just as good as asserting any other,
from the standpoint of saying how things are in the world of
26objects existing in space and time. People could have
only emotional or expressive motives for saying things; all 
utterances would be greetings or expressions of feeling such 
as 'Hi', 'Ouch', or 'Ah'. Even 'Oh what a beautiful
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morning !' would be incapable of being said or understood, 
because of its propositional content. Fact-stating 
discourse would be impossible in the absence of the 
empirical form of knowledge and no one would be able to 
form rational expectations about the future on which to 
base his actions. And so it can hardly be denied that 
rational intercourse with the world as we know it presupposes 
the empirical form of knowledge.
11.5.2 The principle of universalizability and the logico-mathematical
form of knowledge. The principle of universalizability has
been seen to be presupposed by the basic idea of acting for a
reason: acting for a reason involves following rules and a
rule is not a rule unless it is universalizable. The logico-
mathematical form of knowledge may be defined in terms of its
characteristic criterion of truth, namely coherence, which is
a necessary condition of truth in general but a necessary and
sufficient condition only of logico-mathematical truth. The
question is whether there is an indispensable area of
rational action in the world as we know it which could not
take place without truth as coherence. It should not be
thought that in the absence of coherence rational discourse
would be altogether impossible. A rudimentary form of
reasoning could still occur, for the use of general terms
presupposes consistency alone, not coherence, which comprises
27consistency and comprehensiveness. ' And so forms of 
knowledge other than the logico-mathematical would be 
severely curtailed but not inconceivable. The logico-
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mathematical form would however be entirely incomprehensible, 
for the expressions of logic and mathematics are defined 
solely in terms of the rules governing their use in the 
formal systems to which they belong. And the notion of a 
system, a complex whole, evidently involves the ideas of 
consistency and comprehensiveness. In the absence of the 
logico-mathematical form of knowledge no one would be able 
to use a calculus and measurement would be impossible. And 
so it can be concluded that rational activity in the world 
as we know it presupposes the logico-mathematical form of 
knowledge.
Ll 5 3 The concept of other minds and the historico-sociological
form of knowledge. It has been argued that the concept of
other minds is presupposed by the idea of acting for a reason,
in that acting for a reason involves following rules and
rules are necessarily public. The historico-sociological
form of knowledge has been defined by Hirst and Peters in
28terms of knowledge of other minds. It is clear that a
significant area of rational activity would be impossible if 
there were no such thing as the historico-sociological form 
of knowledge. The concept of a rational being is an 
artificial one, abstracting from the many characteristics of 
human beings those they have by virtue of the fact that they 
follow rules. The purely formal notion of a rational being 
excludes everything that might differentiate one such being 
from another. And so it does not make sense to suppose
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that there could be only one rational being. Without the 
concept of other minds a rational being is an absurdity. 
Similarly, without the historico-sociological form of 
knowledge a human being would be unable to see himself as 
responding to his environment in a way that transcends his 
own idiosyncracies. It is only through the systematic 
understanding of why other people act as they do that one 
can comprehend one's own actions. And this would be 
impossible if we were wholly irrational beings, for in that 
case nobody would have anything in common with anybody else. 
It can accordingly be concluded that rational intercourse 
between human beings presupposes the historico-sociological 
form of knowledge.
LI 5 ¿4- The concept of an instrumental good and the ethical form of 
knowledge. The argument for the ethical form of knowledge 
raises considerable difficulties, mainly because there is 
deep disagreement amongst philosophers over the nature of 
ethics. Some deny that ethics is a form of knowledge at 
all, holding that utterances such as 'X is good' or 'You 
ought to do x' are not propositions but merely expressions 
of emotion. And among cognitivists there is controversy 
concerning the special features of moral knowledge: some 
insist that morality without consideration for human welfare 
and injury is incomprehensible, others that ethical matters 
are by definition those of overriding importance. Another 
view is that ethics is essentially a matter of practical 
reasoning, that is to say, reasoning about what ought to be
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done. This interpretation of ethics enables it to be seen 
as the elaboration or concretization of one of the 
constituents of the rational form of sensibility, namely 
the concept of an instrumental good. For without the 
concept of something that has to be done if a desired end is 
to be achieved it would be impossible to evaluate the merits 
and demerits of alternative courses of action. And so it 
seems at first sight reasonable to conclude that reasoning 
about what ought to be done, evidently an indispensable area 
of rational activity in the world as we know it, presupposes 
the ethical form of knowledge.
However, to see the ethical form of knowledge in such 
terms is unsatisfactory, because it fails to differentiate 
genuinely ethical questions from merely technical ones.
Building a bridge, for example, involves practical reasoning, 
about materials, siting, design and so on, but it is obvious 
that how to build a bridge is not a moral problem but an 
engineering one. But there is no reason to abandon the 
account of the ethical form of knowledge as the systematization 
of the concept of an instrumental good, for it can be 
supplemented by drawing on two other constituents of the 
rational form of sensibility, namely the principle of 
universalizability and the concept of an intrinsic good.
The relevance of universalizability arises out of the 
fact that many ethical problems take the form of a conflict 
between the self-interest of the agent and the interests of
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those people who will he affected by his actions. In so
far as this is true the ethical form of knowledge can be
understood as practical reasoning in the context of conflicts
between self-interest and the general interest. An action
cannot be morally justified if it serves the agent's own
interest but damages the interests of others. Since rules
are necessarily universalizable, enjoining the same actions
in the same circumstances, arbitrary exceptions to protect
the agent's own interests are excluded. And so there is a
conceptual connexion between universalizability and morally 
29right action. It might be objected that, since virtually
all rules are qualified in some way, it is consistent with
the universalizability requirement that a non-arbitrary or
systematic exception be added to a rule, suspending its
applicability whenever it conflicts with self-interest. A
full discussion of the problems of self-interest and morality,
of rules and exceptions, is unfortunately beyond the scope of 
30this thesis. But it is clear that there cannot be a non-
arbitrary exception in favour of self-interest. For, if it 
was to exempt the agent and no one else, it would have to be 
expressed in a proposition using indexical terms, such as 'I', 
•here', 'now', or 'this', as, for instance, in 'The person 
performing this action ....'. No general formula, such as 
•Rule r applies to everyone except those possessing attributes 
a ...a*', would exempt only the individual agent wishing to 
further his own interests. Either the formula must name the 
agent or refer to him by an indexical term, in which case it
345.
forfeits its claim to be non-arbitrary, or the whole class 
of agents possessing a...a* is exempted, in which case the 
exception is not self-interested. Thus, self-interest 
cannot override a rule without detracting from its 
universalizability and so the connexion between 
universalizability and morality is preserved. It follows 
that the principle of universalizability can supplement the 
concept of an instrumental good to show that the ethical form 
of knowledge is presupposed by practical reasoning in 
situations of conflict between self-interest and the general 
welfare.
The concept of an intrinsic good provides a means of 
differentiating moral from technical reasoning in the absence 
of such conflicts. The nearer is an instrumental good to an 
intrinsic good, the more clearly is reasoning about it moral 
rather than technical. The bridge-building example alluded 
to earlier will be further developed in order to try to 
vindicate this claim. A bridge can serve as a means to a 
wide variety of purposes, which may be commercial, 
humanitarian, social or military. The builder evidently 
needs to know what the bridge is going to be used for; his 
choice of materials, design and so on will vary according to 
the sort of traffic expected to use it. But the purpose 
for which a bridge is built is generally only an intermediate 
end; the builder chooses one instrumental good (a suspension 
bridge) in order to achieve a further instrumental good (a 
bridge capable of carrying heavy goods vehicles). A bridge 
capable of carrying heavy goods vehicles is not an intrinsic
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good: the ultimate end for which the bridge was built may­
be the happiness of the majority, human welfare or some 
equally general value, to which the increased trade 
engendered by the construction of the bridge is itself only 
a means. It seems that rational action in the world as we 
know it involves a series of instrumental goods whose 
attainment leads to the achievement of an intrinsic good. 
Instrumental reasoning belongs to the ethical form of 
knowledge only if it concerns an instrumental good which is 
the more or less direct means to an intrinsic good. Thus, 
the decision whether to build the bridge is a moral or 
political rather than a technical one; the question is 
whether an intrinsic good, such as maximising welfare or 
treating people as ends in themselves, is best served by 
building the bridge or by achieving some other instrumental 
good, such as constructing a hospital, a warship or a prison 
or reducing taxes through not building anything. It is 
therefore arguable that the ethical form of knowledge is pre­
supposed by practical reasoning about intermediate ends which 
are closely related to ultimate ends or intrinsic goods.
The argument for the ethical form of knowledge is, then, 
that it is to rational action in the world as we know it what 
the concept of an instrumental good is to the formal notion 
of acting for a reason. But the nature of the world as we 
know it leads to the development of two sorts of 
instrumental reasoning, ethical and technical. What makes
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instrumental reasoning ethical is its use of the principle 
of universalizability in cases of moral conflict and its 
proximity to the attainment of intrinsic goods.
U. 5 . 5  The concept of an intrinsic good and the aesthetic form of 
knowledge. It was argued in the previous section that the 
concept of an intrinsic good is presupposed by the idea of 
acting for a reason. It will now be contended that the 
aesthetic form of knowledge is characteristically concerned 
with intrinsic goods and that it is presupposed by an 
important aspect of rational activity in the world as we 
know it.
The aesthetic form can be defined in terms of its central 
concept, that of beauty. The first step in the transcendental 
deduction of the aesthetic form is therefore to establish a 
connexion between beauty and intrinsic goodness. That the 
two qualities are related can scarcely be disputed; what is 
controversial is whether the affinity is sufficiently close 
to justify the claim that the aesthetic form is the 
concretization of the concept of an intrinsic good. The 
claim would clearly be justified if it could be shown that 
beauty is the only thing desired for its own sake, but the 
nearest any philosopher has come to propounding this is 
Moore's argument that beauty is one of only two intrinsic 
goods: 'No one... has ever doubted that personal affection 
and the appreciation of what is beautiful in Art or Nature,
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are good in themselves ; nor ... does it appear probable that any
3ione will think anything else has nearly so great a value.'^
Indirect evidence for classifying beauty as an intrinsic
good is that it is commonly thought of as being not merely
different from but inimical to instrumental goods. Thus,
^lliott points out that 'aestheticism is valuing the
aesthetic above the practical' and goes on to suggest that
'we make the attribution more confidently when we can make it
32more definitely pejorative.'^ Moreover, when beauty is 
used as an instrumental good, as when, for example, the 
director of a television commercial uses a beautiful sunset 
to help to sell cigars or lager, a natural reaction is that 
it has thereby been misused.
However, it must be admitted that the enjoyment of 
beautiful objects and the pleasures of friendship are by no 
means the only intrinsic goods. Few philosophers would 
object to the inclusion of wisdom, knowledge, truth, love, 
love of God, pleasure, happiness, virtue and 'the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number' as at least plausible 
candidates for such status. And indeed it has already been 
agreed that there is in principle no limit to the range of 
things which can be desired for their own sake.^ If 
beauty is only one among indefinitely many intrinsic goods, 
the connexion between the concept of an intrinsic good and 
the aesthetic form is seriously weakened. But a 'special 
relationship' might be preserved by modifying both terms.
Thus, beauty might be shown to enter into a complete
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specification of at least some of/other intrinsic goods: 
the happiness of the majority might be analysed in terms 
of the availability of opportunities for the enjoyment 
of beautiful objects; the fact that theories are sometimes 
appraised in terms of elegance and simplicity might 
indicate that there is an aesthetic aspect to the desire 
for knowledge as an end in itself. And the aesthetic 
form might be defined a little less narrowly, as being 
concerned with what is desired for its own sake; beauty 
would be the paradigm case of the form's characteristic 
concept rather than that concept itself. In this way a 
sufficiently close connexion between the aesthetic form of 
knowledge and intrinsic goodness could probably be 
established and the first step in the argument for the 
form accomplished.
The second and final step in the argument is to show 
that the aesthetic form is presupposed by an aspect of 
acting for a reason in the world as we know it.
Evidently, the more widely the form is interpreted, the 
easier it will be to establish its indispensability. If 
it were to be defined in terms of intrinsic goodness, with 
beauty having no special status among many examples of 
intrinsically good things, then no one could ever have a 
reason for doing anything. But that argument merely 
reiterates what was put forward in section 11.4.1, where 
it was maintained that the notion of an intrinsic good is 
presupposed by the schematic idea of acting for a reason.^
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A more restrictive definition of the aesthetic form must 
therefore be assumed, with beauty as the paradigm case 
of something desired for its own sake. The question is 
whether, if there were no such thing as beauty, rational 
action in the world as we know it would be significantly 
curtailed. Artistic creation would be impossible in 
such circumstances and that in itself would be a serious 
loss. But virtually all actions have an aesthetic 
dimension and few would survive the demise of beauty 
unchanged. In the absence of beauty, acts aimed at 
satisfying wants (in the economic sense of basic needs 
for food, clothing and shelter) would still be performed, 
but they would be carried out very differently from the 
way in which they are executed today. For it is plain 
that such actions are not purely functional; much more 
goes into them than mere biological survival would warrant. 
Once subsistence is assured, biology is supplemented by 
aesthetics. In the case of clothing, sartorial 
considerations, ultimately aesthetic in nature, become as 
important as those of warmth, modesty and protection.
There are, therefore, grounds for believing that a 
transcendental deduction of the aesthetic form of knowledge 
could succeed. It would show that an important aspect 
of rational action in the world as we know it presupposes 
the aesthetic form even when it is quite narrowly defined, 
with beauty being accorded a privileged position among 
intrinsic goods.
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1 1 .5-6 The religious form of knowledge. The problem confronting 
an attempt transcendentally to deduce the religious form 
of knowledge at this stage is plainly that there is no 
constituent of the rational form of sensibility available 
on which such a deduction could be based. There seem to 
be three possible reactions to this situation.
The first response is simply to draw what some 
philosophers would regard as the obvious conclusion and to 
discard the religious form. The argument would be that 
the religious form cannot be shown to be presupposed by an 
indispensable area or aspect of rational activity in the 
world as we know it. True, if the religious form of 
knowledge did not exist, rational beings would be unable 
to engage in practices such as worship and confession; 
what is for many people a major part of their lives would 
never have come into being. But religious belief is by no 
means a universal phenomenon. Indeed, the secularization 
thesis in the sociology of religion - the view that 
religion has declined in modern industrial societies - has 
been criticised on the grounds that genuine religious 
conviction has always been only a minority concern.^ On 
the other hand, it is clear that religious questions, such 
as whether God exists, whether He necessarily exists, 
whether the existence of evil is compatible with that of an 
omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent God, whether there is 
an afterlife and so on, can be rationally discussed. And 
it has been argued that the religious form of knowledge can
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be identified in terms of its own characteristic criteria 
of truth and categoreal concepts.^ So the religious 
form cannot easily be abandoned.
The second reaction might therefore seem attractive: 
perhaps the religious form can be shown to have a better 
claim to be considered the concretization of a constituent 
of the rational form of sensibility than one of the forms 
already, apparently, deduced. Given that there can be 
non-religious ethical systems, the only plausible strategy 
would be to use the religious form to supplant the 
aesthetic form as the systematic elaboration of the concept 
of an intrinsic good. After all, the love of God appeared 
in the list of widely recognised intrinsic goods. However, 
the fact that religious belief is not a universal phenomenon 
undermines this strategy, particularly when the pervasive 
influence of aesthetic considerations, narrowly defined, is 
recalled.
The third reaction seeks to chart a middle course 
between the equally implausible extremes of discarding the 
religious form altogether or relinquishing another form to 
make room for it. The argument would be that the account 
of the rational form of sensibility put forward in the 
previous section is incomplete: a sixth postulate of acting 
for a reason was overlooked and it is in this sixth 
principle that the religious form can be grounded. It 
might accordingly be suggested that a rational being
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necessarily seeks an ultimate reason for the existence of 
the universe, some purpose beyond merely human plans. In 
other words, the rational form of sensibility includes the 
principle of sufficient reason. A plausible case could 
perhaps then be made for seeing the religious form as the 
concrete counterpart of that principle. Some such 
argument seems to be the most reasonable course for 
philosophers who are not prepared to accept the first 
reaction. It might appear to be a somewhat desperate ad 
hoc manoeuvre, 'reading into' the idea of acting for a 
reason more than an impartial investigation was able to 
discern. But Taylor has argued that the principle of
37sufficient reason is 'a presupposition of reason itself.'-'' 
And so there is at least the prospect of augmenting the 
rational form of sensibility in such a way that a 
transcendental deduction of the religious form of knowledge 
could be attempted.
It can only be concluded that further philosophical 
investigation will be required to clarify the position of 
the religious form of knowledge. Some philosophers would 
be happy to discard it, while those wishing to retain it 
have the inkling of a line of thought which promises to 
repay further development.
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The philosophical form of knowledge. It would be para­
doxical for a philosophical thesis to be unable to 
establish the need for the philosophical form of knowledge. 
Yet there is no constituent of the rational form of 
sensibility with which it can be conceptually connected.
And so it might be thought that the philosophical form 
is not a genuine form of knowledge at all. But this would 
not be a valid inference to draw. For the fact that the 
philosophical form of knowledge cannot be regarded as the 
concretization of a presupposition of the bare notion of 
acting for a reason is entirely in accordance with the 
standard contemporary conception of philosophy. According 
to that view, philosophy is a second-order discipline which 
seeks to analyse the concepts and criteria used in trying 
to understand the world through the other forms of knowledge. 
Clearly, there can be no material for philosophical 
analysis until the other forms or disciplines of knowledge 
have developed. Only when the concepts and principles of 
the rational form of sensibility have been fully articulated 
in the forms of knowledge, as presuppositions of acting for 
a reason in the world as we know it, can they become 
subjects for philosophical reflection. Thus, the basis 
of a possible transcendental deduction of the philosophical 
form is not a constituent of the rational form of 
sensibility but their collective manifestation in the 
world as we know it as forms of knowledge.
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A transcendental deduction of the philosophical form
of knowledge would seek to establish that there is an
indispensable area or aspect of rational thought or action
which would be impossible without it. The special
feature of the deduction of the philosophical form is that
the form is not seen as the concretization of a constituent
of the rational form of sensibility. Instead it would be
grounded in the first-order forms of knowledge. What, then,
would a rational being be unable to do if there were no such
thing as the philosophical form of knowledge ? The answer
is that he would be unable to see himself as a rational
being; he would be unable to reflect upon the forms of
knowledge, the concepts and criteria he used in accumulating
a body of objective knowledge. It is an important part of
the concept of a rational being that he should be able to
understand the ways of thinking and acting in which his
rationality consists. Certainly, if we identify the idea of
a human being with that of a rational being existing in the
world as we know it, the resulting claim that it is part of
the concept of a human being that he should be able to
understand his own nature and his place in the world would
xqcommand wide assent among philosophers.
It has been suggested that a transcendental deduction 
of something resembling forms of knowledge is a feasible 
enterprise. The formal question 'What is presupposed by the 
idea of acting for a reason ?' gives way to the concrete 
question 'What is presupposed by the idea of acting for a 
reason in the world as we know it ?
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A considerable degree of correspondence has been found
between the constituents of the rational form of
sensibility and a widely recognised set of forms of knowledge.
It seems not unreasonable to conclude that the correspondence
is sufficiently close to justify the claim that forms of
knowledge are the manifestation in the world as we know it
40of the rational form of sensibility.
11.6 Summary.
In this chapter a transcendental deduction of a widely 
recognised set of forms of knowledge has been attempted.
It was first established that such a deduction could not be 
based upon the reactions of primitive consciousness, for 
they are either socially conditioned or subjective. It 
was then argued that an objective foundation for a deduction 
of the forms could be provided by analysing the idea of 
acting for a reason. This abstract notion was found to 
presuppose five concepts or principles, which constitute 
the rational form of sensibility. A transcendental 
deduction of a set of forms of knowledge was then attempted: 
it was contended that a concrete version of the concept of 
rational action, namely that of acting for a reason in the 
world as we know it, presupposes a set of forms of knowledge.
SUMMARY OF PART THREE
The argument of Part Three was a response to the 
subjectivist critique of educational knowledge. The 
curriculum, and the educational assessments based upon it, 
are instruments of indoctrination, according to the 
subjectivist, because they lack objective foundations.
In chapter nine educational judgements were examined 
in the light of the subjectivist claim that the standards 
on which they are based are arbitrary, reflecting the 
interests of powerful social groups rather than expressing 
objective facts about pupils. The performativist and 
relativist versions of this claim were repudiated, but the 
moderate institutionalist position was accepted. If facts 
about pupils are institutional, the question is whether 
they can somehow be traced back to the human form of 
sensibility. For in that case they would have an objective 
foundation in the presuppositions of rational intercourse 
with reality.
If the standards used in making educational judgements 
arise out of the curriculum, then they cannot have been 
imposed on the education system by outside agencies. But 
this assumes that the curriculum can be shown to have an 
objective basis. This is however just what the subjectivist 
denies and in chapter ten his claim that the curriculum is 
no more than an ideology was examined. It was found that 
the objectivity of the curriculum can be guaranteed by
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deriving it from the forms of knowledge and then showing 
that they are objective. An attempt to do this by 
transcendentally deducing the forms from the reactions 
of primitive consciousness was found to fail.
This failure was diagnosed in chapter eleven and an 
alternative argument for the objectivity of the forms was 
propounded. The first transcendental deduction failed 
because it tried to ground the forms in merely subjective 
elements of the human form of sensibility. They must 
instead be based upon objective characteristics of the human 
condition; the term 'the rational form of sensibility' was 
introduced to signify this strategy. The rational form 
of sensibility consists of the presupposition of acting 
for a reason. It was argued that the forms of knowledge 
consist of the presuppositions of acting for a reason in a 
world such as our own. Without the forms of knowledge, 
rational action in a world such as our own would be 
impossible. An attempt has therefore been made to show 
how the forms of knowledge might be transcendentally 
deduced from the concept of rational action and its pre­
suppositions.
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CONCLUSION
The principal conclusion of the thesis is that there are 
no grounds for accepting the subjectivist critique of 
educational knowledge. This conclusion has been arrived at 
after an examination of issues in epistemology, the 
methodology of the social sciences and the philosophy of 
education.
The subjectivist epistemological claim that there can be no 
objective knowledge was discussed and eventually rejected in 
Part One. The subjectivist claim involved attacks on 
several traditional philosophical positions, such as the view 
that knowledge is justified true belief, the correspondence 
theory of truth and metaphysical realism. A salient feature 
of the argument advanced in Part One is that its repudiation 
of the subjectivist claim does not entail an unqualified 
acceptance of these traditional theories. Thus, it was 
agreed in chapter one that reliable, as well as justified, 
true belief amounts to knowledge. But it was insisted that 
only justified true belief can constitute objective knowledge, 
by which was meant a body of propositions which have survived 
the most stringent critical tests available. An equally 
eclectic course was followed during the subsequent analysis 
of each of the elements of the familiar thesis that knowledge 
consists in a belief that is justified and true. After 
establishing that belief is not necessarily ideological, it 
was maintained, in reply to the subjectivist claim that beliefs
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cannot be justified because the criteria used in trying to 
do so are no more than social conventions, that some 
criteria of rationality can themselves be rationally 
justified and are universally applicable. The subjectivist 
was therefore found to be right in thinking that some 
criteria of rationality are, as it is frequently put, context- 
dependent, but wrong in thinking that they all are. The 
subjectivist rejection of the idea of truth as correspondence 
to reality was similarly shown to be unacceptable only in 
being complete. For it was found that the only way to do 
justice to the variety of truth-criteria used in different 
forms of knowledge was to propound a syncretistic theory 
which accommodates both correspondence and coherence. Finally, 
it was contended that the subjectivist attempt to preclude 
any role for correspondence at all, by advocating a version of 
metaphysical idealism, fails because it misinterprets the 
nature of philosophical questions. The idealist claim that 
the world is mind-dependent is indeed true, but at the 
philosophical rather than the empirical level. Since the 
idea of truth as correspondence presupposes that the world is 
mind-independent only at the empirical level, metaphysical 
idealism, properly understood, can be incorporated into an 
objectivist theory of knowledge. And so the conclusion was 
reached that there can be objective knowledge.
In Part Two the subjectivist claim that objectivism 
threatens the existence of the sociology of knowledge was 
critically examined and ultimately rejected. Three
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particular worries were discussed and, as in Part One, 
specific subjectivist arguments were not so much rejected 
out of hand but rather shown not to have the damaging 
implications they were thought to have. Thus, the claim 
that objectivism is incompatible with the sociology of 
knowledge because knowledge is socially constructed rather 
than objective was found to be based on the important 
insight that knowledge has social antecedents and effects.
But the claim is untenable as it stands, for knowledge is 
both socially constructed and objective, so that the 
objectivism of Part One and the sociology of knowledge are 
perfectly compatible. The methodological implications of 
the rejection, in Part One, of the subjectivist view that 
all beliefs are necessarily ideological, were next 
considered. It was maintained that the objectivist 
position does not entail that some beliefs are beyond the 
scope of sociological investigation. Rather is it the 
case that three classes of beliefs must be distinguished 
and each one investigated in the particular manner 
appropriate to it. Finally, in reply to the subjectivist 
claim that agents' explanations of their own actions and 
beliefs must be uncritically accepted by sociologists, it was 
argued that objectivism, far from entailing the equally 
unjustified view that sociologists must impose their concepts 
and criteria on the agents whose actions they seek to under­
stand, suggests a middle course, according to which 
sociologists are able to question, and on occasion to over­
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rule, agents' explanations. And so it can be concluded 
that there is no reason for believing that objectivism 
undermines the sociology of knowledge.
It was therefore reasonable to claim that Parts One 
and Two had set out a version of objectivism which is 
epistemologically and methodologically sound. On that 
basis, an examination of the subjectivist critique of 
specifically educational knowledge was undertaken in Part 
Three.
According to the subjectivist, the school curriculum, 
and the educational judgements based upon it, cannot help 
but be instruments of indoctrination. The foundation of 
this claim is the view that teachers' and examiners' 
knowledge about pupils is socially constructed. Once again 
the subjectivist position was found to be based on a valuable 
insight whose significance had been misinterpreted. And so 
it was agreed that claims to educational knowledge of this 
kind express institutional, rather than brute, facts.
However, it was contended that the institutional nature of 
educational judgements need not be indoctrinatory, as long 
as such judgements are based on a curriculum which has 
objective foundations. One way of securing the objectivity 
of the curidculum is to ground it in something resembling a 
set of forms of knowledge. But the problem then arose of 
ensuring the objectivity of the forms. An attempt to solve
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this problem by means of a transcendental deduction of the 
forms from the reactions of primitive consciousness was 
therefore examined, only to be found wanting. For such 
reactions are either socially constructed or subjective.
It was suggested that an objective basis for a set of forms 
could be found by analysing the notion of acting for a 
reason, which resulted in the specification of the rational 
form of sensibility. It was then argued that, just as the 
rational form of sensibility comprises the presuppositions 
of acting for a reason, so a widely recognised set of forms 
of knowledge constitute the presuppositions of acting for a 
reason in the world as we know it. Such an argument is, 
of course, a highly speculative one; all that is claimed is 
that enough has been done to demonstrate the feasibility of 
a transcendental deduction of something resembling the 
forms of knowledge.
A critical examination of the subjectivist critique of 
educational knowledge has therefore failed to find any 
reasons for accepting it. That critique claimed that there 
can be no objective educational knowledge: the school 
curriculum and the educational judgements derived from it 
are inescapably indoctrinatory. But it has been found that 
there are good epistemological reasons for believing that 
there can be objective knowledge; that there are no 
methodological reasons for revising that conclusion; and 
that an objective curriculum based on the rational form of 
sensibility is feasible. Consequently, it can be concluded
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that, although subjectivism has contributed, some valuable 
insights, they are misinterpreted if they are taken to 
undermine the possibility of objective knowledge in 
education.
The threefold examination of the subjectivist critique
of educational knowledge proposed in the Introduction has
therefore been completed. Now that the objectivist
position developed during the course of that examination
can be seen in its entirety, it is possible to justify the
claim made in the Introduction that objectivism must be
pdistinguished from absolutism. It can now be seen that 
subjectivists who argue that those who defend the objectivity 
of knowledge 'treat western academic standards as absolutes' 
are guilty of a double misinterpretation of objectivism. 
Firstly, it has been made clear that objectivists are not 
typically dogmatic in their attitude to knowledge. Indeed, 
the truth is precisely the opposite, for, as was argued in 
Part One, objectivism involves a critical approach to 
propositions: to be justified in believing a proposition is 
to have found that it survives the best available critical 
tests.^ Secondly, while it is true that objectivism, as 
advocated in this thesis, entails that something resembling 
forms of knowledge are 'absolute', in that they are pre­
supposed by rational intercourse with the world as we know 
it, this endorsement does not extend to any particular set 
of forms. A fortiori it does not extend to the school 
curriculum as we now have it nor to all Western academic
standards.
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This defence of objectivism can be turned into an 
attack on subjectivism; it is arguable that it is the 
latter doctrine which leads to absolutism. For, if 'man 
is the measure of all things' is taken to mean that each 
individual is the guarantor of his own rationality, then 
every claim to know will be an absolute, forever beyond 
the reach of criticism. What subjectivism lacks is a means 
of imposing a separation of epistemological powers: the 
claimant to knowledge is also the sole adjudicator of his 
own claim. By contrast, it has been a recurring theme of 
this thesis that claims to know must be judged against 
criteria, all of which apply to others than the claimant and 
some of which apply to rational beings as such. Without 
this independent check, those beliefs would be likely to 
prevail which were held by the powerful; beliefs would be 
chosen according to their utility in serving the interests 
of the dominant social group rather than their ability to 
withstand critical tests. And so subjectivism would bring 
about what it professes to deplore: a society in which the 
strong control the beliefs of the weak.
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of that argument is to deduce the principles of 
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arrangements. Accordingly, they are placed behind a 
veil of ignorance: 'They do not know how the various 
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view of the laws of moral psychology, men would 
not acquire a desire to act upon it even when 
the institutions of their society satisfied it 
(p 138).' Now this is an important point, 
because kawls is, by implication, claiming that 
it is necessary for rational beings to have access 
to objective knowledge, if they are to construct a 
just society, which is surely a paradigm of 
rational action in the world as we know it.
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